The defendants insist the temporary restraining order issued without notice should have been dissolved because of the failure of the resident judge to give the defendants a hearing within 20 days as provided in G.S. 1-490. The statute does not require a hearing within 20 days. It provides that no order for a period longer than 20 days shall be granted. It provides also, any order issued shall continue until vacated. The date fixed for the hearing in the order in question was within the 20-day period. However, due to death in the family of the judge two days before the hearing date, the judge notified counsel for the plaintiff *600and tbe Clerk Superior Court of Buncombe County be would not be able to bold tbe bearing as scheduled on the 12th. Neither the court, nor tbe clerk, nor plaintiffs’ counsel notified defendants’ counsel of tbe postponement. Up to that time tbe defendants had filed no pleadings, consequently no counsel appeared of record. Another bearing was scheduled for 20 November. However, on that date tbe judge was engaged in another bearing that consumed tbe entire day.
Finally, a bearing was held on 27 November, when all parties and counsel were present. Tbe defendants filed motions to dismiss because of the court’s failure to bold the bearing on tbe 12th, and upon tbe merits. Both motions were supported by affidavits. After tbe bearing, and presumably considering all matters presented, tbe judge continued tbe restraining order until tbe trial.
In this ease, the court was amply justified in continuing tbe bearing-scheduled for 12 November.
Tbe defendants argue tbe purpose of this action is to try title to land and that tbe plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. They argue that tbe equitable remedy of relief by injunction is not available and tbe restraining order should be dissolved. In support of this position they cite Armstrong v. Armstrong, 230 N.C. 201, 52 S.E. 2d 362; Whitford v. Bank, 207 N.C. 229, 176 S.E. 740; Jackson v. Jernigan, 216 N.C. 401, 5 S.E. 2d 143. Tbe defendants further argue that while the complaint may contain sufficient allegations which, if true, will support tbe temporary restraining order, yet “tbe attempted allegations by tbe plaintiff as to nuisance have been waived by their stipulation as to tbe ease on appeal.” Tbe stipulation of counsel as appears in the record is silent on tbe question of tbe purpose of tbe action. What defendants’ counsel evidently referred to as a stipulation is tbe defendants’ statement in tbe case on appeal as follows: “This is a civil action instituted in tbe Superior Court of Buncombe County by tbe plaintiffs for trespass to try title upon tbe lands described in the complaint and for actual and punitive damages, together with a restraining order and order to show cause as appears of record.” Plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that tbe defendants’ statement shall constitute tbe case on appeal. However, in tbe case on appeal, appears also tbe verified complaint, tbe affidavits, orders, etc. So, we have before us not only what tbe defendants say tbe case is about, but what tbe complaint and affidavits say it is about.
Tbe allegations of tbe verified complaint are sufficient to support and warrant tbe temporary restraining order. As an answer to some of tbe allegations of tbe complaint, tbe defendant offered tbe affidavit to Mr. William DeBruhl who stated be was employed by the defendants to operate and manage their turkey shoots, which conformed to police require*601ments, and that only shotguns with sheet loads were used; and that the shooting did not affect or impair the operations of the airstrip.
After hearing and, so far as appears, considering all affidavits, the resident judge found the temporary order should be continued to the final hearing and entered an order accordingly. This order relates back to the findings and prohibitions of the original order and continues it in effect. The defendant argues that since the court in continuing the restraining order did not find any facts, that it is impossible for the defendants to point out wherein the order is deficient, except to say that it contains no findings and that the objection to the order is the only method of attack left to them. Findings of fact were not required if the allegations of the complaint and supporting affidavits, if any, and the affidavits in opposition, if any, show facts sufficient to warrant and require a restraining order, the judge may properly issue it without further findings. This is so for the reason that even if the judge below were to find facts, the findings would not be conclusive on appeal. In determining whether a restraining order was properly issued, the Supreme Court may look into and review the evidence in order to determine on appeal whether the order was justified. Clinard v. Lambeth, 234 N.C. 410, 67 S.E. 2d 452.
The defendants’ exceptive assignments do not disclose error.
Affirmed.
BaeNHIll, C. J., and Devim, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.