This is an action brought by plaintiff against the defendant self-insurer under the North Carolina 'Workmen’s Compensation Act. Public Laws of North Carolina, 1929, chap. 120. Plaintiff contends that under section 2(f) of said act, he sustained injury “by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.” N. C. Code of 1931 (Michie), 8081 (i) (f). This was denied by defendant. The trial commissioner found “that the plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment on 19 December, 1932.” On appeal by defendant from the trial commissioner his decision was affirmed by the full Commission. On appeal to the Superior Court, the judgment of the full Commission was sustained, an appeal was then taken to the Supreme Court. We do not think the exceptions and assignments of error made by defendant self-insurer can be sustained. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, but was not certain the plant would run on the Monday morning he went to work. *742He lived some distance from the plant and rode to> work with a fellow-employee. There had been a big snow and he had his son to come with his automobile so that he could ride back home, if the plant would not run that day. He went to his place of work and found that the plant would run that day and put his lunch up. This was about the time the five-minutes to seven whistle blew. He then went to the outside platform at the front of the plant to tell his son that the plant would run and his feet slipped on ice and he fell and was injured. We think the facts of this case come within the decision of Bellamy v. Mfg. Co., 200 N. C., 676. In that ease, after citing numerous authorities, at page 679, is the following:
In N. C. R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. Rep., at p. 260, we find: “Again, it is said that because deceased had left his engine and was going to his boarding-house, he was engaged upon a personal errand, and not upon the carrier’s business. Assuming (what is not clear) that the evidence fairly tended to indicate the boarding-house as his destination, it nevertheless also appears that deceased was shortly to depart upon his run, having just prepared his engine for the purpose, and that he had not gone beyond the limits of the railroad yard when he was struck. There is nothing to indicate that this brief visit to the boarding-house was at all out of the ordinary, or was inconsistent with his duty to his employer. It seems to us, clear that the man was still bn duty,’ and employed in commerce, notwithstanding his temporary absence from the locomotive engine.”
The defendant’s contention cannot be sustained. We think the plaintiff was “on duty.” The case of Beavers v. Power Co., ante, 34. “The Photographer case” is easily distinguishable. The judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.