Tbe question involved: Is tbe finding of tbe Industrial Commission to tbe effect that tbe fatal injuries received by tbe employee, tbe husband of plaintiff, did not “arise out of and in tbe course of bis employment” supported by competent evidence? We think so.
In Hunt v. State, 201 N. C., 707 (710-11), it is written: “So, 'while there is a difference between tbe beginning of employment and tbe beginning of work, or going to work on the employer’s time, an accident to a workman on bis way to work is not ordinarily in tbe course of employment.’ I Ilonnold on Workmen’s Compensation, sec. 107. True, tbe moment when be begins bis work is not necessarily tbe moment when be gets into tbe employment, because a reasonable margin must be allowed him to get to tbe place of work if be is on tbe premises of tbe employer or on some access to tbe premises which tbe employer has provided. Davidson v. M’Robb, supra (Appeal Cases, 1918, 304). ‘The workman is not regarded to be outside tbe scope of bis employment unless actually at work or in the receipt of wages, nor is be regarded as within it because what be is doing is something which has relation only to bis work. Tbe test finally adopted lies between tbe two. Tbe place at which tbe injury is sustained becomes the determining factor among those things which be does solely because be is engaged in a particular employment; only those are regarded as in tbe course of tbe employment which are done within tbe master’s premises or upon some means ,of conveyance to or from bis place of work which is provided by the master for tbe sole use of bis servants and which tbe servant is required or entitled to use by virtue of bis contract of employment.’ 25 Harvard Law Review, 403. Tbis is also Honnold’s conclusion. He says: 'The rule has been established in accordance with sound reason that tbe employer’s liability in such cases depends upon whether tbe conveyance has been provided by him, after tbe real beginning of tbe employment, in compliance with one of tbe implied or express terms of tbe contract of employment, for tbe mere use of tbe employees,' and is one which tbe employees are required, or as a matter of right are permitted, to use by virtue of that contract. Pursuant to tbis rule, tbe employee is in tbe course of employment if be has a right to tbe transportation, but not if it is gratuitous, or a mere accomodation. A workman injured while riding to or from bis work in tbe conveyance of a third person is not ordinarily entitled to compensation.’ Honnold, sec. 110. Tbis is tbe *230principle underlying the decision in Dependents of Phifer v. Dairy, 200 N. C., 65, to the effect that if an employer furnishes transportation for his employee as an incident of the employment, or as a part of the contract, an injury is compensable if suffered by the employee while going to or returning from the place of work in the vehicle furnished by the employer and under his control.” Hildebrand v. Furniture Co., 212 N. C., 100; Davis v. Mecklenburg County, 214 N. C., 469.
It is established in this jurisdiction that the findings of fact made by the Industrial Commission, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal and not subject to review by the Superior Court or this Court, although this Court may have reached a different conclusion if it had been the fact finding body.
From the findings of fact by the Industrial Commission on competent evidence, the judgment of the court below must be
Affirmed.