The trial judge concluded that the facts found by the Commission established as a matter of law the right of the plaintiff to recover. In this there was error. Even if it be conceded that the facts found will support the conclusion that the plaintiff’s injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, this is not the only reasonable conclusion that may be drawn therefrom. This being true, and the Commission being the judge of the credibility, weight and sufficiency of the testimony, its conclusion must stand. While it was said in Singleton v. Laundry Co., ante, 32, that the Workmen’s Compensation Act seemed to treat the conclusion that an injury resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment as a question of law, this Court has consistently held that such conclusion is a mixed question of law and fact. When the Industrial Commission concludes that an injury arose out of and in the course of *359the employment of a claimant and such conclusion is supported by competent testimony, neither the Superior Court nor this Court may interfere therewith. Marsh v. Bennett College, 212 N. C., 662; Wimbish v. Detective Co., 202 N. C., 800. Likewise, when the Commission finds that the evidence is insufficient to support such conclusion and it finds that the injury relied upon by the plaintiff as a basis for compensation did not arise out of and in the course of the employment of the plaintiff, such conclusion must stand unless under no view of the facts found by the Commission such conclusion is warranted.
When an injury cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause, or comes from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment, or from a hazard common to others, it does not arise out of the employment. Walker v. Wilkins, Inc., 212 N. C., 627; Marsh v. Bennett College, 212 N. C., 662; Plemmons v. White’s Service, Inc., ante, 148. The injury must come from a risk which might have been contemplated by a reasonable person as incidental to the service when he entered the employment. It may be said to be incidental to the employment when it is either an ordinary risk directly connected with the employment, or an extraordinary risk which is only indirectly connected with the service owing to the special nature of the employment. The Workmen’s Compensation Act does not contemplate an award for every injury an employee may receive during the course of his employment. It provides only for compensation for injuries which result from accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
While the phrase “in the course of” refers to time, place, and circumstances, the words “out of” relate to the origin or cause of the accident. Harden v. Furniture Co., 199 N. C., 733; Conrad v. Foundry Co., 198 N. C., 723; Hunt v. State, 201 N. C., 707; Ridout v. Rose’s Stores, Inc., 205 N. C., 423; Chambers v. Oil Co., 199 N. C., 28; Walker v. Wilkins, supra; Plemmons v. White’s Service, Inc., supra; Hildebrand v. Furniture Co., 212 N. C., 100. Speaking to the subject in In re Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, 102 N. E., 697, the Supreme Judicial Court of Mass, says: “It (the injury) arises ‘out of’ the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises ‘out of’ the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes *360from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.”
The fruit peeling on the street created a hazard to which the plaintiff was exposed apart from his employment and was one common to the neighborhood and all other persons who should use the street. The hazard created thereby cannot fairly be traced to the employment, and it cannot be said that it was a natural incident of the work or a hazard which would have been contemplated by a reasonable person in accepting employment with the defendant. The hazard did not arise out of the exposure occasioned by the nature of plaintiff’s employment. It was neither an ordinary nor an extraordinary risk, directly or indirectly connected with the service of plaintiff. We are of the opinion that the Full Commission properly concluded, upon the facts found and the evidence disclosed by the record, that plaintiff’s injury “arose neither out of nor in the course of the plaintiff’s employment.” The conclusion of the court below that the facts found established plaintiff’s right to recover as a matter of law cannot be sustained.