While the evidence consumes less than forty pages of the record, there are 243 assignments of error. However, many of them are not brought forward and discussed in the brief of appellants. Those that are preserved present four questions for consideration and decision: (1) Are the facts found by the court sufficient to support the judgment, and if so, (2) is there competent evidence sufficient to support the findings; (3) did the court admit incompetent evidence to the prejudice of the respondents; and (4) have the respondents purged themselves of any contempt on their part ?
A mere reading of the findings of fact answers the first question. It was not necessary that the order be formally served on each of the respondents. Actual notice of its existence and contents was sufficient. Lodge v. Gibbs, 159 N.C. 66, 74 S.E. 743; Wilson v. Bryan, 195 N.C. 360, 142 S.E. 491; High, Injunctions, 4th Ed., sec. 1422.
The mandate of the court was operative as against all parties having notice thereof from the time it was issued. To fix the liability of respondents for a violation of its terms, it was only necessary to show that they were actually apprised of its existence at the time they committed the acts alleged. Lodge v. Gibbs, supra; High, Injunctions, sec. 1421.
There is substantial evidence in the record in support of each finding of fact made by the judge. The appellants and others were gathered en masse in the area prohibited by the restraining order. They were defendants in the action and knew a restraining order had been applied for and might be issued. They were advised of the order and its contents and were told they were violating its terms. Upon being requested to leave, they held their ground and declined to disperse. Instead they greeted the request of the officer with boos. They then sang a good hymn for the inappropriate purpose of conveying a defiant intention to remain where they were.
Indeed, none of the appellants, other than Lester Matthews and Clarence Whitley, denied that they were present at the main gate in a group which completely blocked the entrance. Nor do they deny notice of the injunction or challenge the evidence as to the conduct of the group at the time. They merely deny that they engaged in mass picketing in the prohibited area on the morning of 14 September for the purpose of preventing other persons from working in said plant or intentionally prevented free ingress into the plant and aver “that whatever confusion or disturbance, or congregating, or related activity, which occurred on or about September 14, 1949, by any group of persons, defendants, or otherwise, was to the best of our knowledge and belief caused by genuine confusion brought about by lack of information about what order, if any, this Court had issued, what the contents of any order were, what was *439required of tbe defendants in tbis cause, and others.” In addition to tbis they assert that tbe injunction has never been served upon them.
The appellants and others were acting in concert in furtherance of a common purpose. Each was a party to what the others did and said in the course of their conduct in violation of the court order. Those who did not boo or sing were present, participating in the mass blocking of the company gate. Hence the exceptions to the evidence as to what was done and said at the time are without merit. Henderson-Snyder Co. v. Polk, 149 N.C. 104; Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610; S. v. Davis, 177 N.C. 573, 98 S.E. 785; S. v. Beal, 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604; S. v. Ritter, 199 N.C. 116, 154 S.E. 62. the testimony as to the statement made by Thomas and as to the booing and singing was competent also as a part of the res gestee and to show the quo animo of the group. Saunders v. Gilbert, supra; S. v. Davis, supra; S. v. Rumple, 178 N.C. 717, 100 S.E. 622; Manufacturing Co. v. Arnold, 228 N.C. 375.
That a witness may use a photograph or map or chart or diagram to illustrate bis testimony and make it more understandable to tbe jury is settled law in this jurisdiction. S. v. Shepherd, 220 N.C. 377, 17 S.E. 2d 469; S. v. Holland, 216 N.C. 610, 6 S.E. 2d 217; S. v. Mays, 225 N. C. 486, 35 S.E. 2d 494; S. v. Gardner, 228 N.C. 567, 46 S.E. 2d 824.
Tbe oath of a contemner is no longer a bar to a prosecution for contempt. “The question is not whether tbe respondent intended to show bis contempt for tbe court, but whether be intentionally did tbe acts which were a contempt of the court.” In re Fountain, 182 N.C. 49, 108 S.E. 342, 18 A.L.R. 208; In re Parker, 177 N.C. 463, 99 S.E. 342; Herring v. Pugh, 126 N.C. 852; In re Young, 137 N.C. 552; In re Gorham, 129 N.C. 481.
“Tbe violation of a judicial mandate stands upon different ground, and tbe only inquiry is, whether its requirements have been wilfully disregarded. If tbe act is intentional, and violates tbe order, tbe penalty is incurred, whether an indignity to tbe Court or a contempt of its authority, was or was not tbe motive for doing it.” Green v. Griffin, 95 N.C. 50; Nobles v. Roberson, 212 N.C. 334.
Tbe respondents having sought to purge themselves, tbe burden was on them to establish facts sufficient for that purpose.
While Lester Matthews denied be was present at tbe main gate at tbe time tbe sheriff appeared and read tbe injunction, there is positive evidence in tbe record that be was there in tbe group and remained until tbe crowd dispersed.
Tbe plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that Clarence Whitley was at tbe office gate at tbe time, and it is conceded by plaintiff that be was inadvertently included in tbe judgment in lieu of Clarence White. As tbe court below concluded there was not sufficient evidence that those *440at the office gate had actual notice of the injunction, Clarence Whitley will be discharged.
The other exceptions and assignments of error are without substantial merit. We find in them no cause for disturbing the judgment. Except as to Clarence Whitley, the judgment entered is
Affirmed.