Defendant Andre Levern Miller appeals from judgment entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of possession of cocaine and attaining habitual felon status. Defendant contends that the State presented insufficient evidence of possession of cocaine, and therefore the trial court erred by failing to dismiss that charge. After careful review of the record, we agree with defendant. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of possession of cocaine and remand to the trial court with instructions to dismiss.
I. Background
The State presented evidence at trial tending to show the following: On 8 December 2005 Winston-Salem policé officers entered the home at 1924 Dacian Street. Inside, the officers discovered defendant and one other person in a small bedroom in the home. The bedroom contained a bed, a TV stand, and a chair. The foot of the bed was about three feet from the door. The bed was extremely messy, unmade, with bedding of light colors and a floral bedspread on top. Defendant was sitting on the bed, and the other person was sitting in a chair. Upon searching the room the officers discovered a plastic bag containing crack cocaine behind the door and a “rock” of crack cocaine among the folds of the bedding, tied up in a small comer cut from a plastic bag. Defendant’s birth certificate and driver license were on the TV stand in the bedroom.
On 1 May 2006, the Forsyth County Grand Jury indicted defendant for maintaining a place to keep a controlled substance, possessing cocaine with the intent to sell and deliver, and attaining the status of habitual felon. Defendant was tried before a jury in Forsyth County Superior Court from 12 to 13 February 2007, Judge Catherine C. Eagles presiding. At the close of the State’s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss all charges. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of maintaining a place to keep a controlled substance, but denied his motion to dismiss the cocaine possession charge. Defendant renewed his motion to dismiss at the close of all the evidence, and the trial court again denied the motion. Defendant was found guilty of possession of cocaine and attaining habitual felon status. The trial court sentenced defendant to 107 to 138 months. Defendant appeals.
*126II. Discussion
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of possession of cocaine because the State presented insufficient evidence that defendant possessed the cocaine found in the bedroom where he was sitting. We agree.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 28-29, 460 S.E.2d 163, 168 (1995). Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction when “substantial evidence exists as to each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of that offense.” State v. Glover, 156 N.C. App. 139, 142, 575 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2003). However, “if the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the motion to dismiss must be allowed . . . even [if] the suspicion aroused by the evidence is strong.” State v. Theer, 181 N.C. App. 349, 356, 639 S.E.2d 655, 660 (citations and quotation marks omitted), appeal dismissed, 361 N.C. 702, 653 S.E.2d 159 (2007).
If the defendant is not in actual possession of contraband when it is discovered, the State may survive a motion to dismiss by presenting substantial evidence of constructive possession. State v. Tisdale, 153 N.C. App. 294, 297, 569 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002). “Evidence of constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction if it would allow a reasonable mind to conclude that defendant had the intent and capability to exercise control and dominion over the drugs.” State v. Carr, 122 N.C. App. 369, 372, 470 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1996).
The State contends that the following incriminating circumstances are sufficient to show constructive possession: (1) defendant and only one other person were in the room where the cocaine was found, (2) a rock of crack cocaine was found in “plain view” on the bed where defendant had been sitting and the bag of cocaine found behind the door was within a few feet of where defendant had been sitting, and (3) defendant’s drivers license and birth certificate were found on a table in the room. The State contends that the case sub judice is apposite to State v. Matias, where evidence that defendant was the only person who could have stuffed cocaine into the crease in the car seat was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 354 N.C. 549, 556 S.E.2d 269 (2001). Defendant relies on State v. Acolatse, *127where evidence that a police officer had seen the defendant make a throwing motion toward the bushes but cocaine was found on the roof of a garage not near the bushes, was not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 158 N.C. App. 485, 581 S.E.2d 807 (2003).
“ [Constructive possession depends on the totality of circumstances in each case.” State v. James, 81 N.C. App. 91, 93, 344 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1986). “[M]ere presence in a room where drugs are located does not itself support an inference of constructive possession.” Id. at 96, 344 S.E.2d at 81. However, “a showing by the State of other incriminating circumstances . . . permit[s] an inference of constructive possession.” Carr, 122 N.C. App. at 372, 470 S.E.2d at 73. Incriminating circumstances which have been identified by this Court and the North Carolina Supreme Court as relevant to constructive possession include evidence that defendant: (1) owned other items found in proximity to the contraband, State v. Autry, 101 N.C. App. 245, 252, 399 S.E.2d 357, 362 (1991); (2) was the only person who could have placed the contraband in the position where it was found, Matias, 354 N.C. at 552-53, 556 S.E.2d at 271; (3) acted nervously in the presence of law enforcement, State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 147-48, 567 S.E.2d 137, 141 (2002); (4) resided in, had some control of, or regularly visited the premises where the contraband was found, James, 81 N.C. App. at 95, 344 S.E.2d at 80-81; (5) was near contraband in plain view, State v. Alston, 91 N.C. App. 707, 710, 373 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1988); or (6) possessed a large amount of cash, State v. Neal, 109 N.C. App. 684, 687-88, 428 S.E.2d 287, 290 (1993).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession of cocaine sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. There was no evidence that defendant acted nervously when law enforcement entered nor that he made any motion to attempt to hide anything. Nor is there evidence that defendant owned any of the items found near the contraband. The presence of defendant’s birth certificate in the room does raise a suspicion that defendant resided on the premises where the cocaine was found, but in the absence of any other evidence of defendant’s residence, it is not sufficient to prove that defendant lived in the house. Defendant’s relative proximity to the cocaine on the bed also raises nothing more that a suspicion, because the bedding was extremely messy, making the small cocaine rock very difficult to see. The cocaine on the bed was not in “plain view” as contended by the State. As properly noted by the trial judge, the bag of cocaine behind the door “could have *128been there for weeks.” The State’s evidence has done nothing more than raise a strong suspicion as to defendant’s guilt, and this was not sufficient to survive defendant’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss charge No. 05CRS042576, possession of cocaine.
[2] Because the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to dismiss charge No. 05CRS042576, it lacked jurisdiction to submit to the jury the charge of attaining the status of habitual felon. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.5; State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 68, 650 S.E.2d 29, 36 (2007). Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s conviction for attaining the status of habitual felon, No. 05CRS064796.
Reversed.
Judge GEER concurs.
Judge TYSON dissents in a separate opinion.