The record contains eleven exceptive assignments of error. Only one of these, to wit, the exception to the refusal of the court to dismiss under G.S. 15-173, is brought forward and discussed in defendant’s brief. The others are deemed to be abandoned. Rule 28, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, 221 N.C. 562; S. v. Jones, 227 N.C. 94, 40 S.E. 2d 700; S. v. Muse, 230 N.C. 495, 53 S.E. 2d 529.
The demurrer to the evidence and motion to dismiss under G.S. 15-173 is untenable. The possession of any quantity of liquor upon which the Federal and State taxes have not been paid is, without exception, unlawful. G.S. 18-48; S. v. Barnhardt, 230 N.C. 223, 52 S.E. 2d 904; S. v. McNeill, 225 N.C. 560, 35 S.E. 2d 629.
Nontax-paid liquor was found in defendant’s home. A large number of people were gathered around his house. Some of them were intoxicated. A “dump body load” of one-half gallon jars was found just outside *279Ms bouse. His conduct toward tbe officers making tbe search tended to sbow guilty knowledge. He bears tbe reputation of being a dispenser of liquor. These and other circumstances disclosed by tbe testimony constitute more than a scintilla of evidence and made out a case for tbe jury.
That tbe bouse was rented by tbe feme defendant, and tbe liquor was owned by her were matters offered in defense. They were not to be considered on tbe motion to dismiss.
Furthermore, that tbe liquor belonged to tbe feme defendant, if such be tbe fact, does not necessarily exculpate tbe defendant. He is tbe bead of bis household. If bis wife kept liquor in bis borne with bis knowledge and consent, it was in bis possession within tbe meaning of tbe law even though actual custody was in tbe wife, S. v. Meyers, 190 N.C. 239, 129 S.E. 600; S. v. Pierce, 192 N.C. 766, 136 S.E. 121, for it is axiomatic that one who aids, abets, or assists another in tbe commission of a misdemeanor is guilty as a principal. S. v. Ward, 222 N.C. 316, 22 S.E. 2d 922; S. v. Jarrett, 189 N.C. 516, 127 S.E. 590; S. v. Jenkins, 234 N.C. 112, 66 S.E. 2d 819; S. v. Parker, 234 N.C. 236, 66 S.E. 2d 907.
Tbe Turlington Act, now G.S. Ob. 18, Art. 1, except as modified or repealed by tbe Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, now G.S. Cb. 18, Art. 3, is still tbe law in this State. S. v. Davis, 214 N.C. 787, 1 S.E. 2d 104; S. v. Wilson, 227 N.C. 43, 40 S.E. 2d 449.
After tbe adoption of this statute, tbe State imposed no tax on alcoholic beverages and it was, with certain exceptions, unlawful to possess any quantity of intoxicating liquor. Under the ABC Act, liquor may be purchased from ABC stores and now it is not unlawful to possess liquor in tbe quantities and under tbe conditions prescribed by that Act.. But, to make certain that this modification of tbe Turlington Act applies only to liquor upon which the taxes imposed by the Federal and State governments have been paid, tbe General Assembly wrote into tbe ABC Act tbe provision which is now G.S. 18-48, making it unlawful to possess any quantity of liquor upon which such taxes have not been paid.
Tbe two Acts constitute tbe body of our law relating to tbe purchase, possession, and sale of intoxicating liquor and must be construed in pari materia. "When so construed, it becomes apparent that an allegation in a warrant or bill of indictment to tbe effect that tbe Federal and State taxes bad not been paid upon tbe liquor seized or that it was illicit liquor is merely descriptive, S. v. Merritt, 231 N.C. 59, 55 S.E. 2d 804, and does not, as contended by defendant, limit tbe prosecution to any particular section of tbe liquor law or deprive tbe State of tbe benefit of tbe general provisions of tbe law as it nou^ exists. Instead, it facilitates proof of tbe unlawfulness of tbe possession and renders it unnecessary to prove possession of any particular quantity.
*280The defendant moves in this Court that the judgment pronounced be arrested “in the event the Court should find that he was arrested, tried and convicted under G.S. Section 18-48, on the grounds that the said warrant was defective because it alleged two separate offenses in one count.” The motion is without merit and is overruled. S. v. Dilliard, 223 N.C. 446, 27 S.E. 2d 85.
Construing the warrant with that degree of liberality required by the statute, G.S. 15-153, it clearly appears that it charges two separate and distinct offenses: (1) unlawful possession, and (2) unlawful possession for the purpose of sale. Furthermore, objection to the warrant on account of duplicity, entered for the first time after verdict, comes too late. S. v. Burnett, 142 N.C. 577; S. v. Mundy, 182 N.C. 907, 110 S.E. 93; S. v. Puckett, 211 N.C. 66, 189 S.E. 183.
We feel compelled to call attention to the state of the record in this cause. In almost every respect it fails to comply with the rules of this Court. Rule .19, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, 221 N.C. 553. The case on appeal and assignments of error precede the record proper. Neither the verdict of the jury nor the judgment of the court are made to appear except in a certificate of the clerk. Neither the warrant nor the verdict nor the judgment — indeed no part of the record proper — is indexed. Though the record is relatively small, it has been necessary for us to search from page to page to find in the record essential information bearing on the questions defendant seeks to present. If counsel desire us to give consideration to their appeals, there must be at least a semblance of compliance with our rules which, in this respect, are simple and require no great degree of astuteness to understand or to follow.
In the trial in the court below we find