Both by statute and the uniform decisions of this Court it is declared that the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission, on a claim properly constituted under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, are conclusive on appeal, both in the Superior Court and in this Court, when supported by competent evidence. Carlton v. Bernhardt-Seagle Co., 210 N. C., 655, 188 S. E., 777; Archie v. Lumber Co., 222 N. C., 477, 23 S. E. (2d), 834. An appeal from the Industrial Commission is permitted only on matters of law. While the Act does not set out with particularity the procedure on appeal, repeatedly it has been held by this Court that by analogy that prescribed for appeals from judgments of justices of the peace, when practical, should apply. Higdon v. Light Co., 207 N. C., 39, 175 S. E., 710; Summerell v. Sales Corp., 218 N. C., 451, 11 S. E. (2d), 304. But this refers only to the mechanics of appeal, as to notice and docketing; for the appeal from the Industrial Commission is only on matter of law and not de novo. It was said in Winslow v. Carolina Conference, 211 N. C., 571 (581), 191 S. E., 403: “Statutory provisions with respect to appeals from judgments of justices of the peace to the Superior Court, where the trial must be de novo, are not controlling with respect to appeals from awards of the Industrial Commission to the Superior Court, where only errors of law appearing in the record may be considered.” It would seem therefore in case of appeals from the Industrial Commission to the Superior Court that the procedure should, conform substantially to that in appeals from subordinate courts where by statute appeals are restricted to questions of law, Smith v. Texas Co., 200 N. C., 39, 156 S. E., 160; or to the consideration of exceptions to the report of a referee. Anderson v. McRae, 211 N. C., 197, 189 S. E., 639; Gurganus v. McLawhorn, 212 N. C., 397 (411), 193 S. E., 844. It follows that where upon an appeal from the Industrial Commission the exceptions point out specific assignments of error, the judgment in the Superior Court thereon properly should overrule or sustain respectively each of the exceptions on matters of law thus designated. We think this practice conducive to more orderly and accurate presentation of appeals brought forward under the Act. The appeal from the Industrial Commission in this case pointed out the particulars in which errors of law were assigned, and the judgment in the Superior Court merely, decreed that the award be in all respects affirmed. Presumably the judge below considered each of the assignments, of error and overruled them. In this view we do not hold that a remand is required in this case.
We note that the defendants in their appeal from the Superior Court to this Court only “object to the foregoing judgment (and) except to the same.” The effect of an exception to the judgment is only to challenge the correctness of the judgment, and presents the single question *584whether the facts found are sufficient to support tbe judgment, as was pointed out in Rader v. Coach Co., ante, 537. In that case Justice Barnhill states the grounds upon which this principle of appellate procedure is based, with citation of numerous authorities.
In conformity with the view expressed in the Rader case, supra, it must be held here that an exception to the judgment affirming an award by the Industrial Commission is insufficient to bring up- for review the findings of fact, or the competency and sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings and conclusions of the Industrial Commission. Rader v. Coach Co., supra; Vestal v. Vending Machine Co., 219 N. C., 468, 14 S. E. (2d), 427; Crissman v. Palmer, ante, 472; Query v. Ins. Co., 218 N. C., 386, 11 S. E. (2d), 139.
However, in view of the questions debated orally and by brief on this appeal, we have examined the record and find that there is competent evidence to support the findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission upon which it was determined that the death of the deceased was by accident arising out of and in course of his employment by defendant Cramerton Mills, and that the award of compensation by the Industrial Commission was properly upheld by the court below. Bellamy v. Mfg. Co., 200 N. C., 676, 158 S. E., 246; Parrish v. Armour & Co., 200 N. C., 654, 158 S. E., 188; Gordon v. Chair Co., 205 N. C., 739, 172 S. E., 485; Pickard v. Plaid Mills, 213 N. C., 28, 195 S. E., 28; Archie v. Lumber Co., 222 N. C., 477, 23 S. E. (2d), 834.
Upon the record the judgment of the Superior Court is