While tbe defendants, heirs at law of John R. Moss, tbe testator, in their answer claim title to tbe locus in quo, they do not allege that tbe plaintiff refused to accept or, having accepted, later rejected the devise, so as to invoke tbe terms of tbe reverter clause. Instead, in support of their claim, they allege that tbe deterioration and destruction of tbe buildings was due to tbe negligence of tbe life tenant and constitutes acts of waste; that tbe removal of structures therefrom was wrongful and unlawful; that it was tbe duty of tbe remainderman to prevent tbe loss and destruction of said property; and that by its negligence in failing so to do it violated tbe terms of tbe will and forfeited all interest in tbe property. They pray that tbe Court decree that both tbe life tenant (who has died since tbe institution of tbis action) and tbe re-mainderman have forfeited all right, title, and interest in said property and tbe title thereto is now vested in them.
Hence tbe answer, considered in tbe light of allegations of waste and negligence and tbe prayer for a decree of forfeiture, would seem to indicate that tbe defendants initially relied upon tbe law of forfeiture for waste.
*431We concur in tbe view of tbe court below tbat appellants acquired under tbe will no sucb interest in tbe land as would entitle them to maintain tbe claim of forfeiture as tbus alleged. Browne v. Blick, 7 N. C., 511; Gordon v. Lowther, 75 N. C., 194; Latham v. Lumber Co., 139 N. C., 9, 51 S. E., 780; Hybart v. Jones, 130 N. C., 227, 41 S. E., 293; Richardson v. Richardson, 152 N. C., 705, 68 S. E., 217; Batten v. Corporation Commission, 199 N. C., 460, 154 S. E., 748.
Eut they now contend tbat tbe gift to plaintiff created an estate on condition expressed in tbe devise; tbat plaintiff bas rejected or abandoned tbe gift; and tbat, under tbe reverter clause contained in tbe will, tbe title to tbe property now vests in tbe beirs at law.
For a proper determination of tbe question tbus presented it is convenient, and perhaps essential, tbat we separate tbe gift into its two essential parts. (1) Tbe devise is to plaintiff “to bold and use and apply tbe same in so far as it will go after paying for keeping it in repair, for tbe maintenance of said institution.” Tbis is tbe sum total of tbe gift itself. But there is a condition subsequent with a provision for reverter attached. (2) Tbe title to tbe property is to revert to tbe beirs at law of tbe testator if tbe devisee should “refuse tbis gift and devise or later reject it because it might prove unprofitable or for any other cause.”
Hence tbe provision for reverter is limited to a refusal to accept or a rejection after acceptance. Has, tbe conduct of plaintiff been sucb as to call tbis provision into play?
Tbat tbe plaintiff accepted tbe gift cannot be gainsaid. It is now admitted. But tbe defendants say tbat tbe plaintiff, by its failure to maintain tbe property or to take any action against tbe life tenant for waste, and by its conveyances and attempts to convey bas abandoned tbe property and tbat sucb abandonment is in law a rejection. Tbis position is equally untenable.
Tbe plaintiff bad tbe right to proceed against tbe life tenant for waste committed or permitted by her. Tbe exercise of tbis right, however, was optional. It was not compelled to proceed or risk tbe loss of its interest in tbe property. Tbat it refrained from harassing tbe widow of its benefactor with demands and suits for damages cannot be held for cause for forfeiture. Nor is it any evidence of abandonment or rejection of tbe gift in remainder.
But plaintiff’s action was not altogether negative. From time to time it came to tbe aid of tbe life tenant and paid taxes on tbe property. It voluntarily joined in an action against a lessee for damages for breach of contract to keep in repair. It leased and conveyed parcels of tbe property. These were positive acts of ownership effectively refuting any intent to abandon or reject.
*432Tbe former conveyances and the present offer to convey by plaintiff does not constitute an abandonment. “The word ‘abandonment’ has a well defined meaning in the law which does not embrace a sale or conveyance of the property. It is the giving up of a thing absolutely, without reference to any particular person or purpose, and includes both the intention to relinquish all claim to and dominion over the property and the external act by which this intention is executed, and that is, the actual relinquishment of it, so that.it may be appropriated by the next comer.” Church v. Bragaw, 144 N. C., 126, 56 S. E., 688. “There can be no such thing as abandonment in favor of a particular individual or for a consideration, as such an act would be a gift or a sale.” Richardson v. McNulty, 24 Cal., 339; Church v. Bragaw, supra. “The well understood meaning in the law of the term ‘abandonment’ does not embrace a sale, gift, or other transfer of property.” 1 C. J. S., 6. When there is a sale or gift, or a transfer in any other mode provided by law, the continuity of the possession is preserved and any intent to abandon is refuted. 1 C. J. S., 6; Church v. Bragaw, supra; Black’s Law Diet., p. 4; 1 Words and Phrases, Permanent edition, pp. 4, 5, and 57.
The appellants further insist, however, that the gift was in trust for the use of the orphanage; that the plaintiff is, by express language, charged with the duty of “keeping it in repair”; that this creates a condition subsequent; and that the failure to keep in repair constitutes a breach of this condition, working a forfeiture.
The gift is of a fee simple estate in remainder, limited only by the provision for reverter upon a failure to accept or a rejection after acceptance. Church v. Refining Co., 200 N. C., 469, 157 S. E., 438; Hall v. Quinn, 190 N. C., 326, 130 S. E., 18; Lassiter v. Jones, 215 N. C., 298, 1 S. E. (2d), 845; Church v. Bragaw, supra; St. James v. Bagley, 138 N. C., 384, 50 S. E., 841; Coole v. Leggett, 88 Ind., 211.
A clause in a conveyance will not be construed as a condition subsequent unless it expresses, in apt and appropriate language, the intention of the parties to this effect (Braddy v. Elliott, 146 N. C., 578, 60 S. E., 507), and a mere statement of the purpose for which the property is to be used is not sufficient to create such condition. Hall v. Quinn, supra; Church v. Refining Co., supra; Shields v. Harris, 190 N. C., 520, 130 S. E., 189; Shannonhouse v. Wolfe, 191 N. C., 769, 133 S. E., 93; University v. High Point, 203 N. C., 558, 166 S. E., 511; Tucker v. Smith, 199 N. C., 502, 154 S. E., 826; Lassiter v. J ones, supra; Cook v. Sink, 190 N. C., 620, 130 S. E., 714.
“A grantor can impose conditions and can make the title conveyed dependent upon their performance. But if he does not make any condition, but simply expresses the motive which induces him to execute the *433deed, tbe legal effect of tbe granting words cannot be controlled by tbe language indicating tbe grantor’s motive.” 2 Devlin on Deeds, sec. 838; St. James v. Bagley, supra; Mauzy v. Mauzy, 79 Va., 537.
Tbe court below approved tbe sale in tbe exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Johnson v. Wagner, 219 N. C., 235, 13 S. E. (2d), 419. As tbe devise did not create a charitable trust and a fee simple title was conveyed, tbe plaintiff is free to sell in its discretion. Hence we need not discuss tbis phase of tbe judgment entered.
Tbe judgment below is
Affirmed.
'WiNBORNE, J., took no part in tbe consideration or decision of tbis case.