While the deed in question purports to convey both real and personal property, counsel for appellants in brief filed states that the conveyance of the real property is not in question on this appeal.
The ruling of the court below with respect to the provisions of the deed relating to personal property is made expressly upon authority of these decisions: Graham v. Graham, 9 N. C., 322; Morrow v. Williams, 14 N. C., 263; Dail v. Jones, 85 N. C., 221; Outlaw v. Taylor, 168 N. C., 511, 84 S. E., 811; Speight v. Speight, 208 N. C., 132, 179 S. E., 461. We think this ease comes within the principle there enunciated.
*380In Speight v. Speight, supra, the Court said: “It has been the consistent holding in this jurisdiction following the decision in Graham v. Graham, supra (1822), that a reservation of life estate in personal chattels, in a deed attempting to convey them in remainder, reserves the whole estate, and the limitation over is void,” and, continuing, “A reservation for life of 'the complete use and control’ of personal chattels is a reservation for life of said chattels. 25 C. J., 1039; 17 R. C. L., 617; 11 R. C. L., 473.”
In the present case these clauses “all of my personal property . . . not expended, used or disposed of by me during my natural life”; “to have . . . and possess said personal property . . . after the expiration of my natural life, except such of the personal property . . . as may be used, expended or disposed of by me during my natural life, to them, ... in remainder, after the expiration of my life estate”; and “party of the first part expressly reserves unto himself . . . the right to the use and enjoyment of such of the personal property . . . as he may need with full right to expend, use and dispose of such as he may need during his life time,” clearly reserved to E. J. Nixon the right to “the complete use and control” of all the personal property during his life time, with remainder over at his death.
The language used is ineffectual to vest title to the personal property in the nieces and nephews. Hence, they, as the only next of kin of the intestate, all in equal degree, take per capita under the statutes of distribution. C. S., 137, clause 5; Ellis v. Harrison, 140 N. C., 444 ; 53 S. E., 299; In re Estate of Mizzelle, 213 N. C., 367, 196 S. E., 364.
We have carefully considered the able argument and brief of counsel for appellants and the authorities cited. However, we are not persuaded to depart from the applicable rule which “may be said to rest upon common law authority with statutory support and judicial approval in this State.” Stacy, G. J., in Speight v. Speight, supra.
Let the judgment below be
Affirmed.