**54The question in this case is whether the voter-initiated amendment proposed by intervening defendant Voters Not Politicians (VNP) should be placed on the ballot. VNP launched a petition drive to propose an amendment that would reestablish a commission to oversee legislative redistricting. Plaintiffs brought suit to stop the petition from being placed on the ballot, making the now familiar argument that the proposed amendment is actually a "general revision" that can only be enacted through a constitutional convention.
We took this case to determine whether the VNP petition is a constitutionally permissible voter-initiated amendment under Const 1963, art 12, § 2. To answer this question, we must fulfill our Court's most solemn responsibility: to interpret and apply the pertinent provisions of our Constitution. After closely examining the text, structure, and history of the Constitution, we hold that, to be permissible, a voter-initiated amendment must propose changes that do not significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of the government in a manner equivalent to creating a new constitution. We reach this conclusion for the following reasons:
**55• The text of the relevant constitutional provisions, Const 1963, art 12, §§ 2 and 3, makes it clear that a constitutional convention is required to produce a new constitution. (See pages 20 through 31 of this opinion.)
• The primary substantive limitation in the text of the predecessor provision to Const 1963, art 12, § 2 originally imposed on voter-initiated amendments was removed more than 100 years ago. (See pages 20 through 22 of this opinion.)
• Our caselaw on this topic-undeveloped and largely not on point-fails to establish any controlling standard in this area. (See pages 12 through 19 of this opinion.)
In this case, VNP's amendment does not propose changes creating the equivalent of a new constitution:
• VNP's proposed redistricting commission is materially similar to the commission provided for in our current *250Constitution, and VNP's proposed redistricting standards are similar to the ones presently used. (See pages 38 through 44 of this opinion.)
• VNP's proposal does not substantially change the powers of the three branches of government when compared to where the people placed those powers in the 1963 Constitution. (See pages 44 through 50 of this opinion.)
• Finally, treating VNP's proposal as an amendment accords with the stated expectations of key delegates to the 1961-1962 constitutional convention, statements from this Court on this very topic, and the treatment of this issue by other states. (See pages 50 through 55 of this opinion.)
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that VNP's proposal is a permissible voter-initiated amendment.
**56I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
VNP is a ballot-question committee. It filed with defendant Secretary of State the initiative petition at issue in this case. The initiative proposal would, among other things, amend Const 1963, art 4, § 6, which established a commission to regulate legislative redistricting. The commission prescribed by our present Constitution is inactive because this Court declared that it could not be severed from apportionment standards contained in the Michigan Constitution that had been held to be unconstitutional, as explained further below.1 After that ruling, this Court oversaw redistricting until the Legislature took control of the process. VNP's proposal would bring Michigan's constitutional redistricting standards in line with federal constitutional requirements and revive the redistricting commission's authority to set redistricting plans for the state house, state senate, and federal congressional districts.
A sufficient number of registered electors signed the petition for it to be placed on the November 2018 general election ballot. Before the Board of State Canvassers could certify the petition for placement on the ballot,2 plaintiff Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution (CPMC), along with other plaintiffs,3 filed the present complaint for a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State and the Board to reject the VNP proposal. CPMC argued that the proposal was not an amendment of the Constitution that could be proposed by petition under Const 1963, art 12, § 2 ; rather, the **57proposal amounted to a "general revision" of the Constitution and could be enacted only through a constitutional convention under Const 1963, art 12, § 3. The Court of Appeals granted the request by VNP and other parties4 to intervene as defendants and to file a cross-complaint seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the proposal to be placed on the ballot.
In a unanimous published opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs' requested relief and granted the relief sought by intervening defendants, ordering the Secretary of State and the Board "to take all necessary measures to place the proposal on the November 2018 general *251election ballot."5 The Court noted that our courts have long distinguished between an "amendment" and a "revision."6 The former was a narrower concept focusing on specific changes to the Constitution, while the latter was a more comprehensive modification of fundamental government operations.7 To determine if a particular proposal changed the fundamental nature of the government, the Court of Appeals considered the quantitative and qualitative features of the proposal.8
Comparing the present proposal to those addressed in past cases, the Court observed that the proposal **58would continue, with modifications, the redistricting commission already in the Constitution (although not enforced).9 Also, the proposal "involve[d] a single, narrow focus-the independent citizen redistricting commission."10 While the proposal reduced this Court's oversight of redistricting plans from the level contemplated by the present Constitution, our Court would nonetheless retain control over challenges to redistricting plans.11 Regarding quantitative considerations, the Court of Appeals noted the number of words the proposal would add to the Constitution (4,834) and the fact that 11 sections would be changed across 3 articles of the Constitution.12 None of this, however, was enough to convince the Court that fundamental government operations would be altered. Thus, the proposal was an amendment that could be brought by petition, as it had been.
CPMC sought leave to appeal here and requested a stay of proceedings below so that the Board would not certify the proposal while the case remained pending. We denied the motion for a stay,13 but we granted leave to appeal to consider "whether the proposal at issue is eligible for placement on the November 2018 general election ballot as a voter-initiated constitutional amendment under Const 1963, art 12, § 2, or whether it is a revision to the Constitution and therefore is ineligible for placement on the ballot."14
**59II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A lower court's decision on whether to grant a writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.15 To the extent that a request for a writ of *252mandamus involves questions of law, we review them de novo.16
III. ANALYSIS
A. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Our Constitution is clear that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people."17 The people have chosen to retain for themselves, in Const 1963, art 12, § 2, the power to initiate proposed constitutional amendments that, if various requirements are met, will be placed on the ballot and voted on at election time. It has been observed that "there is no more constitutionally significant event than when the wielders of '[a]ll political power' under that document, Const 1963, art 1, § 1, choose to exercise their extraordinary authority to directly approve or disapprove of an amendment thereto. Const 1963, art 12, §§ 1 and 2."18 In this case, we must determine the scope of the voters' power to initiate amendments.
**60In answering this question, we do not consider whether the proposed amendment at issue represents good or bad public policy.19 Instead, we must determine whether the amendment meets all the relevant constitutional requirements.20 There may be an "overarching right" to the initiative petition, "but only in accordance with the standards of the constitution; otherwise, there is an 'overarching right' to have public policy determined by a majority of the people's democratically elected representatives."21 In particular, we have stated that the "right [of electors to propose amendments] is to be exercised in a certain way and according to certain conditions, the limitations upon its exercise, like the reservation of the right itself, being found in the Constitution."22
*253Our inquiry here, then, is to determine the extent of the people's right to initiate constitutional amendments and whether any clear limitations may be found **61in the Constitution.23 As with any constitutional provision, the objective of our interpretation " 'is to determine the text's original meaning to the ratifiers, the people, at the time of ratification.' "24 The primary rule is that of " 'common understanding,' " as Justice COOLEY explained long ago:
A constitution is made for the people and by the people. The interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it. "For as the Constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed."[25 ]
To help discover the "common understanding," this Court has observed "that 'constitutional convention debates and the address to the people, though not controlling, are relevant.' "26
**62B. OVERVIEW OF THE AMENDMENT AND REVISION PROCESS
Three basic procedures allow for alterations of the Constitution. The first, not directly relevant here, provides for "amendments" proposed in the Senate or House and approved by two-thirds of the members in each chamber, then submitted to the voters for approval.27 Const 1963, art 12, § 2 provides the second manner of altering the Constitution, which is the one VNP attempted here: "Amendments may be proposed to this constitution by petition of the registered electors of this state."28 "Every petition shall include the full text of the proposed amendment, and be signed by registered electors of the state equal in number to at least 10 percent of the total vote cast" for Governor in the most recent general gubernatorial election.29 Once the "person authorized by law to receive such petition" determines that the petition signatures *254were valid and sufficient, the proposed amendment is placed on the ballot.30 Finally, under Const 1963, art 12, § 3, the third manner of changing the Constitution is by constitutional convention.31 Every 16 years, "and at such times as may be provided by law, the question of a general revision of the constitution shall be submitted to the electors of the state"; if the voters vote in favor of performing a "general revision," a constitutional convention is convened for that purpose.32
We have explained that the adoption of the initiative power, along with other tools of direct democracy, **63"reflected the popular distrust of the Legislative branch of our state government."33 While the right to propose amendments by initiative must be done according to constitutional requirements, we have observed that "it may be said, generally, that [the right] can be interfered with neither by the legislature, the courts, nor the officers charged with any duty in the premises."34 Indeed, we have held that Article 12, § 2 is self-executing,35 although the Constitution explicitly allows the Legislature to prescribe by law procedures regulating the initiative.36
C. LIMITATIONS ON VOTER-INITIATED AMENDMENTS
The scope of the initiative amendment process and its relation to the "general revision" process is at the **64heart of this case. How extensive can a voter-initiated amendment be, and does the Constitution place any relevant subject matter limitations on such amendments?
1. CASELAW
We will begin with our caselaw on this topic, which ultimately proves unilluminating. There is no controlling authority from this Court construing the meaning of the term "amendment" in Article 12, § 2. The issue has been raised twice in the last 10 years, but neither case yielded a majority opinion from this Court construing the term "amendment" in this context. In Citizens ,37 the Court of Appeals addressed this issue for the first time. In that case, a group called Reform Michigan Government Now! (RMGN) submitted an initiative *255petition proposing a vast array of changes to Michigan's Constitution.38 CPMC argued that "the RMGN initiative petition [was] not eligible to be placed on the ballot because it [was] not merely an 'amendment' to the constitution, but [was] a 'general revision' ... that only a constitutional convention [could] accomplish."39 The Court distinguished an "amendment" from a "general revision" and held:
[I]n order to determine whether a proposal effects a "general revision" of the constitution, and is therefore not subject to the initiative process established for amending the constitution, the Court must consider both the quantitative nature and the qualitative nature of the proposed **65changes. More specifically, the determination depends on not only the number of proposed changes or whether a wholly new constitution is being offered, but on the scope of the proposed changes and the degree to which those changes would interfere with, or modify, the operation of government.[40 ]
In reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed: (1) the text of the constitutional provisions at issue;41 (2) two cases from this Court-one interpreting a city charter under the Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1 et seq .,42 and one interpreting the predecessor provisions of the 1908 Michigan Constitution;43 and (3) several cases from other jurisdictions, including two leading cases decided by the California Supreme Court.44 The Court "agree[d] with the reasoning of these decisions" and found them "to be consistent with Michigan law as stated in Laing and Pontiac School Dist ."45
Much of the Court of Appeals' analysis hinged on Laing and Pontiac Sch. Dist. , so it is worth considering whether those cases did, in fact, establish the above standard, and whether they are binding or persuasive authority. Despite the Court of Appeals' reliance on Laing and Pontiac Sch. Dist. , we find these cases to be of limited value on this topic. Laing is clearly distinguishable **66because, while it addressed the distinction between a "revision" and an "amendment," it did so in the context of a city charter under the Home Rule City Act.46 And, in any event, its discussion was unnecessary to resolving the case, since it occurred immediately after the Court's holding that "[t]he petition on its face is not in the form required by law, and raised no duty in defendants to provide for an election."47 We agree with the Solicitor General that this case is not binding; however, *256the Court's opinion does give some insight into the plain meaning of the terms "amendment" and "revision" 24 years after the 1908 Constitution was ratified:
"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the charter and are sometimes used inexactly, but there is an essential difference between them. Revision implies a re-examination of the whole law and a redraft without obligation to maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and submit a new instrument, whether the desired changes from the old be few or many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan and purport of the law, with corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental change, while amendment is a correction of detail.[48 ]
**67Nine months later, in Pontiac Sch. Dist. , this Court again addressed the distinction between an "amendment" and a "revision," this time in the context of a challenge to an amendment of the Constitution proposed under Article 17, § 2 of the 1908 Constitution, the predecessor to Article 12, § 2 of the 1963 Constitution.49 Without any discussion of the text of the provision, or citation of any authority (notably absent was any citation of Laing , decided less than a year earlier), the Court summarily rejected the argument that the amendment amounted to a revision because it "does not so interfere with or modify the operation of governmental agencies as to render it other than an amendment by way of an addition to the Constitution."50 It is hard to glean much meaning from this statement, since the Court did not purport to set forth a standard to govern this question but instead merely rejected the argument in the form that it was presented. Notably, the distinction between an amendment and a revision was contained only in the parties' arguments to the Court; speaking for itself, the Court did not actually embrace a dichotomy between "amendments" and "revisions" but simply concluded that the proposal was not so dramatic a change as to "render it other than an amendment ...."51
In Citizens , this Court had an opportunity to resolve the case under the amendment/revision dichotomy but declined to do so, affirming the result only and fracturing on the reasoning. Three justices gave a qualified endorsement of the Court of Appeals' articulation of the distinction between an "amendment" and a "general **68revision" of the Constitution.52 The remaining four justices declined to adopt the *257Court of Appeals' standard. Three of the four agreed with the order affirming, but did so based on grounds not addressed by the Court of Appeals, namely, that "a proposal of this extraordinary scope and multitude of unrelated provisions clearly cannot be reasonably communicated to the people in 'not more than 100 words,' " as required by Article 12, § 2.53 By its willingness to dispose of the case on the alternative ground that "[t]his language establishes a clear limitation on the scope of the constitutional amendments under [ Article 12, § 2 ],"54 the statement by this grouping of justices may be read as an implicit recognition that the "amendment/general revision" dichotomy did not provide such a clear limitation, at least not under the Court of Appeals' standard.55 Justice KELLY 's dissent questioned the test developed by the Court of Appeals and lamented that our failure to construct a clearer test left the state of the law unsettled.56 **69The Court of Appeals again confronted this issue in Protect Our Jobs v. Bd. of State Canvassers .57 As the Court summarized it, the ballot proposal at issue was narrow, providing in one constitutional section the "people with the right to organize and bargain collectively" with public and private employers, to the extent not preempted by federal law, and in another section "protecting the rights of classified civil service employees to bargain collectively concerning all conditions and aspects of employment except promotions."58 CPMC challenged the proposal on the same grounds it asserted in Citizens and is asserting in this lawsuit, i.e., that it was a general revision of the Constitution under Article 12, § 3.
The Court of Appeals rejected CPMC's challenge, using the "qualitative and quantitative" standard from its decision in Citizens and concluding that although the proposal might affect "various provisions and statutes," it was "limited to a single subject matter" and changed only two sections of the Constitution.59 By contrast, the RMGN proposal in Citizens
sought to replace vast portions of the constitution and massively modify the structure and operation of Michigan's government. The initiative proposal here is far more akin to a correction of detail than a fundamental change, when viewed in the proper context of the constitution as a whole. See Kelly v. Laing , 259 Mich. 212, 217, 242 N.W. 891 (1932).[60 ]
*258**70This Court did not order briefing on the issue61 and our opinion declined to address it.62
Thus, we could locate no controlling authority from this Court construing the meaning of the term "amendment" in Article 12, § 2. At most, Pontiac suggests there may be undefined limitations on what can be achieved by an amendment. Moreover, our caselaw lacks a detailed examination of this issue, especially one that conducts the proper analysis by examining the constitutional text. Perhaps as a result of veering from the text, the rather vague standard that has developed below affords courts considerable discretion in this area.63 We believe the constitutional text provides a clearer standard, which we turn to now.
**712. ARTICLE 12, § 2
The textual analysis begins with examining the meaning of "amendment" as used *259in the text.64 "Amendment" is relevantly defined as "an alteration of a legislative or deliberative act or in a constitution; a change made in a law, either by way of correction or addition," or "the correction of an error in a writ, record, or other judicial document."65 The definition does not directly speak to the breadth of the change **72that can be made by amendment or provide any substantive limitations on amendments.
With regard to limitations on the scope of amendments, the text of the predecessor provision to Article 12, § 2 was meaningfully changed soon after its ratification in 1908. When it was ratified, the Constitution gave the Legislature a veto over voter-initiated amendments before the election at which the proposal would appear on the ballot, and the Legislature could also submit alternative or substitute amendments.66 Yet despite the Legislature's considerable oversight, the framers of the Constitution nonetheless thought that "the effect of this provision [i.e., the initiative provision] will be the submission to a vote of the electors of **73practically all amendments petitioned for."67 In a telling passage of the Address to the People, the framers explained that legislative oversight of the amendments proposed by initiative was a crucial factor to the convention:
The convention realized the far-reaching effect that each amendment to the constitution may have beyond the immediate purpose intended by it, and it was deemed essential in so important a matter as changing the fundamental law of the state that the very greatest care should be required in both the form and substance of amendments to it. Such care is secured by requiring the amendments proposed to pass the scrutiny of the legislature .[68 ]
But even the legislative veto-the clearest and most significant substantive check on *260the petition power-was deleted by amendment in 1913.69 In light of this history, we should be wary of finding a textual limitations on voter-initiated amendments.
The critical limitation in Article 12, § 2-at least based on the amount of discussion it prompted at the 1961-1962 convention-is instead the procedural requirement of obtaining a certain number of signatures. Originally, signatures in a number equal to 20 percent of the vote at the most recent election for secretary of state had to be collected, but in 1913 this threshold was reduced to 10 percent of the votes for Governor at the **74most recent general gubernatorial election.70 The importance of this restriction in the constitutional framework was made abundantly clear by the framers of the 1963 Constitution, who engaged in a spirited debate regarding the signature requirement. At the convention, it was proposed, and briefly added to the constitution under consideration, that the 10 percent requirement be amended to include "or 300,000 such registered electors, whichever shall be less."71 The effect would have been to make it progressively easier to obtain enough signatures as the population increased. Delegate J. Harold Stevens successfully recommended striking this addition, arguing that the voter-initiated amendments should not be too easy to accomplish.72 But his concern reflected his belief that initiative amendments should not be akin to "statutory matter."73 He did not want to debase the Constitution by cluttering it with trivial amendments-in other words, he wanted amendments to be important enough to merit inclusion in a constitution. He was not, then, suggesting that initiative amendments should be limited to trivial matters; quite the contrary.74 **75Thus, the convention decided to keep voter-initiated amendments difficult because amendments, like the Constitution itself, were intended to deal with serious matters. The convention accomplished its goal by imposing what it viewed as the clearest and most stringent limitation on initiative amendments: a signature requirement.75 *2613. ARTICLE 12, §§ 2 AND 3 : THE NEW-CONSTITUTION TEST
The relevant substantive limitation on the scope of voter-initiated amendments arises from the text of Article 12, § 2 when read together with Article 12, § 3. By adopting these two different procedures for altering the Constitution, the framers intended that the mechanisms must be different in some regard. As one treatise similarly observed in 1910:
It may be argued ... that if a constitution specifically provides two methods of alteration, the language employed with reference to the proposal of amendments by the legislative method may, when read with that concerning the convention method, often be construed as an implied prohibition of complete constitutional revision by the legislative method.[76 ]
**76In other words, the distinction between changes proposed by amendments and changes proposed by a convention indicates a substantive difference that limits the breadth of amendments.
Our Constitution tells us what this basic difference is. The result of a constitutional convention called to consider a "general revision" is a "proposed constitution or amendments" adopted by the convention and proposed to the electors.77 The convention, then, can propose amendments to the existing Constitution or offer a new constitution.78 By contrast, if approved, a *262**77voter-initiated amendment under Article 12, § 2"shall become part of the constitution, and shall abrogate or amend existing provisions of the constitution ...."79 Consequently, an amendment does not replace a constitution in full, but simply adds to or abrogates specific provisions in an existing constitution.80 Thus, the constitutional text distinguishes between amendments that can be made by petition and new "constitutions." Because only the convention has the power to propose a constitution, by logical implication an initiative amendment cannot do so. And since this limitation would be meaningless if it only required a new constitution to be labeled as an amendment, it follows that an initiative amendment cannot propose changes that are tantamount to the creation of a new constitution.81 **78The phrase "general revision" supports this dichotomy between amendments and "new" constitutions, although the phrase has engendered some confusion. The "purpose" of a convention is to consider "the question of a general revision of the constitution ...."82 "General" means "dealing with all or the overall, universal aspects of the subject under consideration ...."83 "Revision," in turn, is relevantly defined as "the act or work of revising."84 *263This is how we **79characterized the term in Laing85 and how it was described at the 1908 convention: "What is meant by revision or to revise? Why simply to re-examine for the purpose of correction-the act of reviewing or re-examination for the purpose of correction."86 The "revision" is simply the process for reconsidering the constitution as a whole. It is not, as some Court of Appeals opinions suggest,87 a particular document or proposed change. Thus a "revision" is not contradistinguished from an "amendment." Rather, as noted, the distinction between the Article 12, § 3 convention process and the Article 12, § 2 amendment process is that the former can produce a proposed constitution, while the latter is limited to proposing less sweeping changes.88 **80Having determined that the relevant substantive limitation is that a voter-initiated amendment cannot be equivalent to a new constitution, we must determine what this limitation entails. As an initial matter, the number of changes is not dispositive, as even a limited number of changes can have the effect of creating a new constitution.89 A constitution, after all, is more *264than words on a page. Its most basic functions are to create the form and structure of government, define and limit the powers of government, and provide for the protection of rights and liberties.90 These are **81the basic threads of a constitution, and when they are removed, replaced, or radically rewoven, the whole tapestry of the constitution may change.
Therefore, changes that significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of our government, in a manner equivalent to creating a new constitution, are not amendments under Article 12, § 2.91 Contrary to the suggestion in Pontiac Sch. Dist. ,92 it is not necessarily the impact on the operations of government that matters-like the United States Supreme Court, we decline to accept "the narrow-minded assumption" that the only purpose of our constitutional provisions "is to make the government run as efficiently as possible."93 Further, a change that recalibrates the relative power **82of the branches of government-such as limiting or taking away a specific power from one branch-is not, absent a significant effect on the structure of government, a change that is tantamount to the creation of a new constitution.94 Indeed, we have stated that, despite its eliminating power from the judiciary *265or executive branch, an amendment permitting indeterminate criminal sentences was "the people['s] exercise[ ] [of] a right inherent in them to adopt a constitutional amendment taking away from, or adding to, the powers of either of the departments of government."95 In fact, it would be difficult to imagine many amendments that leave the proportionate powers of the branches completely unchanged.96
IV. APPLICATION
Given the above analysis, VNP's proposal will be considered a permissible amendment if it does not propose changes that significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of our government in a way that is tantamount to creating a new constitution. To answer this question, we must examine our current law on redistricting and apportionment and how VNP's proposal would change that law.
**83A. APPORTIONMENT AND REDISTRICTING
Under our first three Constitutions, the Legislature was granted authority to redistrict.97 But the Legislature did not always carry out this responsibility.98 In light of this history, two competing voter-initiated amendments to the then-existing Constitution were placed on the November 1952 ballot.99 One was approved, which wrote directly into the Constitution the then-existing alignment of seats in the Senate provided for in the 1952 amendment, added 10 seats to the House, and conferred upon the Board of State Canvassers the obligation to draw up new house districts if the Legislature failed to act.100
Our present Constitution, as ratified by the voters in 1963, laid out a different framework for reapportionment and redistricting, although for reasons that will become clear below, it is not currently followed.101
**84Under the Constitution, "the 38 *266members of Michigan's senate and the 110 members of the house of representatives are elected according to the district in which they reside. The Constitution sets forth the apportionment factors and rules for individual districts, which are redrawn after" the federal census is published.102 The Constitution aligns the senate districts with counties and apportions senators based on "factors" consisting of percentages of the county's population and "land area" in the state.103 The house districts were based on counties and apportioned according to population.104 In other words, the apportionment was based on "weighted land area/population formulae."105
A key innovation of the 1963 Constitution was to create a bipartisan "commission on legislative apportionment" to draw the relevant district lines.106 The commission consisted of eight seats, with the major political parties each entitled to appoint four members.107 The Secretary of State was the commission's nonvoting secretary, required to furnish "all necessary technical services," and the Legislature was required to "appropriate funds to enable the commission to carry out its activities."108 The commission was required **85to "hold public hearings as may be provided by law."109 The commission had to complete its work within 180 days of the census data becoming available.110 Each final apportionment and districting plan adopted by the commission had to be published and would become law 60 days after publication.111 If the commission could not agree on a plan, commissioners could submit plans to our Court, which was required to "determine which plan complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements" and direct that the plan be adopted.112 The Court was also given jurisdiction over any application filed by electors within 60 days of publication of the plan.113
As our present Constitution was being deliberated at the 1961-1962 constitutional convention, the United States Supreme Court was also considering constitutional challenges to apportionment schemes. In 1962, that Court held that challenges to apportionment plans were justiciable, setting the stage for vast changes in this area of law.114 Two years later, in Reynolds v. Sims , the Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis."115 Geographical considerations, such as apportionment based on counties, could no longer play a role in apportionment if they **86produced population deviations between *267the districts.116 One week after Reynolds was decided, the United States Supreme Court peremptorily reversed a federal district court's earlier judgment that Michigan's apportionment rules were constitutional, which invalidated them.117
Days after Reynolds was decided, we ordered the commission to adopt a new plan for redistricting and apportionment that complied with the Supreme Court's decisions in Reynolds and various related cases decided the same day.118 When the commission failed to reach an agreement, we issued an opinion directing it to adopt the so-called Austin-Kleiner Plan, as it most closely adhered to the new constitutional requirements.119 In a concurrence, Justice SOURIS argued that the commission "was so dependent upon the continuing validity of the [now unconstitutional apportionment formula] by which the commission's duties were specified and expressly limited, that it could not survive alone."120
The apportionment issue was back before the Court in 1972 after the commission once again deadlocked **87and invoked our supervision.121 We ordered the adoption of a proposed apportionment plan, but did not comment on the viability of the commission.122 Justice T. G. KAVANAGH dissented, reaching the same conclusion Justice SOURIS had in 1964: the commission could not exist-i.e., was not severable from-the unconstitutional apportionment standards in our Constitution.123
In 1982, with yet another deadlocked commission seeking our supervision, we adopted the position of Justices SOURIS and T. G. KAVANAGH by declaring that the commission was not severable from the unconstitutional apportionment provisions it was directed to implement.124 We thought the commission was inseparable from the unconstitutional standards because holding otherwise would have required us to opine on whether the people would have voted for the commission without those standards.125 Because the issue of changing how legislators are chosen is "a fundamental matter," we would not "speculate on a matter of such enormous importance."126 Critically, we emphasized repeatedly that "[t]his is a decision which the people *268should make."127 It was a decision, we suggested, that the people could initiate through a constitutional amendment:
**88The power to redistrict and reapportion the Legislature remains with the people. The people, however, can only exercise that power, as a practical matter, by amending the constitution, which, unless the Legislature proposes an amendment acceptable to the people, is a difficult and time-consuming process.[128 ]
Tellingly, we noted in the same discussion that "[t]he initiative process is also difficult and time-consuming."129 Because that process was slow, and a plan needed to be formulated in the meantime, we appointed an individual to oversee the drawing of a redistricting and apportionment plan consistent with various principles we established.130 We noted, however, that the Legislature could draw its own plan, which would supersede the one we set in motion.131 But again, we stressed that our plan was merely a stopgap that would "stand until the people act, or it is changed by the collective action of the other two branches of this government, composed of persons who are the most immediate representatives of the people."132 It was not until 1996 that the Legislature codified apportionment standards and committed itself to drawing districts in the future.133
Thus, the last time the voters had direct input on this issue, they opted for apportionment and redistricting to be conducted by a commission. The rules to be implemented by that commission have been declared unconstitutional, and we deactivated the commission by concluding **89that it was not severable from those unconstitutional rules. The Legislature now exercises a power that the Constitution of 1963 expressly denied to it-to draw legislative districts-because our Constitution has never been amended to modify the unconstitutional provisions concerning apportionment and redistricting.
B. THE VNP PROPOSAL
That is precisely what VNP's constitutional amendment proposes to do. To accomplish this task, the proposal would eliminate the current language in the Constitution laying out the apportionment formulae.134 Instead, seven criteria are proposed, requiring that the districts must, in order of priority: (1) have "equal population as mandated by the United States Constitution," (2) "be geographically contiguous," (3) "reflect the state's diverse population and communities of interest," (4) "not provide a disproportionate advantage to any political party," measured by "accepted measures of partisan fairness," (5) "not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official," (6) "reflect consideration of county, city, and township boundaries," and (7) "be reasonably compact."135
Rather than rewriting the constitutional section governing the commission, the *269VNP proposal simply deletes the language in Const 1963, art 4, § 6 establishing the commission.136 In its place, the proposal offers a reformed commission that is similar to its **90predecessor.137 Like the old one, it consists of four members from each major political party, but it would have five additional members who are declared independent voters.138 All 13 members would be selected from a pool of candidates who have submitted applications, taken oaths, and met various other requirements.139 The leaders of both parties in the Senate and House can strike, in total, 20 names from the applicant pools.140 The commission, once selected, must hold public hearings and its contact with the public is regulated in detail by the proposal.141 A plan is adopted only with at least two votes from each subgroup (Republicans, Democrats, and independents), as well as a majority of the whole.142
The proposal continues nearly verbatim various ancillary provisions from the 1963 commission. The Secretary of State, for example, remains a nonvoting secretary of the commission, charged with providing the commission "all technical services that the commission deems necessary."143 Likewise, the Legislature remains obligated to "appropriate funds" for the commission, although the proposal provides a detailed breakdown of what the funds go to, whereas the 1963 Constitution simply required the appropriation of sufficient funds "to enable the commission to carry out its activities."144 Our Court has a similar, if perhaps narrower, **91jurisdictional grant under the proposal: we can "direct the Secretary of State or the commission to perform their respective duties," and we may also "review a challenge to any plan adopted by the commission" and "shall remand a plan to the commission for further action if the plan fails to comply with the requirements of this Constitution, the Constitution of the United States or superseding federal law."145 The proposal adds various provisions clarifying that the commission's power is legislative and not subject to the Legislature's146 or the Governor's147 control, and the vesting clauses of the judicial, executive, and legislative branches are amended so as to vest power in their respective branches "except to the extent limited or abrogated" by certain of the new provisions.148
C. ASSESSING THE PROPOSAL
To determine whether VNP's proposal is a permissible amendment, we must ask whether it significantly alters or abolishes the form or structure of our government in *270a manner that is tantamount to creating a new constitution.149 **93One central feature of the VNP amendment is that it sweeps away unconstitutional provisions that have remained in the Constitution for some time. The "weighted land area/population formulae" and the accompanying apportionment factors150 are gone, and so counties would not be the organizing feature of redistricting plans. But these changes involve no great transformation because these features were held unconstitutional 36 years ago. In their place our state has used federal constitutional requirements and various state "guidelines,"151 enacted in 1996, including that the districts "[be] areas of convenient territory contiguous by land,"152 "preserve *271county lines with the least cost to the principle of equality of population,"153 and remain as compact as possible when drawn within a city or township with multiple districts.154 VNP's proposed standards reflect many of the same principles, including, of course, adhering to federal law, and also requiring contiguous districts, respecting municipal boundaries, and seeking reasonable compactness.155 The proposal contains a few new items too, such as considerations of partisan fairness. But given their continuities with the current standards, VNP's proposed standards are no revolution in redistricting, and they certainly do not portend a transformation of our form or structure of government. **94As noted above, various provisions in VNP's proposal mirror those in the current Constitution. The Secretary of State has substantially the same general responsibilities, being the nonvoting secretary of the commission responsible for furnishing its needs.156 The Secretary of State has more detailed obligations under the proposal, involving the formation of the commission.157 But these tasks are ministerial and in line with our current Constitution-requiring the Secretary of State to manage applications or other records is business as usual, not a new way of governing Michigan.158
Since plaintiffs and the Chief Justice's dissent concede that "the people can alter the power of redistricting by amending the Constitution,"159 the more significant argument against the VNP proposal is that it disrupts the separation of powers. The powers are most glaringly reconfigured, according to plaintiffs, by the proposal's inclusion of limiting language in the vesting clauses of each branch. The legislative, executive, and judicial branches are given their respective powers "except to the extent limited or abrogated" by certain parts of the proposal.160 The dissent takes the position that these changes "fundamentally change the operation **95of our government" by limiting the vested powers of the branches and creating a new commission with responsibility for redistricting.161 We disagree.
The limitations in the vesting clauses are, in many ways, the result of VNP's attempt to comply with other requirements in Article 12, § 2. By including this language, the proposal simply seeks to harmonize its changes with the rest of the Constitution. This is important because Article 12, § 2 requires that the proposal republish for the voters any portion of the *272present Constitution that the proposed amendments would alter or abrogate.162 This requirement has kept at least one proposal off the ballot in the recent past.163 By explicitly adding limitations to the vesting clauses here, VNP sought to avoid any argument that it was implicitly altering or abrogating the vesting clauses or other parts of the Constitution. More broadly, by adding this language, the proposal makes explicit what would have been implicit without the language-the proposal does have some effect on the responsibilities and powers of the branches of government. But the proposed language in the vesting clauses tells us nothing useful to the critical inquiry: just how significant are the changes? The proposal is in jeopardy only if the changes are equivalent to the creation of a new constitution. To answer that question, we have to examine the proposed changes that affect the branches' relative powers.
To begin, consider how the proposal would change the present Constitution with regard to the Legislature.
**96The present Constitution does not accord the Legislature any role in the redistricting or apportionment process. Instead, like VNP's proposal, a commission is placed in charge. The commissions are materially similar. Both are charged with drawing a redistricting plan based on various guidelines. And while the guidelines have changed, as explained above, VNP's proposal actually reflects many of the same standards currently used. The major difference between the 1963 Constitution's commission and VNP's is the process by which commission members are chosen. VNP's proposal is undoubtedly more elaborate on this point. Nonetheless, as with the old commission, VNP's proposal seeks to ensure that the membership strikes a partisan balance. In fact, in doing so, VNP's proposal gives the Legislature a formal role in the process, with the majority and minority leaders of each house entitled to a certain number of vetoes on members.164 The Legislature has no such role in the 1963 Constitution's commission. If anything, then, VNP's proposal increases, slightly, the Legislature's participation in the process over the level contemplated in 1963. And the Legislature's new, minor role does not come at the expense of either of the other two branches, which have no real part in this process.
Of course, we are not oblivious to the fact that the Legislature, since 1996, has established the standards and framework for redistricting, as well as drafted the plans.165 But the current state of affairs is a deviation from what the voters chose when they ratified the 1963 **97Constitution.166 Under the 1963 Constitution, the *273power to draw districts never belonged to the Legislature. Rather, its present role is solely due to a judicial remedy we crafted in light of our conclusion that the unconstitutional apportionment standards the commission was directed to implement could not be severed from the commission itself.167 Nothing about the commission was intrinsically unconstitutional. Thus, to the extent that the Legislature's power is being diminished, that power had not been granted by the **98people through the Constitution. If anything, VNP's proposal is an attempt to correct the constitutional deficiencies so that the basic design of the 1963 Constitution-which created an independent redistricting commission-can be implemented. We cannot reasonably conclude that this effort to revivify and improve upon a feature of the present Constitution amounts to a substantial alteration in the form or structure of our government.168
The executive branch is not significantly affected by the proposal. Under the 1963 Constitution, the executive played no role in redistricting except for the Secretary of State's various responsibilities. Those would expand under VNP's proposal, as noted above, but not in any material respect. VNP's proposal neither adds to nor subtracts from any other responsibilities or powers of the executive branch compared to its position under the present Constitution. Any additional powers the executive might currently have-such as a veto over the Legislature's statutorily drawn redistricting-do not flow from a constitutional grant of power, but instead from the provisional situation that has been created by declaring the 1963 commission to be inseverable from the unconstitutional apportionment standards.
Finally, VNP's proposal only modestly changes the judicial branch's role in the redistricting process. The 1963 Constitution has provided this Court with jurisdiction when the commission reached an impasse, **99which it often did.169 In such cases, the commission members could submit *274proposed plans to this Court, and we would have to select the one that best reflected constitutional requirements.170 Additionally, the Constitution provided us original jurisdiction over applications by electors after the commission published a plan-we could then direct the Secretary of State and the commission to "perform their duties," review the commission's proposed plan, and remand the plan to the commission "if it fails to comply with the requirements of this constitution."171 Thus, the Constitution offered this Court a limited array of options to review redistricting plans. VNP's proposal does likewise. In some ways, in fact, the review is slightly broader. When the original commission failed to reach agreement under the current Constitution, this Court was empowered only to select between the plans proposed by the commission members. Under VNP's proposal, we can review any challenge to a plan for compliance not only with this Constitution, but also the United States Constitution and "superseding federal law."172 Thus, the Court would no longer have the option to choose a plan-from those presented-but it would maintain the same general powers it wielded under the 1963 Constitution as ratified.173 **100In sum, VNP's proposal leaves the form and structure of the government essentially as it was envisioned in the 1963 Constitution. Consequently, it is not equivalent to a new constitution and is therefore a permissible amendment under Const 1963, art 12, § 2.174
This conclusion finds support from a host of other considerations. It is consistent with the expectations of key members of the 1961-1962 constitutional convention, as evidenced by their discussion of the signature requirement in Article 12, § 2. During that discussion, which centered on whether to add an alternative requiring only 300,000 signatures,175 some delegates expressed the belief that a voter-initiated amendment could be used to change the apportionment system, which was a noted problem at the convention. One delegate-referring to the United States Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Baker v. Carr , which opened the door to constitutional challenges to redistricting176 -thought that the initiative could be "a remedy to the problem of reapportionment."177
*275Delegate Stevens, one of the leading proponents of keeping **101the amendment process difficult, agreed, opining that "the initiative could be used for amending the constitution to make apportionment ... or changing the apportionment easier."178
Similarly, when declaring the redistricting commission not viable in 1982, this Court suggested that our apportionment system could be addressed through an amendment to the Constitution initiated by the people.179 Our statement, quoted above, bears repeating: "The power to redistrict and reapportion the Legislature remains with the people ."180 It was only because the amendment process-whether initiated by the Legislature or the people-was time-consuming that we invited the Legislature to fill the void.181 As Justice LEVIN later explained, our approach in 1982 was based, in part, on the "assumption ... that responsible persons would come forth and place on the ballot, and the people would adopt, new apportionment rules in time for the 1992 and 1994 elections. Indeed, that was one of the arguments for non-severability-to highlight the need for a new constitutional provision regarding legislative apportionment."182 "The Court's exhortation," he added, "has not been heeded."183
**102The history of our constitutional amendments, too, supports treating VNP's proposal as a proper voter-initiated amendment.184 Most directly, the voters have in the past proposed a number of amendments dealing with apportionment,185 including one successful amendment that, in certain circumstances, expressly stripped the Legislature of the power to redistrict. In 1952, voters initiated two competing constitutional amendments addressing apportionment.186 The successful amendment "guaranteed the decennial reapportionment of the house of representatives substantially on a population basis, and fixed senate districts permanently in the constitution ...."187 The Legislature was responsible *276for reapportioning the house, but, critically, if it failed to do so "in accordance with the mandate of this [constitutional] article, the board of state canvassers" was required to reapportion the districts.188 In other words, the voters initiated an amendment that, in certain cases, eliminated the Legislature's reapportionment power and gave it to an agency in the executive branch. By comparison, VNP's proposal is more modest-the present Constitution **103prescribes a commission for these purposes, and VNP's amendment would retain that commission. The voters have also approved, in the past, various amendments creating commissions or affecting the powers of government at various levels and branches.189
Other states have created independent redistricting commissions through voter-initiated amendments, including Arizona and California.190 And the issue of whether to create such a commission has appeared on the ballot, by virtue of the initiative process, numerous times in multiple states.191 Similarly, citizens in several states have employed initiatives to accomplish redistricting.192
**104Our conclusion today is also reinforced by the reasoning in Bess v. Ulmer , which addressed a similar argument concerning a similar ballot proposal.193 In Bess , a "Legislative Resolve" placed a proposed amendment before the voters that would remove the reapportionment power from the executive branch (where the state's constitution had placed it) and transfer it to a "neutral body."194 Using a test similar to what the Court of Appeals employed in this case-focusing on the quantity and quality of the proposed changes and whether the changes were few, simple, and *277of less importance-the Alaska Supreme Court determined that the proposal was an amendment:
Reassigning this power is unquestionably a significant change in the present system of Alaskan government. It does not, however, deprive the executive branch of a "foundational power," and as a result does not constitute a revision. As the quantitative effect of the proposal is minimal, the qualitative force of this narrow change would have to be greater to satisfy our hybrid test. The essential function of the executive branch-to enforce the laws of the state-remains unchanged, as does its structure. No executive power is delegated to either of the other two branches. In fact, the intent of the Framers in giving the reapportionment power to the executive was primarily to prevent the abuse or neglect of that power in the hands of the legislature, rather than to safeguard a uniquely executive function.[195 ]
**105In our case, the framers of the 1963 Constitution did not assign the apportionment power to any elected body, and so the effect of the changes here would be even less significant than that in Bess .196
Thus, our holding here reflects the constitutional text, our historical experience, logic, and the wisdom of other states. For all the above reasons, then, we conclude that VNP's proposal does not create the equivalent of a new constitution by significantly altering or abolishing the form or structure of our government and is, instead, a permissible voter-initiated amendment.197
The question we face today has broad significance for the people of this state: what limitations have they placed, in the Constitution they ratified, on their power to put forward voter-initiated amendments? This question implicates some of the oldest and most perplexing problems in political theory, such as the nature of sovereignty, republicanism, and democracy. But it is not a judge's role to philosophize a theory of government. Rather, we are stewards of the people and must faithfully abide by the decisions they make through the laws they adopt. We accomplish this by adhering to the plain meaning of the text of those laws. Here, that approach leads us to conclude that a voter-initiated amendment under **107Const 1963, art 12, § 2 is permissible if it does not significantly alter or abolish the form or structure of our government, making it tantamount to creating a new constitution. VNP's proposal surpasses these hurdles and is a permissible voter-initiated amendment under Article 12, § 2. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Pursuant to MCR 7.315(C)(3), the Clerk of the Court is directed to issue the judgment forthwith.
David F. Viviano
Bridget M. McCormack
Richard H. Bernstein
Elizabeth T. Clement