The issue presented for review in this case is whether a six-year delay in the preparation of a trial transcript for appellate review violates a criminal defendant's constitutional or statutory right to an appeal.
Steve Lawrence Berryman ("defendant") was indicted on 18 November 1997 for: (1) robbery with a dangerous weapon in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-87; (2) possession of crack cocaine in violation of N.C.G.S. § 90-95(a)(3); and (3) being an habitual felon under N.C.G.S. § 14-7.1. The underlying facts of these charges are described in the Court of Appeals' opinion below, State v. Berryman, 170 N.C.App. 336, ___, 612 S.E.2d 672, 674-75 (2005), and are not a basis for this review.
Defendant was tried by a jury on 18 February 1998. Following presentation of evidence by the State and the defense, the jury found defendant guilty of: (1) common law robbery; (2) possession of cocaine; and (3) being an habitual felon. After determining defendant's prior record level was IV, the trial court entered judgment and sentenced defendant to a prison term of 133 months to 169 months. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court. Defendant was designated indigent, and his trial counsel was appointed as appellate counsel in the Appellate Entries signed by the trial judge.
On 20 February 1998, the clerk's transcript order, certificate, and the Appellate Entries were personally delivered by a deputy clerk of Wake County Superior Court to Johnie L. King, III ("King"), the court reporter. The order instructed King to "[p]repare and deliver to the parties a transcript of all portions of the proceedings in the above-captioned case." The order did not specify anything to be excluded. King completed the prepared transcript on 30 January 2004 and mailed it to the trial court on 2 February 2004, almost six years after defendant's conviction. The transcript was filed with the North Carolina Court of Appeals on 23 April 2004.
Defendant argued in his appeal to the Court of Appeals: "'The State's failure to provide a transcript of the proceedings in a timely fashion has deprived [him] of his constitutional and statutory rights to meaningful and effective appellate review.'" Berryman, 170 N.C.App. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 676. The record includes copies of a letter, a written request, and a signed affidavit drafted by defense counsel regarding the status of defendant's trial transcript. The letter, dated 3 April 2000, and the written request, dated 31 May 2000, are both addressed to King. Defense counsel's affidavit details fifteen separate inquiries concerning defendant's trial transcript:
a. 1/13/99 - Phone msg. to J. King re: transcript - completed?
b. 5-17-99 - Confer w/ct. reporter; phone msg. to ct. reporter.
c. 9-30-99 - Phone call to court reporter.
*353d. 10-7-99 - Confer w/court reporter re: transcript.
e. 1-14-00 - Confer w/court reporter re: transcript.
f. 4-10-00 - Draft letter to court reporter.
g. 4-18-00 - Hand-delivered letter to court reporter; confer w/ct. reporter.
h. 5-31-00 - Court Reporter Request.
i. 6-1-00 - Deliver Court Reporter Request.
j. 12-18-00 - Review dates/check status of transcript.
k. 11-18-03 - Obtained telephone number for J. King from courthouse personnel; telephone msg. to J. King.
l. 11-19-03 - Telephone call w/J. King re: transcript.
m. 11-21-03 - Telephone call from J. King; mailed him copy of appeal entry.
n. 1-22-04 - Telephone call to J. King re: transcript.
o. 2-10-04 - Received transcript.
There is no indication in the record and defendant does not assert that the State either purposefully delayed production of the transcript or assisted with its procurement beyond the clerk's 20 February 1998 transcript order. In addition, defense counsel's inquiries concerning defendant's trial transcript as described above were all directed to King, not to the State, the trial court, the clerk of superior court, or the clerk of the Court of Appeals. There is no explanation in the record for the delay.
After reviewing defendant's arguments, the Court of Appeals' majority opinion held the nearly six-year delay did not deprive defendant of his due process rights. Berryman, 170 N.C.App. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 678. Judge Timmons-Goodson dissented, concluding "the length of the delay and the disregard of defendant's assertions of his right to a speedy appeal produced a due process violation in the instant case." Id. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 678. Defendant appealed to this Court as of statutory right based on the dissenting opinion. See N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2005). After careful review and for the reasons set forth below, we hold the approximate six-year delay did not violate defendant's constitutional rights or any statutory right and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
We note at the outset defendant asserts violations of both his federal and state constitutional rights. This Court has recognized:
State courts are no less obligated to protect and no less capable of protecting a defendant's federal constitutional rights than are federal courts. In performing this obligation a state court should exercise and apply its own independent judgment, treating, of course, decisions of the United States Supreme Court as binding and according to decisions of lower federal courts such persuasiveness as these decisions might reasonably command.
State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 74, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2292, 90 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986), habeas proceeding at McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988). Thus, we shall consider defendant's contentions in both the federal and state context.
At common law, criminal defendants were not afforded appellate review of final judgments entered based upon convictions. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687, 14 S.Ct. 913, 38 L.Ed. 867, 868 (1894); State v. Bailey, 65 N.C. 426, 427 (1871) ("At common law, there was no appeal from the decision of any of the Courts, high or low. . . ."). The United States Constitution does not require either the federal government or the states to provide a right to an appeal from criminal convictions. Halbert v. Michigan, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552, 559-60 (2005) (citing McKane, 153 U.S. at 687, 14 S.Ct. at 915, 38 L.Ed. at 868); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821, 827 (1985) (citing McKane, 153 U.S. at 687, 14 S.Ct. at 915, 38 L.Ed. at 868); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987, 993 (1983); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341, 351 (1974) (citing McKane, 153 U.S. at 687, 14 S.Ct. at 915, 38 L.Ed. at 868); Ortwein v. Schwab, *354410 U.S. 656, 660, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 35 L.Ed.2d 572, 576 (1973) (citations omitted); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, 898 (1956) (citing McKane, 153 U.S. at 687, 14 S.Ct. at 915, 38 L.Ed. at 868); McKane, 153 U.S. at 687-88, 38 L.Ed. at 868. Rather, "[i]t is wholly within the discretion of the State to allow or not to allow such a review." McKane, 153 U.S. at 687, 14 S.Ct. at 915, 38 L.Ed. at 868; see also Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 299, 16 S.Ct. 304, 40 L.Ed. 432, 434 (1895) ("[T]he right of review in an appellate court is purely a matter of state concern. . . .").
Should a state provide an appeal of right, "the procedures used in deciding appeals must comport with the demands of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution." Evitts, 469 U.S. at 393, 105 S.Ct. at 834, 83 L.Ed.2d at 827-28; Ross, 417 U.S. at 609, 94 S.Ct. at 2443, 41 L.Ed.2d at 350 ("`Due Process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the State. . . ."); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724-25, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 669 (1969) (While no per se constitutional right to appeal exists, once a state establishes an appellate forum it must assure access to it upon terms and conditions equally applicable and available to all.) (citations omitted); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310-11, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 581 (1966) ("This Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts.") (citations omitted); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, 813-14 (1963) (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19, 76 S.Ct. at 591, 100 L.Ed. at 899); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17, 76 S.Ct. at 590, 100 L.Ed. at 898 ("Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system - all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, `stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.'" (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716, 724 (1940))).
The North Carolina Constitution does not mandate that this state provide appellate review of criminal convictions. See N.C. Const. arts. I & IV; see also Gunter v. Town of Sanford, 186 N.C. 452, 457-58, 120 S.E. 41, 44 (1923) ("[P]laintiffs present the question whether the right of appeal is essential to due process of law. The question has frequently been considered by the courts and answered in the negative."); State v. Pulliam, 184 N.C. 681, 683, 114 S.E. 394, 395 (1922) (The only appeal provided by the North Carolina Constitution is Article I, Section 13: "No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men in open court. The Legislature may, however, provide other means of trial for petty misdemeanors with the right of appeal."); State v. Webb, 155 N.C. 426, 431, 70 S.E. 1064, 1066 (1911) (overruling argument that appeals are constitutionally provided for "under and by virtue of the first clause of [Article IV, Section 8 of the North Carolina Constitution], `The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to hear, upon appeal, any decision of the court below.'").
Similar to federal procedure, a North Carolina criminal defendant's right to appeal a conviction is provided entirely by statute. In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 592, 131 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1963) ("There is no inherent or inalienable right of appeal from an inferior court to a superior court or from a superior court to the Supreme Court."); State v. Blades, 209 N.C. 56, 56, 182 S.E. 714, 714 (1935) ("The right of appeal to this Court is wholly regulated by statute. . . ."); State v. China, 150 N.C.App. 469, 473, 564 S.E.2d 64, 68 (2002) ("The right to appeal in a criminal proceeding is purely statutory.") (citations omitted), appeal dismissed, 356 N.C. 683, 577 S.E.2d 899 (2003); State v. Hammonds, 141 N.C.App. 152, 164, 541 S.E.2d 166, 175 (2000) (acknowledging the court's research did not disclose either North Carolina or United States Supreme Court precedent recognizing a constitutional right to a speedy appeal), aff'd per curiam, 354 N.C. 353, 554 S.E.2d 645 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907, 122 S.Ct. 2363, 153 L.Ed.2d 184 (2002); State v. Shoff, 118 N.C.App. 724, 725, 456 S.E.2d 875, *355876 (1995) ("The right to appeal in a criminal proceeding is purely statutory." (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651, 658 (1977))), aff'd per curiam, 342 N.C. 638, 466 S.E.2d 277 (1996); see N.C. R.App. P. 4(a) ("Any party entitled by law to appeal from a judgment or order of a superior or district court rendered in a criminal action may take appeal. . . .").
The authority for appellate review in criminal proceedings is found in the North Carolina General Statutes and Rules of Appellate Procedure. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444(d) (2005) ("Procedures for appeal to the appellate division are as provided in this Article, the rules of the appellate division, and Chapter 7A of the General Statutes. The appeal must be perfected and conducted in accordance with the requirements of those provisions."). Specifically, section 15A-1444 of the Criminal Procedure Act specifies "When defendant may appeal," and section 7A-27 of the Judicial Department Chapter outlines "Appeals of right from the courts of the trial divisions." N.C.G.S. § 15A-1444; N.C.G.S. § 7A-27 (2005). The Rules of Appellate Procedure "govern . . . in all appeals from the courts of the trial division to the courts of the appellate division. . . ." N.C. R.App. P. 1(a); Pruitt v. Wood, 199 N.C. 788, 789, 156 S.E. 126, 127 (1930) ("[T]he rules of this Court, governing appeals, are mandatory and not directory." (citing Calvert v. Carstarphen, 133 N.C. 25, 27, 45 S.E. 353, 354 (1903))). A criminal defendant may appeal from entry of final judgment or order by a superior or district court in accordance with the provisions of these two statutes and the rules of appellate procedure. See Shoff, 118 N.C.App. at 725, 456 S.E.2d at 876-77; see also N.C. R.App. P. 4.
Specific to the issue at bar, Rule 7 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure governs preparation of the trial transcript and the court reporter's duties. It states in pertinent part:
(a) Ordering the transcript.
. . . .
(2) Criminal cases. . . .
Where there is an order establishing the indigency of the defendant, unless the trial judge's appeal entries specify or the parties stipulate that parts of the proceedings need not be transcribed, the clerk of the trial tribunal shall order a transcript of the proceedings by serving the following documents upon either the court reporter(s) or neutral person designated to prepare the transcript: a copy of the appeal entries signed by the judge; a copy of the trial court's order establishing indigency for the appeal; and a statement setting out the number of copies of the transcript required and the name, address and telephone number of appellant's counsel. The clerk shall make an entry of record reflecting the date these documents were served upon the court reporter(s) or transcriptionist.
(b) Production and delivery of transcript.
. . . .
In criminal cases where there is an order establishing the indigency of the defendant for the appeal: from the date the clerk of the trial court serves the order upon the person designated to prepare the transcript, that person shall have 60 days to procure and deliver the transcript in non-capital cases and 120 days to produce and deliver the transcript in capitally tried cases.
. . . .
Except in capitally tried criminal cases which result in the imposition of a sentence of death, (t)he trial tribunal, in its discretion, and for good cause shown by the appellant may extend the time to produce the transcript for an additional 30 days. Any subsequent motions for additional time required to produce the transcript may only be made to the appellate court to which appeal has been taken. All motions for extension of time to produce the transcript in capitally tried cases resulting in the imposition of a sentence of death, shall be made directly to the Supreme Court by the appellant. Where the clerk's order of transcript is accompanied by the trial court's order establishing the indigency of the appellant and directing the transcript to be prepared at State expense, the time for production of the transcript commences seven days after the filing of the clerk's order of transcript.
*356(2) The court reporter, or person designated to prepare the transcript, shall deliver the completed transcript to the parties, as ordered, within the time provided by this rule, unless an extension of time has been granted under Rule 7(b)(1) or Rule 27(c). The court reporter or transcriptionist shall certify to the clerk of the trial tribunal that the parties' copies have been so delivered, and shall send a copy of such certification to the appellate court to which the appeal is taken. The appealing party shall retain custody of the original transcript and shall transmit the original transcript to the appellate court upon settlement of the record on appeal.
N.C. R.App. P. 7.
Under North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure 7, 9, and 11, the burden is placed upon the appellant to commence settlement of the record on appeal, including providing a verbatim transcript if available. See State v. Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 341, 298 S.E.2d 631, 644-45 (1983) ("It is the appellant's duty and responsibility to see that the record is in proper form and complete." (citing N.C. R.App. P. 9 and State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969), death sentence vacated, 403 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 2283, 29 L.Ed.2d 859 (1971))); State v. Milby, 302 N.C. 137, 141, 273 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1981) ("It is the duty of an appellant to see that the record on appeal is properly made up and transmitted to the appellate court." (citing Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241)); Hicks v. Alford, 156 N.C.App. 384, 389-90, 576 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2003) ("It is the duty of the appellant to ensure that the record is complete." (citing Alston, 307 N.C. at 341, 298 S.E.2d at 644)); McLeod v. Faust, 92 N.C.App. 370, 371, 374 S.E.2d 417, 418 (1988) ("Plaintiff, as appellant, bears the burden of seeing that the record on appeal is properly settled and filed with this Court." (citing State v. Gilliam, 33 N.C.App. 490, 235 S.E.2d 421 (1977))). Once the record on appeal and verbatim transcript are settled, Rule 9(c)(3)b. states the "appellant shall cause the settled, verbatim transcript to be filed, contemporaneously with the record on appeal, with the clerk of the appellate court in which the appeal is docketed." N.C. R.App. P. 9(c)(3)b. The record on appeal and verbatim transcript must be filed by the appellant within fifteen days after the record's settlement. N.C. R.App. P. 12(a); Chamberlain v. Thames, 130 N.C.App. 324, 327, 502 S.E.2d 631, 633 ("Defendant's failure to supervise the process of his appeal has deprived him of his right to appellate review. . . ."), abrogated by, 131 N.C.App. 705, 509 S.E.2d 443 (1998). In the case sub judice, defendant, as the appellant, bore the burden of proceeding and of ensuring that the record on appeal and verbatim transcript were complete, properly settled, in correct form, and filed with the appropriate appellate court by the applicable deadlines.
On 19 February 1998, the trial court designated defendant as indigent in the Appellate Entries following his conviction. On 20 February 1998, the deputy clerk ordered a transcript of the trial proceedings by personally serving King a copy of the Appellate Entries signed by the trial judge, which included the order designating defendant as indigent and appointing appellate counsel and indicating counsel's address. King completed defendant's trial transcript on 30 January 2004 and mailed it to the trial court on 2 February 2004. The Court of Appeals received the transcript on 23 April 2004, heard defendant's appeal on 12 January 2005, and filed its opinion on 17 May 2005. There is no evidence or indication in the record that either King or defendant requested an extension of time beyond the prescribed sixty days to complete the transcription pursuant to Rules 7 and 27 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. There is no indication the State, the trial court, the clerk of superior court, or the clerk of the Court of Appeals inquired of King as to the status of the trial transcript. It would be out of the ordinary for the State, the trial court, the clerk of superior court, or the clerk of the Court of Appeals to do so. There is also no indication defendant or his counsel ever requested the State or the trial court to become further involved. Nevertheless, defendant asserts this failure by the State, to make any efforts to avoid the considerable delay in completing the trial transcript and subsequently his appeal, violated his due process rights.
*357The United States Supreme Court established a four-factor balancing test designed to analyze alleged violations of an individual's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 117 (1972). The four factors are: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id. This Court has adopted the Barker factors when considering alleged violations of the right to a speedy trial. See, e.g., State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 118, 579 S.E.2d 251, 254 (2003); State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 62, 540 S.E.2d 713, 721 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838, 122 S.Ct. 93, 151 L.Ed.2d 54 (2001); State v. Jones, 310 N.C. 716, 721, 314 S.E.2d 529, 532-33 (1984); State v. O'Kelly, 285 N.C. 368, 371, 204 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1974).
When presented with the issue of whether an individual's rights were violated due to prevention or delay of an appeal, federal and state courts of this and other jurisdictions have almost uniformly applied the Barker test in considering appellate proceedings. China, 150 N.C.App. at 473-75, 564 S.E.2d at 68-69; Hammonds, 141 N.C.App. at 164, 541 S.E.2d at 175; United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 204, 207 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1133, 117 S.Ct. 997, 136 L.Ed.2d 877 (1997); United States v. Hawkins, 78 F.3d 348, 350-51 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 126, 136 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996); Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 963, 111 S.Ct. 398, 112 L.Ed.2d 407 (1990); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1222 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Johnson, 732 F.2d 379, 381-82 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1033, 105 S.Ct. 505, 83 L.Ed.2d 396 (1984); DeLancy v. Caldwell, 741 F.2d 1246, 1247-48 (10th Cir.1984); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 303 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 1392, 67 L.Ed.2d 365 (1981); Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 510, 521, 481 A.2d 1084, 1092 (1984); People v. Sistrunk, 259 Ill.App.3d 40, 54, 197 Ill.Dec. 89, 630 N.E.2d 1213, 1223, appeal denied, 157 Ill.2d 517, 205 Ill.Dec. 181, 642 N.E.2d 1298 (1994); Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 783 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073, 119 S.Ct. 807, 142 L.Ed.2d 667 (1999); State v. Harper, 675 A.2d 495, 498 n. 5 (Me.1996); Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, ¶ 43, 78 P.3d 205, 218-19 (Wyo.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1205, 124 S.Ct. 1476, 158 L.Ed.2d 127 (2004). The Court of Appeals' majority opinion below utilized the Barker test to analyze defendant's due process claim. Berryman, 170 N.C.App. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 676-78. We agree with the use of the four Barker factors by both our Court of Appeals and other jurisdictions to address issues concerning whether an individual's rights to an appeal were violated.
As noted earlier, the Barker factors are: "(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) defendant's assertion of his right . . .; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay." Hammonds, 141 N.C.App. at 158, 541 S.E.2d at 172 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 116-17). "We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118; see also China, 150 N.C.App. at 473, 564 S.E.2d at 68; Hammonds, 141 N.C.App. at 158, 541 S.E.2d at 172.
When considered in Sixth Amendment cases, the first factor, the length of delay, "is not per se determinative of whether defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial." Spivey, 357 N.C. at 119, 579 S.E.2d at 255 (citing State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 678, 447 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994)). The length of delay is a triggering mechanism that requires further inquiry into the other Barker factors only after the delay is deemed presumptively prejudicial. Hammonds, 141 N.C.App. at 159, 541 S.E.2d at 172; Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117 ("Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance."); State v. Hill, 287 N.C. 207, 211, 214 S.E.2d 67, 71 (1975) ("[W]e elect to view this factor merely as the `triggering mechanism' that *358precipitates the speedy trial issue. Viewed as such, its significance in the balance is not great.").
Here, over six years passed between defendant's conviction, King's production of the trial transcript, and appellate review by the Court of Appeals. Such an egregious delay is clearly sufficient to trigger examination of the remaining factors. See China, 150 N.C.App. at 474, 564 S.E.2d at 68 ("An approximately seven year delay in processing defendant's appeal is lengthy and sufficient to examine the remaining factors."); Hammonds, 141 N.C.App. at 164, 541 S.E.2d at 175 ("The length of the delay, approximately two and a half years . . . is . . . sufficient to trigger the examination of the remaining factors."); Johnson, 732 F.2d at 382 ("With regard to the first of [the Barker] factors, the two-year delay in this case is in the range of magnitude of delay as a result of which courts have indicated that due process may have been denied."); Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 302-03 ("[W]e assume without deciding . . . a delay of nearly two years . . . exceeds the limits of due process.").
In the instant case, defendant asserts that establishing a justifiable reason and cause of the six-year delay in completing his appeal, the second Barker factor, rests with the State. He argues in his brief that "[t]hroughout this time, the State is aware of the situation and makes no effort to obtain the transcript." Contrary to defendant's assertion and consistent with analyses of delays during the trial phase of a criminal proceeding, the burden is on the defendant to show the delay resulted from intentional conduct or neglect by the State. See Spivey, 357 N.C. at 119, 579 S.E.2d at 255 ("[The] defendant has the burden of showing that the delay was caused by the neglect or willfulness of the prosecution." (citing Webster, 337 N.C. at 679, 447 S.E.2d at 351)); State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 141, 240 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1978) ("[T]he circumstances of each particular case must determine whether a speedy trial has been afforded or denied, and the burden is on an accused who asserts denial of a speedy trial to show that the delay was due to the neglect or wilfulness of the prosecution.").
After thorough review of the record on appeal and the parties' briefs, we agree with the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals that "[t]he record is devoid of any indication as to why the extensive delay took place." Berryman, 170 N.C.App. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 677. The trial court proceeded properly and ordered a trial transcript from King on 20 February 1998 after defendant gave notice of appeal in open court. N.C. R.App. P. 7. No motions for extensions of time to complete the transcript were submitted to either the trial court or the Court of Appeals. See N.C. R.App. P. 7(b); see also N.C. R.App. P. 27(c). The only documented evidence present in the record from that six-year period is defense counsel's letter, written request, and affidavit. However, this evidence does not shed light on the cause of the delay. Thus, there is no evidence to support defendant's assertion that the State acted willfully to delay or neglected production of the transcript, a fact conceded by the Court of Appeals' dissenting opinion. Berryman, 170 N.C.App. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 678 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) ("In the instant case, I recognize that the delay was not due to the fault of the prosecutor."). Defendant simply has failed to meet his burden of proof on this point. See Spivey, 357 N.C. at 119, 579 S.E.2d at 255; see also McKoy, 294 N.C. at 141, 240 S.E.2d at 388.
As to the third Barker factor, defendant argues he never acquiesced in the six-year delay and instead asserted his right to prompt appellate review by and through defense counsel's submission of numerous requests and inquiries. Under our Appellate Rules and case law, it is the appellant's responsibility to compile a proposed record on appeal which includes the verbatim transcript, to work with the State towards settlement of the record on appeal, and then to submit the completed record to the Court of Appeals. N.C. R.App. P. 9, 11 & 12; Alston, 307 N.C. at 341, 298 S.E.2d at 644 ("It is the appellant's duty and responsibility to see that the record is in proper form and complete."); China, 150 N.C.App. at 474-75, 564 S.E.2d at 68 ("Defendant's failure to stay informed concerning the status of his appeal of right and to assert his rights weighs heavily *359against his contention that his due process rights were violated."); McLeod, 92 N.C.App. at 371, 374 S.E.2d at 418 ("Plaintiff, as appellant, bears the burden of seeing that the record on appeal is properly settled and filed with this Court.").
The record includes a letter, a written request, and an affidavit drafted by defense counsel which document defendant's assertions of his right to an appeal. Defense counsel made approximately nine inquiries to King regarding the transcript during 1999 and 2000. However, there is a noticeable gap between defense counsel's "Review dates/check status of transcript" on 18 December 2000 and "telephone msg. to J. King" on 18 November 2003. Defense counsel then placed two more phone calls to King between 19 November 2003 and 22 January 2004. On 21 November 2003, King telephoned defense counsel. The transcript was completed on 30 January 2004.
Defense counsel averaged two and one half inquiries per year during the six years defendant awaited appellate review. None of defense counsel's efforts were directed to the State, to the trial court, to the clerk of superior court, or to the clerk of the Court of Appeals. See Hammonds, 141 N.C.App. at 157, 541 S.E.2d at 171 (defendant filed three separate motions for new trial after extensions granted to court reporter expired); Johnson, 732 F.2d at 382 (defendant filed petitions with appellate court to obtain transcript). Instead, each effort in the instant case was addressed to King. There is no evidence that defendant, himself, asserted to anyone his right to appellate review. As the Court of Appeals noted in both this case and in China, defendant or his attorney could have contacted the trial court or the clerk of the Court of Appeals. Berryman, 170 N.C.App. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 677; China, 150 N.C.App. at 474, 564 S.E.2d at 68. Although defense counsel made some efforts to expedite defendant's appeal, neither he nor defendant satisfied the mandates of the Appellate Rules and case law to compile a proposed record on appeal including the verbatim transcript, work with the State towards settlement of the record on appeal, and then submit it to the Court of Appeals. N.C. R.App. P. 9, 11 & 12; Alston, 307 N.C. at 341, 298 S.E.2d at 644; China, 150 N.C.App. at 474-75, 564 S.E.2d at 68; McLeod, 92 N.C.App. at 371, 374 S.E.2d at 418. Defendant did not sufficiently assert his right to an appeal.
In considering whether defendant has been prejudiced because of a delay between indictment and trial, this Court noted that a speedy trial serves: "'(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.'" Webster, 337 N.C. at 680-81, 447 S.E.2d at 352 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118). Courts addressing the issue at bar have adopted the same analysis to show prejudice. China, 150 N.C.App. at 475, 564 S.E.2d at 69; Johnson, 732 F.2d at 382; see also N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1442 & -1443 (2005) (Appellate courts may grant relief in criminal appeals only if defendant can prove he suffered prejudice from error.).
Initially, with respect to the prejudice factor, we note defendant's assignments of error to the Court of Appeals pertaining to his trial are not before this Court based on the dissent. See N.C. R.App. P. 16(b); see also State v. Hooper, 318 N.C. 680, 681-82, 351 S.E.2d 286, 287 (1987). The Court of Appeals' majority opinion held that defendant's assignments of error aside from his right to a timely appeal argument were without merit. Berryman, 170 N.C.App. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 674-76. Accordingly, the first interest or concern cited above, prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration, is not applicable to the case at bar.
Regarding the second interest, defendant argues:
Waiting for the ax to fall, an inmate suffers the anxiety of uncertainty while on appeal. Once he finds out the decision, he can go on to deal with it. Only then can he turn his concentration, for example, to long term prison programs. . . . Berryman's anxiety was maximized by the extra long delay.
We agree with the Court of Appeals' majority opinion that a review of the record does not divulge any evidence to support defendant's *360allegation of experiencing "maximum anxiety." Berryman, 170 N.C.App. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 678 (quoting China, 150 N.C.App. at 475, 564 S.E.2d at 69 ("`Defendant has failed to show that he suffered any more anxiety than any other appellant.'")).
Finally, concerning the third interest, defendant argues the delay prevented "any possibility of meaningful appellate review" of his case. He also asserts the public suffers from such delays, particularly crime victims and other interested parties. We are not insensitive to the potential effects of a long delay in completing an appeal on a defendant, other interested parties, and the public at large. However, defendant has totally failed to provide the Court of Appeals or this Court with any specific evidence supporting these contentions relating to his case. See Berryman, 170 N.C.App. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 678.
This Court has also noted in cases involving the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial that although a defendant's failure to assert his right to a speedy trial earlier in the process does not preclude the argument later, such failure is considered when determining whether the defendant was prejudiced. Webster, 337 N.C. at 680, 447 S.E.2d at 352 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117-18). Having determined that defendant failed to sufficiently assert his right to an appeal, we conclude that the prejudice from which defendant allegedly suffered was not so great as to inspire him or his counsel to act. Thus, after considering the three recognized protected interests and defendant's corresponding arguments, we conclude defendant has not shown through supportive evidence, and our review of the record fails to disclose, that he was prejudiced by the six-year delay. See N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1442 & -1443.
Appellate review in a criminal proceeding is provided and governed by the North Carolina General Statutes and Appellate Rules, not the United States or the North Carolina Constitutions. Alleged violations of the right to an appeal shall be considered under the four-factor analysis enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker. After extensive review of defendant's case and arguments in light of Barker, we hold defendant's statutory and due process rights were not violated by the six-year delay in producing his trial transcript. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.