The assignments of error present this question for decision: Is the finding of fact of the full commission that the deceased was an employee of the Home Oil Company at the time he received the personal injuries from which he died supported by competent evidence?
The following rules are well settled in respect to proceedings coming within the purview of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act:
1. Full fact-finding authority is vested in the industrial commission. G.S. 97-84. In exercising this authority, the industrial commission, like any' other trier of facts, is the sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence. Henry v. Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E. 2d 760; Beach v. McLean, 219 N.C. 521, 14 S.E. 2d 515. As a consequence, it may accept or reject the testimony of a witness, either in whole or in part, depending solely upon whether it believes or disbelieves the same. Anderson v. Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 64 S.E. 2d 265.
2. When the party aggrieved appeals to court from a decision of the full commission on the theory that the underlying findings of fact of the full commission are not supported by competent evidence, the court does not retry the facts. The court merely determines from the proceedings had before the commission whether there was sufficient competent evidence before the commission to support the findings of fact of the full commission. This is necessarily so because under the statute codified as G.S. 97-86, the findings of fact of the full commission are conclusive on appeal, both in the Superior Court and in the Supreme Court, if they are supported by competent evidence. Henry v. Leather Co., supra; Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 53 S.E. 2d 668; Fox v. Mills, Inc., 225 N.C. 580, 35 S.E. 2d 869.
*719When all is said, tbe case comes to tbis: Tbe evidence invoked by tbe plaintiff and tbat relied on by tbe defendants are irreconcilable. Tbe industrial commission accepted tbe testimony invoked by tbe plaintiff and rejected tbat relied on by tbe defendants because it believed tbe former and disbelieved tbe latter. In so doing, tbe industrial commission merely fulfilled its fact-finding function.
Tbe evidence invoked by tbe plaintiff and accepted by tbe industrial commission amply supports tbe findings of fact of tbe full commission. Tbis would be true even if tbe dying declaration of tbe deceased and tbe testimony given by tbe plaintiff in person should be adjudged incompetent and eliminated from consideration for tbat reason. Moreover, tbe findings of fact justify and require tbe conclusions of law and tbe award of tbe full commission.
For these reasons, tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court affirming tbe decision of tbe full commission is