Plaintiff proposes to convey 155.52 acres of land known as the Reidsville Airport property, under authority of G.S. 63-53 (d) and G.S. 160-59. On 15 November 1960 the City Council of the City of Reidsville adopted a resolution finding that the City “no longer had any need for . . . the Airport property,” and ordering that it be sold at public auction subject to specific conditions and covenants restricting its use to industrial and commercial purposes. Due advertisement of the sale and the terms thereof was had. Defendant became the last and highest bidder at the price of $45,000, deposited ten per cent of the bid, and executed a contract in which it agreed to purchase the land according to the terms of sale and at the price bid. The sale was confirmed. Plaintiff executed and tendered to defendant a deed for the land containing the restrictions. Defendant refused to pay the balance of the purchase price and accept the deed. This action for specific performance was instituted and the judgment set out above was entered. Defendant excepts to the signing of the judgment.
The admissions in the pleadings and the facts stipulated are insufficient to support the findings and conclusions of the • court that . . the Mayor and City Council of the City of Reidsville had the legal power and authority to sell its real property known as the ‘Airport Property’ . . . ,” and that “. . . said property is surplus city property.”
“Where, as here, a case is tried on an agreed statement of facts, such statement is in the nature of a special verdict, admitting there is no dispute as to the facts, and constituting a request by each litigant for a judgment which each contends arises as a matter of law on the facts agreed, and consequently the court is not permitted to infer or deduce further facts from those stipulated.” Sparrow v. Casualty Co., 243 N.C. 60, 62, 89 S.E. 2d 800. Where agreed facts are insufficient to determine the controversy, the cause will be remanded for further proceedings as the rights of the parties may require. Guilford College v. Guilford County, 219 N.C. 347, 349, 13 S.E. 2d 622.
It does not appear from the record whether the 155.52 acres known as the Airport property was acquired by the City of Reidsville from *277funds realized from the bond issue approved by this Court in Turner v. Reidsville, 224 N.C. 42, 29 S.E. 2d 211 (1944), or by other means, whether there are presently any outstanding airport bonds, whether it is the entire tract originally acquired for airport purposes, whether an airport is now being operated on a portion of the original tract with the 155.52 acres being surplus property not needed in that connection, whether an airport is being operated on other and separate property and this tract is no longer necessary for airport purposes, whether Reidsville has even constructed, maintained, and operated an airport, or whether an airport was formerly operated and was before 15 November 1960 abandoned.
Quaere: Is the proposed sale subject to the provisions of G.S. 160-2, subsec. 6?
The judgment below is vacated and the cause is remanded for further proceedings and that sufficient evidence may be adduced to support a judgment determining the controversy.
Remanded.
PARKER and Higgins, JJ., dissent.