Yiewing tbe evidence in its most favorable light for tbe prosecution, tbe accepted position on motion to nonsuit, it seems sufficient to carry tbe case to tbe jury. It is true, tbe defendant’s evidence, if accepted in its entirety, would tend to leave tbe question of culpable negligence in doubt. S. v. Lowery, 223 N. C., 598, 27 S. E. (2d), 638. However, tbe jury has accepted tbe State’s version of tbe matter, and rejected tbe defendant’s theory of tbe case. S. v. Sudderth, 184 N. C., 753, 114 S. E., 828. No doubt tbe force of tbe impact, tbe destruction and death which followed tbe collision, and tbe circumstances surrounding tbe incident, led tbe jury to believe that tbe defendant’s car was being driven faster than be thought or else be was unable to control it. Physical facts speak their own language and are often beard above thr *598voices of witnesses. Atkins v. Transportation Co., 224 N. C., 688, 32 S. E. (2d), 209; Powers v. Sternberg, 213 N. C., 41, 195 S. E., 88.
The jury found that the defendant was culpably negligent. There is evidence to support the finding. S. v. Cope, 204 N. C., 28, 167 S. E., 456; S. v. Stansell, 203 N. C., 69, 164 S. E., 580; S. v. Satterfield, 198 N. C., 682, 153 S. E., 155. The facts here are quite different from those appearing in the case of S. v. Lowery, supra, upon which the defendant strongly relies.
The exceptions to the charge are also untenable. While somewhat meager in its application of proximate cause, it will do when considered contextually. S. v. Davis, 225 N. C., 117, 33 S. E. (2d), 623.
A careful perusal of the record leaves us with the impression that no reversible error has been made to appear. Hence, the verdict and judgment will be upheld.
No error.