The immediate question for decision is whether the defendant must account to the plaintiffs for a portion of the proceeds derived from the sale of the timber on one of the tracts of land. The trial court answered in the affirmative. We are inclined to a different view.
In the first place, Allie Barfield who was most assuredly the special object of the testator’s bounty, is devised a life estate in the lands in question with certain conditions attached including the appurtenant “to sell any or all said lands” and use “the proceeds therefrom,” i.e., the whole of the proceeds, for her common comfort and necessities of life. This is more than a naked power of sale attached to the life estate such as appeared in the case of Darden v. Matthews, 173 N.C. 186, 91 S.E. 835. More nearly in point, we think, is the case of Burcham v. Burcham, 219 N.C. 357, 13 S.E. 2d 615. Here, as there, viewing the will in its entirety, it seems that the testator intended the remaindermen to take the “residue” of the lands or that which remained unsold at the death of the life tenant. Trust Co. v. Heymann, 220 N.C. 526, 17 S.E. 2d 665; Smith v. Mears, 218 N.C. 193, 10 S.E. 2d 659; Hardee v. Rivers, 228 N.C. 66, 44 S.E. 2d 476. The language of Item Eour is, that if any of the lands should remain unsold at the death of the life tenant, “I give and devise the residue” to my nephews and nieces, naming the plaintiffs herein, and they are to share alike in the division of “such of my lands as may come to them under the terms of this my last will and testament.” Clearly the testator intended that the life tenant should use all of the proceeds from any sale or sales for her own common comfort and necessities of life. The remaindermen are to share alike in the division of any *597 lands tbat may come to tbem under tbe will, not in tbe proceeds of any sales made by or for tbe benefit of tbe first taker.
Secondly, tbe plaintiffs concede tbat tbe defendant bas tbe right to sell tbe timber and convey full title thereto. Indeed, this would seem to follow necessarily from tbe language of tbe will. Not only is tbe first taker empowered to sell any or all of tbe lands in question, but she is also made tbe sole judge of tbe time and amount of such sales; and in case of her disability or inability to act, further provision is made whereby sales may be bad for her benefit.
Tbe ease is controlled by tbe directions of tbe testator as expressed in bis will. Cannon v. Cannon, 225 N.C. 611, 36 S.E. 2d 17; Holland v. Smith, 224 N.C. 255, 29 S.E. 2d 888; Smith v. Mears, supra; Richardson v. Cheek, 212 N.C. 510, 193 S.E. 705; Heyer v. Bulluck, 210 N.C. 321, 186 S.E. 356; Hampton v. West, 212 N.C. 315, 193 S.E. 290.
Declaration and judgment will be entered in accordance with this opinion.
Error and remanded.