Tbe defendant excepts and assigns as error tbe refusal of bis Honor to sustain bis motion for judgment as of nonsuit.
Tbe State is relying upon tbe breach of two statutes by tbe defendant to sustain tbe judgment below, to wit, section 101, chapter 407, Public Laws of 1937, N. C. Code of 1939 (Michie), section 2621 (286), which makes it unlawful for any person to drive an automobile on the highways •of tbe State while under tbe influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic •drugs; and section 116 of tbe same Act, N. C. Code of 1939 (Micbie), section 2621 (301), which requires tbe driver of an automobile upon a highway to give certain signals before starting, stopping or turning said motor vehicle from a direct line of traffic.
Tbe real question presented for our consideration is whether or not tbe evidence presented on this record is sufficient to show culpable or criminal negligence on tbe part of tbe defendant. Tbe violation of tbe statutes referred to herein, if conceded, is not sufficient to sustain a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter unless a causal relation is .shown between tbe breach of tbe statute and the death of Mrs. Rohr. S. v. Satterfield, 198 N. C., 682, 153 S. E., 155. Tbe violation of a traffic law unintentionally or merely through a want of ordinary care would not constitute culpable negligence unless tbe prohibited act was in itself dangerous — i.e., likely under the circumstances to result in death •or great bodily barm, S. v. Stansell, 203 N. C., 69, 164 S. E., 580, in which ease tbe Court said: “Ordinary negligence is based on tbe theory that a person charged with negligent conduct should have known tbe probable consequence of bis act; culpable negligence rests on tbe assumption that be knew tbe probable consequences but was intentionally, recklessly, or wantonly indifferent to tbe results. With respect to tbe breach of a statute enacted in tbe interest of public safety a basic concept may *602involve tbe distinction between the intentional violation of the statute and the negligent failure to observe its provisions.”
There is no evidence that the defendant was driving at an excessive rate of speed. The only evidence that the defendant made a left turn and drove his ear in front of the Sherrill ear, which was driven by Allison, was the testimony of Allison, and his evidence is not clear as to whether Lowery was approaching on the right or left side of the road. The defendant and two other witnesses testified that defendant’s car was driven on the left side of the highway in front of the Kluttz home, and that the defendant was requested to back his car and enter the driveway of the Kluttz home. That at the time he backed his car into the highway, for the purpose of entering the driveway, no car was approaching from the north, but before the defendant could complete the operation the car driven by Allison approached at a high rate of speed and ran into defendant’s car. Allison testified he saw the Lowery car for “as much as three hundred yards.” If this is correct and the defendant was approaching him or backing his car in the lane of traffic on Allison’s right, it was the duty of Allison to operate his car with due caution and circumspection under the circumstances. He testified, however, he did not make any effort to slacken his speed. There is evidence to the effect that the front wheels of the defendant’s car were on the shoulder of the highway entering the driveway, at the time of the wreck, and that a distance of twenty-five or thirty feet of the highway on the left going south was unobstructed. One witness testified that Allison was in the second lane until “he got right at us. Instead of going around he pulled back to the outside curb on the right.”
Furthermore, if defendant was parked on the left-hand side of the road, and no car was in sight at the time he undertook to back into the road for the purpose of entering the driveway at the Kluttz home, he was under no obligation to give a signal. Stovall v. Ragland, 211 N. C., 536, 190 S. E., 899. Moreover, the difficulty in seeing a hand signal at night is pointed out in the case of Butner v. Spease, 217 N. C., 82, 6 S. E. (2d), 808, in which the Court said: “It is a matter of common knowledge that a hand signal can seldom be seen by the driver of an approaching car under the circumstances here disclosed, because to him the other driver’s hand would be in the shadow of his own light.”
The only evidence to show a breach of the statute making it unlawful for a person to drive an automobile on the highways of this State under the influence of liquor, was the testimony of the witness, Harkey, to the effect: “From the conversation I had with him and the observation of Lowery, he was drinking pretty heavy.” The defendant and four other witnesses testified the defendant was sober and had not had anything to drink. The witness Allison, the driver of the other car involved in the *603wreck, admitted be bad drunk a bottle of beer earlier in tbe evening and tbat bis companions in tbe car were “feeling pretty good.” Tbe investigating officer testified: “I smelled alcoholic odor on Allison’s breatb.” Neither Allison nor Harkey informed tbe investigating officer tbat Lowery was drinking and both were present while tbe officer was investigating tbe accident.
In tbe case of S. v. Satterfield, supra, this Court said: “There is ample evidence of tbe defendant’s disregard of tbe statute; bis failure to obey tbe law was tbe negligent omission of a legal duty. Ledletter v. English, 166 N. C., 125. But this was not sufficient within itself to warrant conviction. There are yet to be considered tbe element of causal relation, and, indeed, of proximate cause; for mere proof of a negligent act does not establish its causal relation to tbe injury.” There is no contention on tbe part of tbe State tbat tbe conduct of this defendant was such as to sustain a conviction at common law irrespective of tbe violation of tbe statutes relied upon, as was tbe case in S. v. Huggins, 314 N. C., 568, 190 S. E., 926; S. v. Landin, 209 N. C., 20, 183 S. E., 526; S. v. Palmer, 197 N. C., 135, 147 S. E., 817; S. v. Trott, 190 N. C., 674, 130 S. E., 627; S. v. Gray, 180 N. C., 697, 104 S. E., 647; S. v. Gash, 177 N. C., 595, 99 S. E., 337; and S. v. Mclver, 175 N. C., 761, 94 S. E., 682.
Moreover, as pointed out in S. v. Cope, 204 N. C., 28, 167 S. E., 456, there is a difference in negligence which renders one civilly liable in damages and culpable or criminal negligence in tbe law of crimes. Stacy, G. J., speaking for tbe Court, in tbe above case, said: “An unintentional violation of a prohibitory statute or ordinance, unaccompanied by recklessness or probable consequences of a dangerous nature, when tested by tbe rule of reasonable prevision, is not such negligence as imports criminal responsibility. S. v. SLansell, supra; S. v. Agnew, 202 N. C., 755, 164 S. E., 578; S. v. Satterfield, 198 N. C., 682, 153 S. E., 155; S. v. Tanhersley, 172 N. C., 955, 90 S. E., 781; S. v. Horton, 139 N. C., 588, 51 S. E., 945.”
We think tbe evidence as to tbe failure of tbe defendant to give a signal as required by tbe statute, when considered in its most favorable light for tbe State, is insufficient to show culpable negligence. As to tbe breach of tbe other statute upon which tbe State relies to sustain tbe trial court, conceding tbat there is some evidence of tbe intoxication of tbe defendant, there is no evidence on this record of reckless driving or other misconduct on tbe part of tbe defendant resulting from intoxication which shows such proximate causal relation between tbe breach of tbe statute and tbe death of Mrs. Rohr as is essential to a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, S. v. Satterfield, supra. It is in this respect tbat this case is distinguishable from other decisions of this *604Court involving violations of tbe statute wbicb makes it unlawful to drive an automobile on tbe highways of tbe State while under tbe influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs. S. v. Landin, supra; S. v. Dills, 204 N. C., 33, 167 S. E., 459; S. v. Harvell, 204 N. C., 32, 167 S. E., 459; S. v. Palmer, 197 N. C., 135, 147 S. E., 817; S. v. Leonard, 195 N. C., 242, 141 S. E., 736; S. v. Jessup, 183 N. C., 771,. 111 S. E., 523.
Tbe defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit should have been, allowed.