Tbe plaintiff’s action is grounded on negligence, with tbe burden imposed upon ber of affirmatively proving tbe allegations of ber complaint. It is apparent that sbe bas failed to offer sufficient evidence to entitle ber to bave ber case submitted to tbe jury, unless tbe fact of tbe accident itself affords some evidence of negligence, or is sufficient to require tbe submission of tbe case to tbe jury under tbe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Neither of tbe allegations of negligence in tbe complaint was supported by any evidence. There was no evidence of excessive speed (York v. York, ante, 695), nor even of tbe rate of speed, though plaintiff’s witness, who was seated beside tbe driver, testified be was looking at tbe speedometer. There was no evidence of failure to exercise due care in tbe operation of tbe car, or to keep a proper lookout. There was no other traffic, tbe road was straight, of standard width, paved. There was no defect in tbe automobile or its tires. It bad rained at intervals and tbe road was wet. All tbe facts of tbe occurrence and of tbe conduct of tbe defendant were testified to by tbe plaintiff and two other witnesses who were with ber in tbe car at tbe time. Tbe suggestion that defendant bad not bad adequate sleep tbe previous night is met by plaintiff’s evidence that be was apparently alert at tbe time of tbe accident and said before tbe car ran off tbe road, “Keep steady, I’ll straighten out.”
Tbe accident occurred in tbe State of South Carolina, and therefore tbe question of defendant’s liability for negligence must be determined by tbe law of that State. Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N. C., 286, 171 S. E., 82. It is elementary that matters of substantive law are controlled by tbe law of tbe place — tbe lex loci — but that matters of procedure are governed by tbe law of tbe forum — tbe lex fori. Wigmore on Evi., sec. 5. Under this principle tbe methods b,y which tbe parties may prove tbe truth of their assertions, tbe production of evidence, as well as tbe rules for tbe submission of tbe evidence to tbe jury, are matters of procedure, and hence governed by tbe law of tbe forum. 5 R. C. L., sec. 136; 12 C. J., 485; 3 Beale Conflict of Laws, sec. 377.1' et seq. So that whether tbe evidence offered was sufficient to require its submission to tbe jury under tbe doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was a matter to be determined in accordance with tbe law prevailing in this jurisdiction. Harrison v. R. R., 168 N. C., 382, 84 S. E., 519; 11 Am. Jur., sec. 203; 78 A. L. R., 883; 89 A. L. R., 1278.
Tbe statute law of South Carolina relative to liability for injury to guests resulting from tbe operation of an automobile contains this *827provision: “No person transported by tbe owner or operator of a motor vehicle as Ms guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such automobile, its owner or operator, for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others.” South Carolina Code, sec. 5908.
The defendant calls attention to this statute and contends that in any event the burden was on the plaintiff to show, in respect to a gratuitous guest, that the injury complained of was intentionally inflicted or was the result of heedless or reckless disregard of the rights of others. Wright v. Pettus, 209 N. C., 732, 184 S. E., 494; Wise v. Hollowell, supra. But the plaintiff’s evidence is susceptible of reasonable inferences favorable to her contention that there was a sufficiently definite agreement on the part of the defendant to transport Selden’s party (including plaintiff) to Charleston and back for the consideration of furnishing the lunch and dividing the expense of gasoline and oil. The question of what constitutes a “guest without payment” for transportation in an automobile, within the meaning of the above quoted statute, does not seem to have been considered by the' South Carolina Court. However, it is stated in Fulghum v. Bleakley, 177 S. C., 286, 181 S. E., 30, that the South Carolina statute is an exact copy of a statute in force in the State of Connecticut, and the construction put upon it by the Supreme Court of the latter state supports plaintiff’s contention on this point. Kruy v. Smith, 108 Conn., 628; Russell v. Parles, 115 Conn., 687; Gage v. Chapin Motors, 115 Conn., 546; Chaplowe v. Powsner, 119 Conn., 188. The same conclusion is reached in McGuire v. Armstrong, 268 Mich., 152, 255 N. W., 745, where the word “guest” in a similar statute is construed. See, also, Campbell v. Casualty Co., ante, 65. Other cases on the subject will be found collected in 95 A. L. R., 1180.
Coming back to the determinative question presented by the appeal, whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the facts of this case, it seems to have been definitely settled in North Carolina that this principle does not apply to the skidding of an automobile resulting in injury to a passenger. It was so held in Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240, 148 S. E., 251, and reaffirmed in Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749, 161 S. E., 389, and Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117, 179 S. E., 428.
The applicability of res ipsa loquitur to particular cases has been many times discussed in the decisions of this Court, ever since Judge Gaston, in Ellis v. R. R., 24 N. C., 138, first applied the rule, and the doctrine does not now require restatement or further elaboration. Womble v. Grocery Co., 135 N. C., 474, 47 S. E., 493; Stewart v. Carpet Co., *828138 N. C., 60, 50 S. E., 562; Ross v. Cotton Mills, 140 N. C., 115, 52 S. E., 121; Perry v. Mfg. Co., 176 N. C., 68, 97 S. E., 162; White v. Hines, 182 N. C., 275, 109 S. E., 31; Bryant v. Construction Co., 197 N. C., 639, 150 S. E., 122; Armstrong v. Spinning Co., 205 N. C., 553, 172 S. E., 313; Wilson v. Perkins, 211 N. C., 110; Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S., 233; Weston v. Hillyer, 160 S. C., 541, 159 S. E., 390; 45 C. J., sec. 768. The application of tbe rule to injury resulting from the use of machinery or complicated tools or apparatus has been extended to a variety of situations where the cause of the injury is inaccessible to the party injured, but accessible to the party having exclusive control or management of the instrumentality, but ordinarily it does not apply when all the facts causing the accident are known and testified to by the witnesses at the trial. Baldwin v. Smitherman, 171 N. C., 772, 88 S. E., 854. The general rule stated in Huddy on Automobiles, sec. 373, is quoted with approval in Springs v. Doll, supra, as follows: “The mere fact of the skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” And in Linden v. Miller, 172 Wis., 20, 177 N. W., 909, it was said: “Skidding may occur without fault, and when it does occur it may likewise continue without fault for a considerable space and time. It means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily implying negligence. Hence, plaintiff’s claim that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the present situation is not well founded. In order to make the doctrine res ipsa loquitur apply, it must be held that skidding itself implies negligence. This it does not do. It is a well known physical fact that cars skid on greasy or slippery roads without fault either on account of the manner of handling the car or on account of its being there.”
The contention that the facts here do not present a case of skidding is untenable. There is no other reasonable conclusion to be reached but that the wheels of the automobile slipped sideways on the pavement, resulting in inability of the driver to control the movement of the car. This is the meaning of the word “skidding” as applied to the operation of automobiles. One of plaintiff’s witnesses testified in the trial that the car seemed to be skidding.
Upon consideration of the record before us, we conclude that the principle of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to. the facts disclosed, and that there being no evidence of negligence, the judgment of nonsuit was properly entered.