The Court of Appeals held that a condemning agency cannot take a larger estate in the condemned land than is necessary to carry out the public purpose for which the land is condemned. For this reason, said the Court of Appeals, the City could condemn only an easement in the property. We disagree with the Court of Appeals.
*225In Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co. v. Davis, 19 N.C. 451 (1837), we dealt with the condemnation of land for the construction of a railroad. Chief Justice Ruffin, writing for the Court, explained the nature of the power of eminent domain. He pointed out that unlike the federal government, which has only those powers delegated to it by the people through the Constitution of the United States, the government of our state has all the power necessary to exercise its sovereignty. Id. at 457. This sovereign power may be restricted only by the state or federal Constitution. The right of eminent domain is one of the sovereign powers. Chief Justice Ruffin said it is for the legislature to determine whether private property should be taken and to what extent. Id. at 467.
Following Rail Road, we have developed a rule governing the taking by the State of private property. Property may be condemned only for a public purpose, and the Judicial Branch of the government determines whether a taking is for a public purpose. The Legislative Branch decides the political question of the extent of the taking, and the courts cannot disturb such a decision unless the condemnee proves the action is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. City of Charlotte v. McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 690, 190 S.E.2d 179, 184 (1972); N.C. State Highway Comm’n v. Farm Equip. Co., 281 N.C. 459, 470, 189 S.E.2d 272, 278 (1972); Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 251 N.C. 531, 533, 112 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1960).
It is unquestioned that the taking in this case was for a public purpose. The question then becomes whether the defendants have shown that the action of the City in condemning a fee simple estate was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. We cannot so hold.
The Charlotte City Council held two public hearings before authorizing the commencement of the condemnation proceedings. An affidavit by Thomas W. Vandeventer, a professional engineer, was submitted to the Council. Mr. Vandeventer said in his affidavit that it was necessary to acquire a fee simple title to the property because of the depth at which the line would be laid, the facilities that will be constructed close to the line, and the need to have effective control over all uses of the pipeline route. Mr. Vandeventer also said that CMUD had experienced difficulties in other places where facilities were within easements rather than on property owned in fee.
The defendants filed an affidavit by James Roderick Butler in which Mr. Butler refuted the reasoning of Mr. Vandeventer and concluded that there was no reason for CMUD to have more than an ease-*226merit in the property in order to lay the line. There was conflicting evidence in the affidavits of the two engineers, and we cannot disturb Judge Sitton’s decision to accept the testimony of Mr. Vandeventer. This testimony supports findings of facts (a) through (d). There was also evidence that if the plaintiff did not have a fee simple title to the property, it could not buy power from Duke Power Company but would have to purchase power from Crescent at a higher rate. See Crescent Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 126 N.C. App. 344, 485 S.E.2d 312 (1997). This evidence supports finding of fact (f). The findings of fact support the conclusions of law that the City may take a fee simple title in the property.
The defendants argue that the City of Charlotte has admitted that a fee simple title is not necessary for the construction of the line. They base this argument on statements made by a deputy city attorney at a meeting of the City Council, who said, “It is possible that an easement could be used,” and that the plaintiff could acquire additional rights in the property if needed. They also rely on a statement at the Council meeting by the director of CMUD, who said when asked if it was possible with an easement to accomplish CMUD’s purposes, “[I]t is technically possible, but not preferable.”
We do not believe the statements show a fee simple title is not necessary. The City does not have to show it would be impossible to construct a line using an easement. If the City can show that it needs a fee simple title to construct and operate the line under optimum conditions, this is proof of necessity.
The defendants contend that the affidavit of Mr. Vandeventer is not credible, especially when compared to the affidavit of Mr. Butler. The credibility of the respective affidavits was for the City Council and the superior court to determine. We cannot overrule their findings.
The City took only an easement for the intake site on Lake Norman, and the defendants contend this shows the plaintiff did not need a fee simple title in their property. We do not know why the plaintiff acquired only an easement for the intake facility. The fact that it did so does not mean it does not need a fee simple title in the property involved in this case.
The mayor pro tern of the City was an employee of Duke Power Company. The mayor was absent from the meeting at which the City Council voted to condemn the property, and the mayor pro tern *227presided over the meeting. The mayor pro tern voted to condemn a fee simple title. He filed an affidavit in which he said that if he had known Duke Power Company was involved in the matter, he would not have participated in the meeting. There was some evidence that he knew Duke was involved. The defendants say this makes the action by the Council arbitrary and capricious. We cannot so hold. An ethical problem involving the Council has to rise to a much higher level than this one for us to upset a decision by the Council.
The defendants next say that the Council’s action must be set aside because Robert’s Rules of Order were not followed at the meeting at which the decision was made to condemn a fee simple interest. We do not know what rules the City Council follows, but we shall let it judge its own procedure.
For the reasons given in this opinion, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for further remand to the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, for reinstatement of the judgments.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.