" 'Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful determination to forego all parental *770duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.' " In re Young , 346 N.C. 244, 251, 485 S.E.2d 612, 617 (1997) (citation omitted). " 'Whether a biological parent has a willful intent to abandon his child is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence.' " In re S.Z.H. , --- N.C. App. at ----, 785 S.E.2d at 347 (citation omitted). However,
[a] judicial determination that a parent willfully abandoned her child, particularly when we are considering a relatively short six month period, needs to show more than a failure of the parent to live up to her obligations as a parent in an appropriate fashion; the findings must clearly show that the parent's actions are wholly inconsistent with a desire to maintain custody of the child .
Id. (citation omitted).
In support of its adjudication under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7), the trial court made the following uncontested findings of fact:
4. In May 2013, [Mother and Father] were involved in a domestic violence incident.... [They] voluntarily placed the [D.E.M.] in the physical custody of [ ] Petitioners. [D.E.M.] has been in the exclusive custody of [ ] Petitioners since May 2013.
5. [Mother] sent a text to [ ] Petitioners on May 31, 2013 that indicated that she was going to harm herself. As a result of [Mother's] text, substance abuse on the part of both [Mother and Father], and the unstable relationship between [Mother and Father], [ ] Petitioners filed a custody action and obtained a temporary custody order for [D.E.M.].
6. Following a hearing on November 14, 2013, the Court granted [ ] Petitioners full legal and physical custody of [D.E.M.].
*4067. Prior to entry of the November 2013 Order, the Court had granted [Mother and Father] supervised visitation. Neither parent exercised any supervised visitation with [D.E.M.] from June 2013 through November 2013.....
8. The November 2013 Order also granted [Mother and Father] visitation with [D.E.M.]. The visits were to be supervised by [ ] Petitioners for an initial sixty-day period. Thereafter the visits were to transition to unsupervised visitation.
9. [Mother] had one visit with [D.E.M.] on December 22, 2013. [She] did not feel comfortable with [ ] Petitioners' supervision and she did not pursue any further visits. Neither [Mother nor Father] exercised any visitation whatsoever with [D.E.M.] after December 2013 , even though the visitation schedule was to transition to unsupervised visits within a reasonable period of time.
10. Neither [Mother nor Father] has ever paid child support for the benefit of [D.E.M.] or offered any type of support for his case. [Mother and Father] did send Christmas gifts to [D.E.M.] in 2014. Both [Mother and Father] have been gainfully employed and have had the ability to provide support for the benefit of [D.E.M.].
11. A prior termination of parental rights proceeding was filed against [Mother and Father] in 2014. The decision in the prior proceeding was vacated by the North Carolina Court of Appeals on March 1, 2016.... During the entire time that the prior action was pending, [Mother and Father] did not pursue any attempts to contact [D.E.M.] .
12. [ ] Mother saw [D.E.M.] and Petitioner [grandfather] at a grocery store in May 2015 and spoke to the child. It did not appear that [D.E.M.] knew her.
13. The Court previously found [Mother's] excuses for not attempting to visit with [D.E.M.] unpersuasive. [Her] reasons for not attempting to visit with [D.E.M.] are even less persuasive now given the passage of time.
The trial court also "found:"
15. [Mother's and Father's] conduct with respect to the minor child evinces a settled purpose to forego their *407parental duties. They have failed and refused to perform the natural and legal obligations of parental care and support and as such they have abandoned the minor child since he has been in Petitioners' care, custody and control.
Mother argues that Finding 15 is actually a conclusion of law, and also argues that even *771if it is considered to be a finding of fact, it is not supported by the record evidence. The trial court concluded that Petitioners had shown "by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" that Mother and Father "have willfully abandoned" D.E.M. under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7).
Mother argues she cannot be deemed to have willfully abandoned D.E.M. during the six-month period from 8 September 2015 to 8 March 2016 because, until this Court vacated the order in its opinion filed in In re D.E.M. on 1 March 2016,3 she was bound by the trial court's prior order terminating her parental rights. Mother notes that "the trial court did not grant [her] visitation during the pendency of the initial appeal in this case" or stay the termination order pending her appeal, as authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1003. Mother contends that "[w]ithout an order from the trial court granting visitation pursuant to [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 7B-1003 or an entry of a stay by the Courts, [her] failure to contact D.E.M. was not willful."
We find Mother's argument without merit. The evidence and the trial court's findings show that Mother made no effort to contact D.E.M. and paid nothing toward his support during the six months at issue in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). While it is correct that the prior order terminating her parental rights remained in effect during this period, there is no evidence that Mother sought to stay the order while her appeal was pending pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1003(a), or otherwise requested visitation with D.E.M. from the trial court or Petitioners. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1003(b) (2015). To the contrary, the evidence shows Mother made no attempt to have any form of contact with D.E.M. While Mother now suggests she "was prohibited from contacting and visiting D.E.M.," no such prohibition was imposed. (Emphasis added). Although Mother's options were limited after she was divested of her parental rights, she was not absolved of the requirement that she take whatever measures possible to show an interest in D.E.M. Regarding an incarcerated father, this Court had held: "Although his options for showing affection are greatly limited, the respondent will not be excused from showing *408interest in the child's welfare by whatever means available. The sacrifices which parenthood often requires are not forfeited when the parent is in custody." Whittington v. Hendren (In re Hendren) , 156 N.C. App. 364, 368, 576 S.E.2d 372, 376 (2003). Similarly, in the present case, Mother had limited options to interact with D.E.M., yet she still failed to show that she even attempted to exercise any of the options available to her. Mother was not under any type of order restraining her from attempting to contact Petitioners about D.E.M., or sending gifts or letters to D.E.M. through Petitioners. Just as in Hendren , Mother's failure to even attempt to show affection for her child through her limited options was evidence that the child had been abandoned. Hendren , 156 N.C. App. at 369, 576 S.E.2d at 376-77.
In addition, "[a]lthough the trial court must examine the relevant six-month period in determining whether respondent abandoned the juvenile, the trial court may consider respondent's conduct outside this window in evaluating respondent's credibility and intentions ." In re C.J.H. , 240 N.C. App. at 503, 772 S.E.2d at 91 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Mother has demonstrated almost no interest in D.E.M. since losing custody of him. This Court detailed Mother's lack of interest in its prior opinion in this matter:
On 11 December 2013, following a hearing on the merits on 14 November 2013, the district court issued an order awarding petitioners primary legal and physical custody of [D.E.M.] As part of the court's custody order, [Mother] was granted the following visitation rights: "For the first sixty (60) days from the date of this hearing, [Mother] may have supervised visitation at [Petitioners'] home every other Sunday afternoon from 1:30 PM until 4:30 PM. If these visits go well and provided that there are no problems then for thirty (30) days after that [Mother] shall have unsupervised visitation with the minor child every other Sunday from 1:30 PM
*772until 6:30 PM. Following that initial unsupervised period, and if those visits go well and provided that there are no problems, [Mother] shall have unsupervised overnight visitation every third weekend of the month from Friday at 6:00 PM until Sunday at 6:00 PM."
On 29 May 2014, [P]etitioners filed a petition seeking the termination of [Mother]'s parental rights. Petitioners noted that at all times since [D.E.M.] was placed in their custody, [Mother] ... knew the street address and phone number of their residence, yet [Mother] "only had contact *409with the child one time since November 14, 2013 and less than a handful of times in total since May, 2013." In addition, at the time the petition was filed, [P]etitioners had not heard from [Mother] since 22 December 2013, which was the only time she visited [D.E.M.] since [P]etitioners were awarded primary custody of him. [Mother has never] paid any support for [D.E.M.] or offered any assistance for his care.
D.E.M. , --- N.C. App. ----, 782 S.E.2d 926. At the 13 September 2016 termination hearing, Petitioner-Grandmother testified:
[T]hrough this whole period, from the time that we first went to court, [Mother and Father] have had visitations. When we first started going to court we communicated through [Petitioner's attorney] to have visitation. At one point, [Mother] wanted to have visitation at playgrounds. We agreed. We have agreed to everything that she requested. But she would never contact us to set up these visits. We never went to any playground. Like I said, she did not show up to Our House [a child abuse and neglect prevention organization], in town. She has come to the one visit [on 22 December 2013].
Petitioner-Grandmother testified that Mother has never contacted her requesting to set up visitation with D.E.M. since that single 22 December 2013 visit, and that Mother has never tried to contact her since a Facebook message Mother sent to Petitioner-Grandmother in February 2014. Petitioner-Grandmother testified that other than a few gifts Mother brought on her 22 December 2013 visit, she has not "sent any type of gifts, cards, correspondence, anything whatsoever," to D.E.M. Mother testified that though she has been continually employed since at least September 2013, she has never sent any money to help support D.E.M.
The trial court's findings show that Mother unilaterally ceased her court-ordered visitation with D.E.M. in December of 2013 and made no further effort to preserve her relationship with D.E.M. Viewed against this history, the evidence of Mother's ongoing failure to visit, contact, or provide for D.E.M. from 8 September 2015 to 8 March 2016 allows a reasonable inference that she acted willfully. C.J.H. , 240 N.C. App. at 501-03, 772 S.E.2d at 91 ; see also In re Adoption of Searle , 82 N.C. App. 273, 276, 346 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1986) ("Whether a biological parent has a willful intent to abandon his child is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence."); In re Hughes , 74 N.C. App. 751, 759, 330 S.E.2d 213, 218 (1985) (Where "different inference[s] may be drawn from the evidence, [the trial court] alone *410determines which inferences to draw and which to reject."). Having made no gesture to assist Petitioners with the support of D.E.M., or to provide D.E.M. with her "presence, love and care ... by whatever means available," we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that Mother abandoned D.E.M. within the meaning of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). In re R.R. , 180 N.C. App. 628, 634, 638 S.E.2d 502, 506 (2006).
In light of our holding that grounds for termination exist under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7), we need not review the remaining ground found by the trial court under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(4). C.J.H. , 240 N.C. App. at 504, 772 S.E.2d at 92 ("Because we hold that the findings of fact support one ground for termination, we need not review the other challenged grounds. See In re Humphrey , 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426-27 (2003).").
IV. Disposition
Mother next claims the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that it was in D.E.M.'s best interests to terminate her parental rights at the dispositional stage of the proceeding. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2015). She argues the court made an erroneous *773assessment of D.E.M.'s best interests under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), based on its misunderstanding of North Carolina's adoption laws. We disagree.
"Once a trial court has concluded during the adjudication phase that grounds exist for termination of parental rights, it must decide in the disposition phase whether termination is in the best interests of the child." In re D.R.F. , 204 N.C. App. 138, 141, 693 S.E.2d 235, 238 (2010). The trial court's ruling on best interests will only be overturned pursuant to a showing that it abused its discretion. S.Z.H. , --- N.C. App. at ----, 785 S.E.2d at 345. The trial court must consider and make findings about the following criteria, insofar as they are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a).
*411In assessing the likelihood of D.E.M.'s adoption under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(2), the trial court found that "Petitioners have expressed their intentions to adopt [D.E.M.]." While Mother does not dispute the evidentiary support for this finding, she suggests that it "reflects [the court's] misapprehension of law" with regard to Petitioners' ability to adopt D.E.M. Specifically, she asserts that Petitioners lack standing to petition for D.E.M.'s adoption under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-2-301(a), which provides as follows:
A prospective adoptive parent may file a petition for adoption pursuant to Article 3 of this Chapter only if a minor has been placed with the prospective adoptive parent pursuant to Part 2 of Article 3 of this Chapter unless the requirement of placement is waived by the court for cause.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-2-301(a) (2015). Mother asserts that the 14 November 2013 custody order entered in 13 CVD 625 does not constitute an adoptive placement for purposes of Chapter 48 of our General Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-1-101(13) (2015) (defining "[p]lacement"); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-201(a) (2015) (defining who may place a minor for adoption). Therefore, she contends that "termination of [her] parental rights would make D.E.M. a legal orphan which is not in his best interest."
We find Mother's argument unpersuasive. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 48-2-301(a) expressly authorizes a waiver of the requirement of an adoptive placement "for cause." N.C.G.S. § 48-2-301(a). The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized a trial court's authority to waive the N.C.G.S. § 48-2-301(a) requirement. In re Adoption of Byrd , 354 N.C. 188, 191-92, 552 S.E.2d 142, 145 (2001) (where the trial court waived the prospective parent placement requirement for petitioners who filed to adopt a child the following day after the child's birth). Thus, it cannot be said Petitioners lack the ability to obtain standing to adopt D.E.M. Moreover, in the present case, Petitioners are D.E.M.'s grandparents and legal custodians; they have raised D.E.M. since he was eighteen months old; and they wish to adopt him. By all accounts, D.E.M. is thriving in Petitioners' home. D.E.M.'s GAL recommended the termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights in order to facilitate D.E.M.'s adoption by Petitioners. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in deeming it likely that Petitioners will adopt D.E.M. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in concluding that D.E.M.'s best interests would be served by terminating Mother's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). Accordingly, we affirm the termination order.
AFFIRMED.
Judge ARROWOOD concurs.
Judge STROUD dissents by separate opinion.