This matter is before the supreme court on a grant of certiorari. We examine the question presented but leave undisturbed the result reached below.
This case involves an appeal to the judiciary from a Workers’ Compensation Hearing Officer's ruling. The granting of certiorari was premised upon a possible inequitable barring of appeal. The final order in this case was filed December 7, 1988. Petitioner claims that she did not receive notice of the decision until January 11, 1989; thirty-five days after the filing and five days too late for her to appeal the decision. Supreme Court Rule 12-601, which controls the time limitation for appeals from special proceeding to the judiciary, allows appeals only within thirty days from the filing of the order, SCRA 1986, 12-601. Petitioner apparently contends that she was unaware of the final ruling until after the thirty days had elapsed. If this were the case, it would be inequitable indeed, and for this reason cer*35tiorari was granted. An examination of the record, however, reveals that no inequity existed. Her attorney was aware of the ruling of the judge by letter before a written order was actually filed. Several alternatives to protect petitioner’s right to appeal existed. Petitioner next contends that it does not matter that she missed the deadline for filing her appeal under Rule 12-601, because she met the deadline for filing an appeal under statutory provisions-governing the Workers’ Compensation Division, NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-8(A) (Repl.Pamp.1987), which allows filing thirty days after the order is mailed. In this situation, a rule adopted by the supreme court supersedes an inconsistent statute. American Auto. Assoc. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 102 N.M. 527, 697 P.2d 946 (1985); James v. Human Serv. Dep’t, Income Support Div., 106 N.M. 318, 742 P.2d 530 (Ct.App.), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 353, 742 P.2d 1058 (1987). Petitioner’s counsel was aware of this, and a written admission can be found in the court file (December 8, 1988, letter to David Grove, exhibit “1”). No confusion existed as to what time limitation controlled this appeal.
Ms. Maples worked for the State of New Mexico and was injured on the job on April 21, 1986. The State of New Mexico paid her temporary disability benefits and medical benefits from the outset, but did not concede permanent and total disability. Ms. Maples retained an attorney, who moved for a hearing to determine four issues: 1) whether Ms. Maples was permanently and totally disabled; 2) whether she should be awarded medical benefits; 3) whether she should be awarded her disability payments in a lump sum rather than weekly; and 4) the amount to be awarded. A hearing was set for October 5, 1988, before Judge Gregory Griego. All issues that dealt directly with petitioner’s claims were decided at that time. No lump sum payment was granted, but she was determined to be permanently and totally disabled. The state was to continue to pay her medical bills, and her disability payment was to remain at $136.33 a week. This ruling was set out in a letter decision and sent to the parties on October 9, 1988. The parties had notice of the court’s ruling at this early date.
Her attorney then filed a motion for a hearing on attorney’s fees. A hearing was set for October 25, 1988, at which time the attorney’s fees were denied.
Counsel again filed a motion for a hearing on attorney’s fees. A second hearing was set for November 25, 1988. After hearing arguments a second time, both parties were informed that the judge’s original denial of the award of attorney’s fees would stand, be incorporated into the letter decision, and filed. The decision was filed within twelve days, on December 7, 1988.
WAS PETITIONER BARRED FROM APPEAL?
Counsel was not unaware of the ruling of the court, only of the exact date of the filing of the order. He had notice of the court’s ruling on the merits in October, and notice of the denial of attorney’s fees orally from the bench on October 25, which was reiterated on November 25. At this point he had several possible courses of action. He could have filed an appeal immediately, pending the filing of the decision, under SCRA 1986, 12-201(A) which provides:
A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, or return of the verdict, but before filing of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed after such filing and on the day thereof.
This alternative was reaffirmed in Weiss v. Hanes Manufacturing Co., 90 N.M. 683, 568 P.2d 209 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977). Maples’ attorney also could have called the workers’ compensation office weekly to determine if the decision had been filed; he could have called the office of his opposing counsel, who apparently received notice of the filing within a few days of the filing date after he received the late notice. If nothing else, Maples’ attorney could have moved for an extension of time in which to file the appeal under SCRA 1986, 12-201(E)(2), whereupon *36the court could have determined if the circumstances constituted “excusable neglect or circumstances beyond the control of the appellant.”
Petitioner was aware that the hearing officer had ruled on the merits and that the award of attorney’s fees in this case had been denied before the ruling was filed. On the application for certiorari it appears petitioner and her counsel had no notice as to the ruling of the court until the decision was received in the mail, when the time to appeal had passed. Steps could and should have been taken at that time to perfect an appeal as outlined above.
CONFLICT BETWEEN SUPREME COURT RULE 12-601 AND NMSA 1978, SECTION 52-5-8(A).
It is true that Rule 12-601 and Section 52-5-8(A) both deal with the amount of time allowed for appeal from workers’ compensation decisions to the judiciary. Rule 12-601 allows appeal within thirty days from the filing; the statute allows appeal within thirty days from the mailing. This conflict could lead to confusion. However, in 1985 this court held in American Automobile Association v. State Corporation Commission, 102 N.M. 527, 697 P.2d 946 (1985) that: “the law is clear that on procedural matters such as time limitations for appeals, a rule adopted by the Supreme Court governs over an inconsistent statute.” See also James v. Human Serv. Dep’t, Income Support Div., 106 N.M. 318, 742 P.2d 530 (Ct.App.), cert. quashed, 106 N.M. 353, 742 P.2d 1058 (1987) (holding that time limitations on the right to appeal are peculiarly within the power of the judiciary to set).
The language of the rule itself dictates that it controls over conflicting law. This is especially clear when one considers that this rule was changed in 1986. The language was significantly strengthened from: “Except as may be otherwise provided by law.” NMSA 1978, Civ.App.R. 13 (Repl.Pamp.1984), to the current language: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law.’’ SCRA 1986, 12-601(A).
Petitioner argues that the statute should control despite this strong language, based on the precedent set in In re Application of Angel Fire Corporation, 96 N.M. 651, 634 P.2d 202 (1981). In that case we found that administrative procedures must be exhausted before the court gains jurisdiction. In this case, unlike Angel Fire, the administrative procedures have been exhausted. A final order was entered, and nothing was left to be done by the Workers’ Compensation Division. In Angel Fire, the appeal was taken from a decision of the State Engineer’s office. Jurisdiction was not relinquished to the court because the administrative process was still continuing, despite the fact that some partial decisions had been made and were final. The result in this case is final. The only place to appeal this order was to the judiciary. The courts must gain jurisdiction at some point. An appeal from a final order to the judiciary is necessarily the point at which the judicial branch gains jurisdiction. When it does, it is inherently within the power of the court to set its own time limitations for appeals. The legislature has no power to fix the time within which an appeal must be heard by the supreme court in appeals from the district courts. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 2237, 56 L.Ed.2d 404 (1978). It follows that the court should have the power to set the time for all appeals from final orders, including appeals from final orders of administrative agencies. Supreme Court Rule 12-601 is the controlling rule in appeals from Workers’ Compensation actions.
IF NO NOTICE HAD BEEN GIVEN.
The erroneous premise upon which we granted certiorari in this case is of great concern to this court: if parties have no idea as to the outcome of a hearing and then are not mailed notice until after the appeal time has run, are they without remedy and barred from appeal? In any hearing before the judiciary, NMSA 1978, Section 39-1-2, requires notice to be given before a judgment may be entered. In Montano v. Encinias, 103 N.M. 515, 709 *37P.2d 1024 (1985), this court held that a judgment entered without notice was subject to being vacated. Counsel in that case was notified of the judgment after the time for filing an appeal had expired. The trial court denied an extension of time to appeal. This court reversed and vacated the judgment so that a new judgment could be entered upon notice. Although this case dealt with an appeal from the district court, the equitable principles informing both Section 39-1-2 and our opinion in Montano also may apply in an appropriate case to an appeal from an administrative hearing.
It is clear from the facts in this case that petitioner’s attorney had notice of the result in this case before it was filed and had several alternatives to preserve his appeal before, during, and after the final written order was entered. The fact that conflicting time limitations for appeal exists within the Workers’ Compensation Act and Rule 12-601 is troubling and could lead to confusion. The language of 12-601 was strengthened for a reason: to keep a tighter control over appeals to the judiciary. It shall be enforced accordingly. It is the responsibility of attorneys to be aware of the procedural rules that control their clients’ appeals. Rule 12-601 controls over the statute in this situation, and the supreme court has exclusive constitutional power to regulate pleadings and procedure before the judiciary. Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SOSA, C.J., and WILSON, J., concur.
RANSOM and MONTGOMERY, JJ., dissent.