Tbe sole question presented for decision is whether there was sufficient evidence to carry tbe case to tbe jury that tbe plaintiffs have ripened title to Lot 51 by twenty years adverse possession under known and visible lines and boundaries. G.S. 1-40; Johnson v. Fry, 195 N.C. 832, 143 S.E. 857. There is no evidence that anyone was under any disability.
Tbe State not being a party to the action, tbe title is conclusively presumed to be out of tbe State. G.S. 1-36.
One issue was submitted to tbe jury: “Are tbe plaintiffs tbe owners and entitled to possession of tbe property described in tbe complaint?”, to which they responded Yes.
A very clear and concise definition of adverse possession is given in Perry v. Alford, 225 N.C. 146, 33 S.E. 2d 665, as follows: “To constitute adverse possession tbe possession must have been actual, open, continuous, and denoted by tbe exercise of acts of dominion over tbe land in making tbe ordinary use and taking tbe ordinary profits of which it is susceptible,” citing authorities.
Tbis Court has also said in Vance v. Guy, 223 N.C. 409, at p. 413, 27 S.E. 2d 117 “tbe possession must be continuous, though not necessarily unceasing, for tbe statutory period, and of such character as to subject tbe property to the only use of which it is susceptible.” (Citing Locklear v. Savage, 159 N.C. 236, 74 S.E. 347; Davis v. Land Bank, 219 N.C. 248, 13 S.E. 2d 417). However, occasional acts of ownership, no matter bow *724adverse, do not constitute a possession that will mature title. Price v. Whisnant, 236 N.C. 381, 72 S.E. 2d 851.
Tbe plaintiffs’ unregistered deed does not prevent tbeir setting up adverse possession for twenty years to Lot 51. Johnson v. Fry, supra; Glass v. Shoe Co., 212 N.C. 70, 192 S.E. 899.
Tbe plaintiffs rely upon adverse possession alone without color of title. Title acquired under such circumstances is confined to tbe lands actually occupied. “An adverse possessor of land without color of title cannot acquire title to any greater amount of land than that which he has actually occupied for the statutory period.” Carswell v. Morganton, 236 N.C. 375, 72 S.E. 2d 748. Citing many authorities.
In ruling on a motion for nonsuit tbe court does not pass on tbe credibility of tbe witnesses or tbe weight of tbe testimony — tbat is for the jury. Bundy v. Powell, 229 N.C. 707, 51 S.E. 2d 307. Contradictions in tbe plaintiff’s evidence do not justify a nonsuit. Maddox v. Brown, 232 N.C. 244, 59 S.E. 2d 791. “When tbe defendant moves for a compulsory nonsuit, be admits, for tbe purpose of tbe motion, tbe truth of all facts in evidence tending to sustain tbe plaintiff’s claim; and tbe plaintiff is entitled to have tbe court, in ruling on tbe motion, to give him tbe benefit of every favorable inference which tbe testimony fairly supports.” Graham v. Gas Co., 231 N.C. 680, 58 S.E. 2d 757.
Tbe deed from W. A. Yanstory and wife to tbe plaintiffs is good as between the parties to tbe deed. Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N.C. 550, 5 S.E. 2d 849. Tbe inference seems to be irresistible tbat whatever use tbe plaintiffs made of Lot 51, they did it with intent to bold this lot solely for themselves to tbe exclusion of all others, and tbat such use was made in tbe character of owners, in opposition to tbe right or claim of any other person, and not merely as occasional trespassers.
Frank Sessoms listed Lot 51 for taxes every year. He bad tax receipts on this lot to cover tbe years 1937 to 1951, both inclusive, except tbe years 1943, 1945, 1947 and 1950. He bad tax receipts prior to 1937, but bis wife lost them. Tbe listing and payment of taxes on Lot 51 by Frank Sessoms, while not sufficient by themselves to show adverse possession, are relevant facts in connection with tbe other circumstances as tending to show a claim of title. Perry v. Alford, supra.
Upon receipt of their unregistered deed on 21 September, 1929, Frank Sessoms ploughed Lot 51, and be and bis wife tended all of it as a garden until 1935, when be and bis wife separated; Frank Sessoms used it as a garden until 1940 or 1941; Simpson and Rhone, with Frank Sessoms’ permission, used it as a garden in 1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946. Hardy Rhone testified there was a garden on Lot 51 every year — it was cultivated somewhat every year, just about like city folks do. In 1931 Frank Ses-soms planted fruit trees on this lot, which stayed there 10 or 12 years. *725In 1931 Frank Sessoms put a fence around all of Lot 51 and bis other two adjacent lots, which stayed there 8 or 9 years. In 1938 or 1939 or 1944 he had cotton seed moult put on the lot. In 1944 he put piles of dirt on the lot to build up the rear where it was low. These piles remained until Alec McDonald leveled them with a bulldozer in 1952 to move his house on the lot. Frank Sessoms’ tenant cut a ditch on Lot 51 after the dirt was piled on this lot to keep the water off of Lot 49 where the tenant lived. This ditch remained open until Alec McDonald moved on the lot. The tenant, Simpson, kept his car on Lot 51; grazed his cow on it each fall; and part of his smokehouse is still on it. Lot 51 never grew up in small trees. There has been no- break in continuous possession.
When the dirt in 1944 was piled on Lot 51 to the extent that a bulldozer leveled it, it is obvious all of the lot could not be planted as a garden.
Considering the size of this lot- — 40.1 feet wide and 140 feet deep — it seems to us that giving to the plaintiffs every favorable inference which the testimony fairly supports that from 21 September, 1929, until the defendant appellants moved on this lot in 1952, the plaintiffs actually occupied all of Lot 51 with intent to hold it solely as possessors to the exclusion of all others; that they exercised acts of dominion over this lot in making the ordinary use and taking the ordinary profits of which this small city lot was susceptible in its condition, and that such acts were so repeated as to show that they were done in the character of owners, in opposition to the right or claim of any other person and not merely as occasional trespassers.
The facts in this case are far different from the cases relied upon by the defendant appellants, which are eases of “occasional acts of ownership” or a break in the continuity of possession.
The court below was correct in overruling the motions for judgment of nonsuit.
The only other assignment of error by the defendant appellants is to the signing of the judgment, which is overruled.
Under a charge that is not brought forward, and is deemed to be correct, the jury, the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the testimony, have answered the issue in favor of the plaintiffs, by which verdict the defendant appellants must abide.
In the trial we find
No error.