The defendant has twenty-two assignments of error based on exceptions to the admission of testimony bearing on the question as to *87whether or not the defendant was under the influence of an intoxicant at the time of the automobile collision which resulted in the death of Bobert Bruce Johnson. Some of the witnesses testified they saw the defendant at 3 :30 in the afternoon, eight or ten witnesses testified they saw him a few minutes before the collision, at a filling station. Other witnesses observed him at the scene of the collision, while others saw him in jail shortly afterwards. Each of the witnesses either testified that in his or her opinion the defendant was drunk, or that he was under the influence of an intoxicant. The defendant testified that he took a small drink late in the afternoon before he left the home of his brother, and might have taken one earlier in the day. He also testified that he was in jail not more than an hour and three-quarters before being released on bond, and that he was in a subconscious condition when he was put in jail. He contends, however, that he was not under the influence of an intoxicant, but that his condition was caused from the concussion which he received in the collision. He further testified that the collision was caused by his being blinded by cars following him, which threw lights on his rear vision mirror and blinded him. “They blinded me and I don’t know what happened ... I couldn’t tell where I was.”
The defendant contends that while a lay witness may, from his observation reasonably made, give his opinion as -to whether he was drunk or sober, on the afternoon and evening of 13 October, 1946, the admissibility of such evidence will depend upon the remoteness from the time of the accident and the opportunity of the witness to observe the defendant’s condition, citing S. v. Kelly, 227 N. C., 62, 40 S. E. (2d), 454. The factual situation in the cited case is not applicable here. There we held it to be error to admit testimony of the condition of the defendant more than twelve hours after the collision as evidence of his condition at the time of the collision, there being no evidence to show a continuous drunken condition. Here the evidence tends to show the defendant was continuously under the influence of an intoxicant during the afternoon and evening of the day in question. We have the testimony of the defendant himself that he took a drink of whiskey after 3 :45 that afternoon and that he-may have taken a drink earlier in the day. According to the evidence he was staggering and in a drunken condition at a filling station about fifteen minutes before the collision. His condition was such that one of the State’s witnesses, at the request of the attendant at the filling station, offered to drive his car to Kinston for him. Furthermore, according to the evidence he was drunk at the scene of the collision. For a short time after the wreck he could not stand alone, and slumped to the ground. Later he staggered when he walked and threatened to kill the Highway Patrolman when he arrested him.. The officers who observed him at the scene of the collision, testified that he was under the *88influence of an intoxicant. Other oflicers who observed him while he was in jail, testified that in their opinion he was at that time under the influence of an intoxicant.
Ordinarily opinion evidence is limited to duly qualified experts, but there are exceptions. A lay witness is competent to testify whether or not in his opinion a person was drunk or sober on a given occasion on which he observed him. The conditions under which the witness observed the person, and the opportunity to observe him, go to the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony, Stansbury on Evidence, Sec. 129; S. v. Harris, 213 N. C., 648, 197 S. E., 142; S. v. Dills, 204 N. C., 33, 167 S. E., 459; S. v. Holland, 193 N. C., 713, 138 S. E., 8; S. v. Jessup, 183 N. C., 771, 111 S. E., 523. The facts and circumstances revealed by this record tend to show that the defendant was continuously under the influence of an intoxicant from 3 :30 in the afternoon of 13 October, 1946, until his discharge from jail between 8 :00 and 9 :00 o’clock the same evening, following the automobile collision about 6:00 o’clock. Consequently, we hold that none of the evidence offered by the State as to the condition of the defendant before and after the time of the automobile collision involved herein, was too remote in point of time to justify its exclusion from consideration by the jury. Stansbury on Evidence, Sec. 90, p. 170; S. v. Peterson, 212 N. C., 758, 194 S. E., 498.
The defendant assigns as error the admission of a written statement of one of the State’s witnesses, for the purpose of corroborating her oral testimony given at the trial. The defendant contends the testimony of the witness had not been impeached and the defendant had made no effort to break down her testimony, therefore the written statement previously given by her was inadmissible, citing S. v. Parish, 79 N. C., 610, and S. v. Lassiter, 191 N. C., 210, 131 S. E., 577. "We do not think the record supports the contention of the defendant in this respect. The witness was a young girl, 16 years of age, and on direct examination she had testified that in her opinion the defendant was drunk. On cross-examination an effort was made to impeach her testimony as to his condition at the time of the collision and also as to her testimony relative to the way or manner the defendant had driven his car just prior thereto. The oral testimony of the witness and the statements made by her prior to the trial, which were reduced to writing and introduced in evidence, were in substantial accord. We think the effort of the defendant to impeach the testimony of this witness on cross-examination, was sufficient to make her previously written statement admissible for the purpose of corroborating her testimony. S. v. Litteral, 227 N. C., 527, 43 S. E. (2d), 84; S. v. Scoggins, 225 N. C., 71, 33 S. E. (2d), 473; S. v. Gore, 207 N. C., 618, 178 S. E., 209; S. v. Bethea, 186 N. C., 22, 118 S. E., 800. In S. v. Litteral, supra, we held where the testimony of *89a witness is challenged and its credibility put at issue by a plea of not guilty and by extended cross-examination, evidence may be introduced to corroborate the testimony of the witness.
The defendant brings forward and argues twenty-two assignments of error based on exceptions to his Honor’s charge to the jury. It is contended that his Honor failed to give as full and complete a statement of the evidence as he should have, particularly of the testimony elicited from the State’s witnesses on cross-examination. There was no request for a more complete narrative of the testimony. Moreover, at the close of the charge, the Court specifically inquired of counsel for the defendant if there was anything further they wished stated to the jury and counsel replied in the negative. Any error or omission in the statement of the evidence, or in the contentions of the parties, must be called to the attention of the Court in time for correction. S. v. Warren, 227 N. C., 380, 42 S. E. (2d), 350; S. v. Thompson, 227 N. C., 19, 39 S. E. (2d), 823; S. v. McNair, 226 N. C., 462, 38 S. E. (2d), 514; S. v. Smith, 225 N. C., 78, 33 S. E. (2d), 472.
We have carefully examined the many assignments of error directed to the charge of the Court, and we think when the charge is considered contextually, as it should he, S. v. Hairston, 222 N. C., 455, 23 S. E. (2d), 885; S. v. Manning, 221 N. C., 70, 18 S. E. (2d), 821; S. v. Shepherd, 220 N. C., 377, 17 S. E. (2d), 469; S. v. Henderson, 218 N. C., 513, 11 S. E. (2d), 462, no prejudicial or reversible error is shown.
The remaining assignment of error as to the form of the judgment, is without merit.
In the trial below, we find
N o error.