There was no error in refusing defendant’s motion to dismiss as upon nonsuit. The evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury upon the question of the possession, and of unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquors. The evidence is largely circumstantial, but sufficient to take these issues to the jury.
The exception, however, to the charge of the court, as disclosed in the statement of case on appeal agreed upon by the solicitor and counsel for the defendant, presents a more serious question. The defendant’s plea of not- guilty puts in issue every element of the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors.
The defendant’s rental of the Tart place for the year 1924, for the purpose of cultivation, and his knowledge that the liquor was in the ditch, are evidence material to and to be considered on the issue of possession of the liquor. The jury may find them sufficient to support the State’s allegation. Standing alone, however, these facts do not, necessarily, constitute the possession condemned by the statute. Possession usually implies detention or control, or the right thereto. The possession may be in one person for another, or in one for sev*243eral, or in several for another, or for themselves, and others not actually present, or however distant from the whiskey itself. Possession is the retention or enjoyment of a thing which a man. holds or exercises by himself or by another who keeps or exercises it in his name. Redfield v. Utica and S. R. Co., 25 Barb. (N. Y.), 58; S. v. Washburn, 11 Iowa, 245; McMahon v. State, 70 Neb., 722.
In S. v. Washburn, supra, defendant was indicted for having in possession counterfeit coin, and the court charged the jury that, if the defendant placed the coin and has the control and can take it into his actual possession at his pleasure, then this is possession within the meaning of the statute.
If the liquor was within the power of the defendant, in such a sense that he could and did command its use, the possession was as complete within the meaning of the statute as if his possession had been actual.
The possession may, within this statute, be either actual, or constructive. S. v. Lee, 164 N. C., 533; S. v. Ross, 168 N. C., 130; S. v. Baldwin, 178 N. C., 693; S. v. Bush, 177 N. C., 551, 554. If a man procures another to obtain liquor for him and put it in a given place, and the other performs this agreement and places the liquor, then the possession is complete. A person may be in the possession of the article which he has not at the moment about his person. 31 Cye., 924. The Turlington Act “shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented.” There the constructive possession, as well as the actual possession, is in the contemplation of the statute.
In S. v. Ross, supra, the holding as to direction of a verdict is easily distinguishable from the case at bar. There the cocaine was in the actual possession, and under the physical control and protection of the defendant, and in a secret place made for it in his house. The defendant, Meyers, contends, and offers evidence bearing on his contention, that he had not been in close proximity to the liquor in the ditch, and that it was not his property or under his control in any manner, and that the tracks indicated that the approach was from a direction opposite to that from his dwelling, while the State’s evidence tended to show guilt on Meyers’ part. However, the holding in the Ross case, supra, as to actual and constructive possession, is clearly applicable- to' the case at bar.
Upon the instant record, the question of possession being a mixed question of law and fact, we are unable to approve the charge excepted to, and, therefore, there must be a