The exception and assignment of error of defendants, which we cannot sustain, is as follows: “For that the court erred in concluding that ‘The death of Y. R. McGill, was caused by an injury by accident, arising out of and in the course of his employment by the town of Lumberton, N. C., and that the said Y. R. McGill did not commit suicided ”
In a letter addressed to the North Carolina Industrial Commission by counsel for defendants, dated 11 July, 1939, is the following: “If we can be of any service or aid the Commission in filing of briefs or presentation of additional evidence, we shall expect to be commanded by you.”
In the findings of fact of the Full Commission is the following: “The Full Commission has written to both parties and the defendants do not desire to further argue the case before the Full Commission. Therefore, the Full Commission is deciding this case without additional evidence or further oral argument.” .
The evidence in this case, which was considered before, is the same on the present appeal. The'case was decided by the North Carolina Industrial Commission in conformity with the opinion in the former case. 215 N. C., 752. We see no reason to go into the matter again, as there was sufficient evidence for the North Carolina Industrial Commission to consider. We think there was sufficient competent evidence to support *591tbe findings of tbe North Carolina Industrial Commission, and, on tbe facts found, tbe conclusions of law are correct.
In Lassiter v. Telephone Co., 215 N. C., 227 (230), it is said: “It is established in this jurisdiction that tbe findings of fact made by tbe Industrial Commission, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal and not subject to review by tbe Superior Court or this Court, although this Court may have reached a different conclusion if it bad been tbe fact-finding body.” Blassingame v. Asbestos Co., 217 N. C., 223 (235).
In MacRae v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 217 N. C., 769 (778), is tbe following: “In II Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation Law (2d Ed.), part sec. 554, at pp. 2002-3, we find: ‘The courts may not interfere with tbe findings of fact, made by tbe Industrial Commission, when these are supported by evidence, even though it may be thought to be error.’ ‘The rule ... is well settled to tbe effect that, if in any reasonable view of tbe evidence it will support, either directly or indirectly, or by fair inference, tbe findings made by tbe Commission, they must be regarded as conclusive’ (citing a wealth of authorities). Courts cannot demand tbe same precision in the finding of Commission as otherwise might be if tbe members were required to be learned in the law.’ ”
In S. v. Dixon, 215 N. C., 161 (167), we find: “Decided cases should be regarded as weighty authority, at least within the courts which decided them. As Broome puts it in that veritable storehouse of legal learning, Legal Maxims, ‘It is, then, an established rule to abide by former precedents, stare decisis, where the same points come up again in litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge’s opinion, as also because, the law in that ease being solemnly declared and determined what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter or swerve from according to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not according to his private judgment, but according to the known laws and customs of the land- — -not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one — jus dicere et non jus dare.’ Legal Maxims, 8th Ed., p. 147.”
The North Carolina Industrial Commission, the fact-finding forum, could have found from the evidence, when this case was remanded to it, in favor of defendants. This was not done, but the Commission decided in favor of plaintiffs. We are bound by its findings. For the reasons given, the judgment in the court below is