An understanding of the precise nature of the cause of action upon which the judgment has been rendered is indispensable to a determination of the validity of the assignments of error.
When it is construed with a proper degree of liberality, the complaint states two causes of action alternative in nature, to wit: (1) A primary cause of action for damages for breach of an implied warranty that the fourteen oil burners were reasonably fit for the particular use of curing tobacco; and (2) a secondary cause of action for breach of an express contract, i.e., the agreement of October 18, 1946, by which the appellants and their associates agreed to make specific reparation to the plaintiffs in the premises in consideration of the plaintiffs’ returning the fourteen oil burners and forbearing to institute legal proceedings for breach of the implied warranty. Manifestly, the plaintiffs could not recover upon both *310of tbe causes of action alleged for tbe reason that tbe establishment of tbe second necessarily required proof of tbe extinguishment of tbe first.
"When a buyer purchases goods for a particular purpose known to tbe seller and relies on tbe skill, judgment, or experience of tbe seller for tbe suitability of tbe goods for that purpose, tbe seller impliedly warrants that tbe goods are reasonably fit for tbe contemplated purpose, and is liable to tbe buyer for any damages proximately resulting to him from tbe breach of this warranty. Aldridge Motors, Inc., v. Alexander, 217 N. C. 750, 9 S.E. 2d 469; Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30; Swift v. Aydlett, 192 N.C. 330, 135 S.E. 141; Poovey v. Sugar Co., 191 N.C. 722, 133 S.E. 12; Gravel Co. v. Casualty Co., 191 N.C. 313, 131 S.E. 754; Farquhar v. Hardware Co., 174 N.C. 369, 93 S.E. 922; Thomas v. Simpson, 80 N.C. 4. This is true even though tbe seller is not tbe manufacturer or producer of tbe goods, and even though tbe buyer is a dealer who purchases tbe goods for resale to others for tbe contemplated use. Aldridge Motors, Inc., v. Alexander, supra; 46 Am. Jur., Sales, sections 346, 355, 356; 55 C. J., Sales, section 719.
In passing upon tbe exceptions of appellants to tbe denials of their motions for a compulsory nonsuit under G.S. 1-183, we must take it for granted that tbe evidence favorable to the plaintiffs is true. Hughes v. Thayer, 229 N.C. 773, 51 S.E. 2d 488; Bundy v. Powell, 229 N.C. 707, 51 S.E. 2d 307. When this is done, it clearly appears that prior to 18 October, 1946, tbe plaintiffs acquired a meritorious case of action against tbe appellants and their associates, James and James, for tbe breach of an implied warranty that tbe fourteen oil burners were reasonably fit for use in curing tobacco, and that on 18 October, 1946, tbe plaintiffs and tbe appellants made an oral agreement whereby tbe plaintiffs refrained from bringing suit against tbe appellants and their associates for breach of this warranty and surrendered tbe oil burners to tbe appellants, who have since retained them, and whereby tbe appellants agreed that they would “replace tbe burners or give plaintiffs their money back.” Since a contract is “an agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing,” tbe oral agreement between plaintiffs and appellants was in law a contract, obligating tbe appellants to make reparation to plaintiffs in one or tbe other of tbe ways specified. Belk’s Department Store v. Insurance Company, 208 N.C. 267, 180 S.E. 63; Overall Co. v. Holmes, 186 N.C. 428, 119 S.E. 817. Tbe forbearance of plaintiffs to institute legal proceedings against tbe appellants and their associates for breach of tbe warranty, and their surrender of tbe defective oil burners constituted a sufficient consideration for tbe promise of tbe appellants to recompense tbe plaintiffs. Myers v. Allsbrook, 229 N.C. 786, 51 S.E. 2d 629; Chemical Co. v. McNair, 139 N.C. 326, 51 S.E. 949; Lowe v. Weatherley, 20 N.C. 353; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, section 104. *311Furthermore, tbe plaintiffs’ evidence discloses that the áppellants have breached the contract of 18 October, 1946, and thereby damaged the plaintiffs to the extent of their monetary outlay. Thus, it is evident that the court properly refused to nonsuit the plaintiffs.
The exceptions to the submission of the first, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth issues are untenable. The'trial court prepared the issues with meticulosity to present to the jury proper inquiries as to all essential matters or determinative facts in dispute. Sams v. Cochran, 188 N.C. 731, 125 S.E. 626; Mann v. Archbell, 186 N.C. 72, 118 S.E. 911. It is true that no issue was submitted to the jury as to whether the defendants, James and James, were bound by the contract of 18 October, 1946. This was proper for there was no evidence tending to justify an affirmative answer to any such issue. Bank v. Furniture Co., 200 N.C. 371, 157 S.E. 13. Moreover, the appellants did not ask for or tender any such issue at the trial. McNeeley v. Shoe Co., 170 N.C. 278, 87 S.E. 64; Curtis v. Cash, 84 N.C. 41.
Appellants except to the verdict on the theory that the answers of the jury to the seventh and eighth issues are in irreconcilable conflict. In addition, they except to the judgment as legally inconsistent in that it adjudges them liable to plaintiffs and exonerates their associates, James and James. These exceptions are based upon a misapprehension of the findings of the jury. When the verdict and judgment are construed in the light of the pleadings and the testimony, it is obvious that the jury has found that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover of appellants for a breach of the contract of 18 October 1946, rather than for a breach of the original warranty, and that the judgment has been rendered on the basis of that finding. This being true, the answers of the jury to the seventh and eighth issues are consistent, and the judgment is correct because the defendants, James and James, were not parties to the contract of 18 October, 1946. Besides, it may be' noted that appellants seek to blow both hot and cold on this phase of the case. Their answer declares that James and James are not liable to the plaintiffs upon either of the causes of action alleged.
We have carefully considered the other assignments of error, and have reached the conclusion that none of them will justify the award of a new trial. The trial and judgment in the Superior Court will be upheld.
No error.