The defendant offered a number of witnesses for the purpose of establishing his general reputation. On cross-examination the solicitor questioned these witnesses with reference to the defendant’s *379general reputation for certain vices, particularly as to whether the defendant did not have the general reputation of getting drunk and mistreating his family and as to whether he did not have the general reputation of having been indicted on numerous occasions. Most of'these questions were answered in the negative or the witnesses professed no knowledge thereof. Others were answered in the affirmative. Later the court, being under the apprehension that under S. v. Shinn, 209 N. C., 22, 182 S. E., 721, this evidence was incompetent, withdrew it and instructed the jury not to consider the same.
The defendant’s exceptions directed to the admission of this testimony cannot be sustained. The court incorrectly interpreted the opinion in the Shinn case, supra. The evidence was competent in the first instance.
While it is true that character witnesses may not be cross-examined as to specific acts of misconduct of the defendant, S. v. Shinn, supra, he may be questioned as to the general reputation of the defendant as to particular vices or virtues. Edwards v. Price, 162 N. C., 243, 78 S. E., 145; Davis v. Long, 189 N. C., 129, 126 S. E., 321; S. v. Nance, 195 N. C., 47, 141 S. E., 468; S. v. Colson, 193 N. C., 236, 136 S. E., 730; S. v. Lefevers, 216 N. C., 494, 5 S. E. (2d), 55. Such evidence is competent for the purpose of testing the knowledge of the witness concerning the general reputation about which he has testified and to impeach his testimony. That is, it goes to the credibility of the witness and is competent for that purpose only. S. v. Holly, 155 N. C., 485, 71 S. E., 450; S. v. Lefevers, supra. Upon request the court should so limit it. However, upon general objection only, without request that it be restricted to the use for which it is competent, the general objection and exception is not tenable. S. v. Tuttle, 207 N. C., 649, 178 S. E., 76, and cases cited; S. v. Hawkins, 214 N. C., 326, 199 S. E., 284.
The exceptions directed to the alleged error of the court in permitting the introduction and use of a photograph of the house, porch and walk are without merit. This photograph shows a car standing in the road. The witness stated that the car was not located as was that of the deceased at the time of the homicide but that otherwise it correctly represented the premises in question. The court charged the jury to disregard the automobile as shown in the photograph and clearly limited the use of the photograph in accord with our decisions. S. v. Mitchem, 188 N. C., 608, 125 S. E., 190, and cases cited; S. v. Holland, 216 N. C., 610, 6 S. E. (2d), 217; S. v. Perry, 212 N. C., 533, 193 S. E., 727; S. v. Wagstaff, 219 N. C., 15, 12 S. E. (2d), 657; S. v. Miller, 219 N. C., 514, 14 S. E. (2d), 522.
The court correctly defined malice. Likewise, its instructions upon the crime of manslaughter, S. v. Jordan, 216 N. C., 356, 5 S. E. (2d), 156, and cases cited; S. v. Koutro, 210 N. C., 144, 185 S. E., 682, and *380as to the consideration to be given the testimony of an interested witness, S. v. Holland, supra, when considered contextually, were in substantial accord with the decisions of this Court. Exceptions to isolated parts thereof cannot be sustained.
The defendant complains that the court’s instructions on his plea of self-defense were inadequate and erroneous and failed to give him the full benefit of this defense. Exceptions based on this contention are without merit. When the evidence is analyzed it appears that the defendant, after the first difficulty, retired to a place of safety. He thereafter armed himself with a pistol, returned to the road where the deceased was and, upon a renewal of the difficulty, immediately shot and killed the deceased. He seeks to justify his conduct upon the theory that he returned to protect his wife. The record fails to disclose any evidence to sustain this theory. His wife was there undertaking to persuade the deceased to leave. No assault had been committed upon her, no threat had been made against her and no fact or circumstance appears which would cause a person of reasonable prudence to apprehend that she was in danger. On the defendant’s own statement, as he outlines the occurrence, the charge on his plea of self-defense was more favorable to him than he had a right to demand.
That the difficulty occurred in front of his home and the deceased instigated it are mitigating circumstances which the court, judging from the sentence imposed, took into full consideration in pronouncing sentence.
We have examined the other exceptive assignments of error appearing in the record. They fail to disclose any sufficient cause for disturbing the judgment below.