Counsel for the defendants conceded with commendable candor on the argument and in their brief that the plaintiff adduced enough evidence on the trial to make the question of actionable negligence on the part of the defendants one for the determination of a jury. For this reason, we pass over this phase of the case, and proceed at once to inquire whether the judgment of nonsuit can be sustained on the ground that the plaintiff’s intestate was contributorily negligent .as a matter of law. The parties join battle on this issue. The plaintiff asks a reversal upon the authority of Cashatt v. Brown, 211 N. C. 367, 190 S. E. 480, and Moore v. R. R., 201 N. C. 26, 158 S. E. 556. The defendants pray for an affirmance on the basis of these decisions: Penland v. R. R., 228 N. C. 528, 46 S. E. (2) 303; Wilson v. R. R., 223 N. C. 407, 26 S. E. (2) 900; Bailey v. R. R., 223 N. C. 244, 25 S. E. (2) 833; Jeffries v. Powell, 221 N. C. 415, 20 S. E. (2) 561; McCrimmon v. Powell, 221 N. C. 216, 19 S. E. (2) 880; Godwin v. R. R., 220 N. C. 281, 17 S. E. (2) 137; Temple v. Hawkins, 220 N. C. 26, 16 S. E. (2) 400.
Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which the defendant must plead and prove. G.S. 1-139. Nevertheless, the rule is firmly embedded in our adjective law that a defendant may take advantage of his plea of contributory negligence by a motion for a compulsory judg*711ment of nonsuit under G.S. 1-183 when the facts necessary to show the contributory negligence are established by the plaintiff’s own evidence. Daughtry v. Cline, 224 N. C. 381, 30 S. E. (2) 322, 154 A. L. E. 789; Montgomery v. Blades, 222 N. C. 463, 23 S. E. (2) 844; Smith v. Sink, 211 N. C. 725, 192 S. E. 725; Hayes v. Telegraph Co., 211 N. C. 192, 189 S. E. 499; Ramsey v. Furniture Co., 209 N. C. 165, 183 S. E. 536; Mason v. R. R., 208 N. C. 842, 181 S. E. 625; Lincoln v. R. R., 207 N. C. 787, 178 S. E. 601; Jones v. Bagwell, 207 N. C. 378, 177 S. E. 170; Davis v. Jeffreys, 197 N. C. 712, 150 S. E. 488; Elder v. R. R., 194 N. C. 617, 140 S. E. 298.
In ruling upon a motion for an involuntary judgment of nonsuit under the statute after all the evidence on both sides is in, the court may consider so much of the defendant’s testimony as is favorable to the plaintiff or tends to clarify or explain evidence offered by the plaintiff not inconsistent therewith; but it must ignore that which tends to establish another and different state of facts or which tends to contradict or impeach the testimony presented by the plaintiff. Humphries v. Coach Co., 228 N. C. 399, 45 S. E. (2) 546; Buckner v. Wheeldon, 225 N. C. 62, 33 S. E. (2) 480; Atkins v. Transportation Co., 224 N. C. 688, 32 S. E. (2) 209; Lindsey v. Speight, 224 N. C. 453, 31 S. E. (2) 371; Gregory v. Insurance Co., 223 N. C. 124, 25 S. E. (2) 398, 147 A. L. E. 283; Godwin v. R. R., supra; Funeral Home v. Insurance Co., 216 N. C. 562, 5 S. E. (2) 820. But the court cannot allow a motion for judgment of nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in actions for personal injury or of the decedent in actions for wrongful death if it is necessary to rely either in whole or in part on testimony offered by the defense to sustain the plea of contributory negligence. Beck v. Hooks, 218 N. C. 105, 10 S. E. (2) 608; Lunsford v. Manufacturing Co., 196 N. C. 510, 146 S. E. 129; Nowell v. Basnight, 185 N. C. 142, 116 S. E. 87; Battle v. Cleave, 179 N. C. 112, 101 S. E. 555.
A judgment of involuntary nonsuit cannot be rendered on the theory that the plea of contributory negligence has been established by the plaintiff’s evidence unless the testimony tending to prove contributory negligence is so clear that no other conclusion can be reasonably drawn therefrom. Daughtry v. Cline, supra; Atkins v. Transportation Co., supra; Crone v. Fisher, 223 N. C. 635, 27 S. E. (2) 642; Hampton v. Hawkins, 219 N. C. 205, 13 S. E. (2) 227; Cole v. Koonce, 214 N. C. 188, 198 S. E. 637; Manheim v. Taxi Corp., 214 N. C. 689, 200 S. E. 382; Morris v. Johnson, 214 N. C. 402, 199 S. E. 190. If the controlling or pertinent facts are in dispute, or more than one inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the question of contributory negligence must be submitted to the jury. Pearson v. Stores Corp., 219 N. C. 717, 14 S. E. (2) 811; Templeton v. Kelley, 215 N. C. 577, 2 S. E. (2) 696; Ferguson v. *712 Asheville, 213 N. C. 569, 197 S. E. 146. In ruling on a motion for non-suit, tbe court does not pass on tbe credibility of tbe witnesses or tbe weight of tbe testimony. Pappas v. Crist, 223 N. C. 265, 25 S. E. (2) 850; Wall v. Bain, 222 N. C. 375, 23 S. E. (2) 330; Alexander v. Utilities Co., 207 N. C. 438, 177 S. E. 427. It takes it for granted that tbe evidence favorable to tbe plaintiff is true, and resolves all conflict of testimony in bis favor. Diamond v. Service Stores, 211 N. C. 632, 191 S. E. 358; Cole v. R. R., 211 N. C. 591, 191 S. E. 353; Brinkley v. R. R., 126 N. C. 88, 35 S. E. 238.
When tbe evidence adduced at tbe trial is tested by these principles, it becomes manifest that tbe question of whether tbe plaintiff’s intestate was guilty of contributory negligence was for tbe jury, and that tbe court erred in allowing tbe motion of tbe defendants for a compulsory nonsuit.
Tbe case is distinguishable from those cited by defendants in that tbe plaintiff’s testimony does not impel tbe single conclusion that bis intestate drove his automobile onto tbe crossing in tbe face of an oncoming train which be saw, or, in tbe exercise of reasonable care, should have seen. Here, opposing inferences are permissible. When interpreted most favorably for him, tbe plaintiff’s evidence justifies tbe deductions that tbe intestate looked and listened immediately before driving onto tbe crossing and thereby ascertained that no train was within range of bis view, which extended to tbe westward 600 feet. Clearly, it is not logical to conclude as a matter of law that the intestate was negligent in attempting to cross tbe railroad track under these circumstances. Besides, tbe plaintiff’s testimony warrants tbe inference that tbe intestate’s automobile stalled on the crossing in consequence of a breach of tbe railroad company’s admitted duty to exercise due care to keep tbe crossing in a reasonably safe condition. Cashatt v. Brown, supra; Moore v. R. R., supra; Stone v. R. R., 197 N. C. 429, 149 S. E. 399; Goforth v. R. R., 144 N. C. 569, 57 S. E. 209; G.S. 60-43. It is not a necessary inference of law that the plaintiff’s intestate failed to exercise reasonable care for bis own protection under tbe existing circumstances, merely because be did not extricate himself from bis perilous position before tbe fatal crash. According to plaintiff’s evidence, tbe intestate bad not exceeding seven seconds in which to escape after being apprised of tbe approach of tbe fast moving train.
Tbe defendants invoke the statement of Chief Justice Stacy in Powers v. Sternberg, 213 N. C. 41, 195 S. E. 88, that “there are a few physical facts which speak louder than some of the witnesses” and tbe declaration of Mr. Justice Barnhill in Caldwell v. R. R., 218 N. C. 63, 10 S. E. (2) 680, that “when a witness makes a statement of fact which is obviously impossible it does not rise to tbe dignity of evidence.” They argue that tbe judgment of nonsuit was proper because tbe photographs allegedly made by their witness, W. M. White, shortly after tbe fatal accident truly *713sbow the physical conditions at and near the crossing at the time in controversy, and render it obvious that the collision could not possibly have happened in the manner depicted by the plaintiff’s witnesses. The defendants might well address this argument to a jury with satisfying result. But the court cannot utilize it without passing on the credibility of the photographer and the other witnesses, and determining the comparative probate force of the photographs and the other testimony. 32 C. J. S., Evidence, section 771. This the court is not permitted to do when considering the propriety of a nonsuit.
For the reasons given, the nonsuit is set aside, and