Tbe basis of seven of the defendant’s exceptive assignments of error is tbe admission of certain written statements and certain oral statements made by tbe State’s principal witness to others at various times prior to tbe trial of this cause. The statements were admitted for, and only for, tbe purpose of corroboration, and tbe judge so told tbe jury at tbe time of tbeir admission. Tbe evidence of this witness, upon which tbe State largely relied, was to tbe effect tbat be, Ben Johnson, struck tbe fatal blow tbat killed tbe deceased, Karl Hayduck, and be did so because of promises and inducements held out to him by tbe defendant Faison Gore. We have carefully examined these statements and think they all tend to corroborate tbe testimony of Johnson. We cannot agree witb tbe position taken in tbe defendant’s brief tbat tbe corroborating evidence was inadmissible because tbe witness Ben Johnson bad not been impeached. Tbe defendant, having-pleaded not guilty, tbe very nature of tbe circumstances challenged tbe *620testimony of tbe witness to tbe effect that tbe defendant procured him, tbe witness, to kill tbe deceased; and also tbe cross-examination of tbe witness was an attack upon and. an impeachment of bis testimony in that it sought to show that such testimony was false, and that tbe witness bad been frequently tried and convicted in various criminal courts and was therefore a man of bad character, whose testimony should not be given credence. S. v. Parish, 79 N. C., 610; S. v. Melvin, 194 N. C., 394.
Tbe evidence of tbe circumstances under which tbe corroborative statements were made, to which tbe defendant excepted, was properly admitted in order to enable tbe jury to determine tbe weight that should be given to such statements; since if they were obtained by coercion or duress they might carry but little if any force, but if given freely and voluntarily, they might carry considerable force. Tbe admission of such evidence was logical, sensible, and did justice to all concerned.
Tbe exception to tbe evidence tending to show a quarrel between tbe defendant and bis wife is untenable, as such evidence was competent to show both motive for tbe crime charged and to corroborate tbe witness Ben Johnson, who testified that tbe defendant told him that tbe deceased was “going with bis wife” and be “didn’t like it,” and gave this as one of tbe reasons for wanting him “to knock him out.”
If there was error in tbe admission of tbe note written by tbe wife of tbe defendant to him while in jail, to which tbe defendant excepted, such error was cured when tbe wife went upon tbe stand as a witness in her husband’s behalf and at bis behest and admitted that she wrote tbe letter, since it tended to discredit her by showing that she proposed to make her testimony agree with bis. Witness this clause: “Honey, what time did you tell them so I can tell tbe same thing. Let me know all you told.”
Those portions of tbe cross-examination of tbe defendant to which exceptions were lodged, in our opinion are well within tbe latitude allowed on such examinations, -as tbe reason for tbe search for Hayduck and tbe manner of such search were proper to be considered by tbe jury; and especially was this so in tbe light of tbe fact that tbe defendant directed tbe search and suggested that one Mazur look behind tbe toilet where tbe deceased was found wounded and unconscious.
Tbe motion for nonsuit was properly denied as tbe testimony of Ben Johnson alone was sufficient to- carry tbe case to tbe jury. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that tbe unsupported testimony of an accomplice, while it should be received with caution, if it produces convincing proof of tbe defendant’s guilt is sufficient to sustain a conviction. S. v. Ashburn, 187 N. C., 717 (728), and cases there cited.
*621Tbe defendant excepted to tbe charge for that “tbe court failed to charge tbe jury what constituted ‘an accessory before tbe fact/ ” and “failed to charge tbe jury as to tbe law applicable to ‘an accessory before tbe fact.’ ” Tbe court read tbe bill of indictment to tbe jury, including tbe following: “That Faison Gore ... did unlawfully and wilfully, feloniously be and become an accessory before tbe fact of tbe murder of Karl Hayduck, by counseling, procuring, or commanding Ben Johnson to commit a felony, to wit: kill and murder Karl ITayduck, . . .” Tbe description of tbe offense contained in tbe bill is full and complete and needs no explanation to be understood. Tbe charge is in compliance with C. S., 564. If tbe defendant desired more specific and elaborate instructions or explanations be should have submitted appropriate prayers. S. v. McLamb, 203 N. C., 442; S. v. O’Neal, 187 N. C., 22, and cases there cited.
Tbe defendant’s motion for arrest of judgment for that tbe bill of indictment charges that tbe murder of Karl Hayduck was committed on 3 May, 1934, when all of tbe evidence tended to show that it was committed on 29 April was properly denied, since “time is not of tbe essence of tbe offense” charged. C. S., 4625.
A perusal of tbe record leads us to tbe conclusion that tbe case has been carefully tried in conformity with tbe practice and authorities in this jurisdiction, and tbe verdict and judgment will therefore be upheld.