It will be noted at tbe outset tbat tbe judgment rendered was in favor of tbe defendant and did not adversely affect any substantial right of bis. Therefore, be was not tbe proper party to appeal from tbe judgment. Hence, tbe appeal is subject to dismissal. Even so, tbe proceeding is in rem and tbe judgment entered in tbe court below vitally affects tbe title to real property. For tbat reason we take jurisdiction for tbe purpose of correcting tbe error in tbe judgment. This we may do in tbe exercise of our supervisory power. N. C. Const., Art. IV, sec. 8; S. v. Cochran, 230 N.C. 523, 53 S.E. 2d 663.
Tbe only question posed by this appeal is: Do tbe words “for church purposes only” appearing at tbe conclusion of tbe habendum clause have tbe effect of reducing tbe estate from an indefeasible title to some lesser estate ? It will be noted tbat there is no language which provides for a reversion of tbe property to tbe grantors or any other person in case it ceases to be used as church property.
Ordinarily a clause in a deed will not be construed as a condition subsequent, unless it contains language sufficient to qualify tbe estate conveyed and provides tbat in case of a breach tbe estate will be defeated, and this must appear in appropriate language sufficiently clear to indicate tbat this was tbe intent of tbe parties. Braddy v. Elliott, 146 N.C. 578, 60 S.E. 507.
“A clause in a conveyance will not be construed as a condition subsequent unless it expresses, in apt and appropriate language, tbe intention of tbe parties to this effect (Braddy v. Elliott, 146 N.C. 578, 60 S.E. 507), and a mere statement of tbe purpose for which tbe property is to be used is not sufficient to create such condition. Hall v. Quinn, supra (190 N.C. 326, 130 S.E. 18); Church v. Refining Co., supra (200 N.C. 469, 157 S.E. 438); Shields v. Harris, 190 N.C. 520, 130 S.E. 189; Shannonhouse v. Wolfe, 191 N.C. 769, 133 S.E. 93; University v. High Point, 203 N.C. 558, 166 S.E. 511; Tucker v. Smith, 199 N.C. 502, 154 S.E. 826; Lassiter v. Jones, supra (215 N.C. 298, 1 S.E. 2d 845); Cook v. Sink, 190 N.C. 620, 130 S.E. 714.
“ 'A grantor can impose conditions and can make tbe title conveyed dependent upon their performance. But if be does not make any condition, but simply expresses tbe motive which induces him to execute tbe deed, tbe legal effect of tbe granting words cannot be controlled by tbe language indicating tbe grantor’s motive.’ 2 Devlin on Deeds, sec. 838; St. James v. Bagley, supra (138 N.C. 384, 50 S.E. 841); Mauzy v. Mauzy, 79 Va. 537.” Oxford Orphanage v. Kittrell, 223 N.C. 427, 27 S.E. 2d 133; Shaw University v. Ins. Co., 230 N.C. 526, 53 S.E. 2d 656.
*509Eigid execution of conditions subsequent are not favored by tbe law ■and are strictly construed because they tend toward the destruction of •estates and in many instances are not reconcilable with good conscience. Hinton v. Vinson, 180 N.C. 393, 104 S.E. 897; Church v. Refining Co., supra.
It is clear from a fair interpretation of the entire deed under which ■the church took title to the property that the grantors intended by the last line of the habendum, clause only to express their motive in deeding the property to the church. Upon the authorities herein cited, we reach the •conclusion and so hold that the Christian Church of Jamesville acquired an indefeasible title to the property in question and has a right to convey the same in fee simple. It follows, therefore, that the judgment below must be
Eeversed.