In view of the admissions in the pleadings in this action, the only question involved in the first issue submitted to the jury was whether the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant L. M. Hipp, as alleged in the answer.
It is alleged in the complaint, and admitted in the answer, that at the time the plaintiff was injured he was riding in an automobile which was owned by the defendant the Quaker State Oil Refining Company, Inc., and driven by the defendant L. M. Hipp in the performance of his duties as its employee; and that the plaintiff was riding in the automo*119bile upon the invitation of the defendants, and for the purpose of aiding the defendant L. M. Hipp in the performance of his duties as an employee of the defendant the Quaker State Oil Refining Company, Inc.
On these admissions in their answer, both the defendants are liable to the plaintiff for the damages which he sustained as the result of his injuries, if his injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant L. M. Hipp*, as alleged in the complaint. It is elementary law that the employer is responsible for the negligence of his employee which results in injury to a third person, when the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, and about his employer’s business. See Martin v. Bus Line, 197 N. C., 720, 150 S. E., 501.
The evidence at the trial tended to show that as the plaintiff and the defendant L. M. Hipp were riding in the automobile, on a State highway between the town of Fountain and the town of Earmville, at a speed of 35 to 37 miles an hour, the automobile side-slipped or skidded, and that the defendant L. M. Hipp, the driver, attempted to control the automobile by turning the steering wheel from his right to his left, and vice versa, with the result that the automobile “zig-zagged” across the highway until it went off the highway and down an embankment, with the result that both the plaintiff and the defendant L. „M. Hipp were injured. The evidence tended to show further that the highway was wet and slippery, and that the tires on the automobile were worn and slick. The plaintiff testified as follows:
“The road between Pinetops and Earmville is of material commonly used in highway construction, and is paved. The road was damp, due to the mist which had fallen during the day on it. ¥e had trouble between Fountain and Earmville. A few miles out of Fountain, the automobile side-slipped. We had been driving at a speed of 40 to 42 miles per hour. I said: ’Mr. Hipp, why does this car side-slip when we are running no faster than we are?’ He replied, ’The tires are worn out.’ I said, ’Why don’t you put on new tires ?’ He said, ’I intended to do so, but the district manager of the company told me to keep down expenses.’ He said he was going to slip- new tires on the automobile, one at a time. I told him that he had better slow down. He did so. We were running at a speed of 35 to 37 miles per hour when the automobile side-slipped and skidded. Mr. Hipp was not able to right the automobile with the steering wheel.”
There was no evidence which tended to show that the plaintiff knew that the tires on the automobile were worn and slick until his conversation with the defendant L. M. Hipp, almost immediately before the accident.
The evidence in this case was properly submitted to the jury as tending to show that the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the de*120fendant L. M. Hipp. Tbe mere fact tbat tbe automobile side-slipped or skidded was not in itself evidence of its negligent operation by tbe defendant. Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240, 148 S. E., 251. But in this case, as in Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749, 161 S. E., 389, there was evidence from wbicb tbe jury could find tbat tbe skidding of tbe automobile was tbe result of tbe negligence of tbe defendant in driving an automobile with tires wbicb be knew were worn out and slick, on a highway wbicb was wet and slippery, at a rate of speed wbicb, although not ordinarily unlawful, was unlawful under all tbe circumstances shown by tbe evidence. C. S., 2621 (45).
There was no error in tbe refusal of tbe court to give tbe special instruction as prayed by tbe defendants. Whether or not tbe conduct of tbe defendant L. M. Hipp, after tbe automobile bad skidded on tbe highway, in attempting to control it, was tbat of a prudent man was for tbe jury and not for tbe court to determine. Tbe instruction, as properly modified by tbe court, was given in tbe charge to tbe jury. Newman v. Queen City Coach Company, 205 N. C., 26, 169 S. E., 808. There was nothing in tbe charge to tbe jury of which tbe defendants can justly complain. It was full and correct.
Tbe refusal of tbe court to set aside tbe verdict on tbe ground tbat tbe damages assessed by tbe jury are excessive is not reviewable by this Court. Lane v. R. R., 192 N. C., 287, 134 S. E., 855. Tbe evidence with respect to tbe plaintiff’s injuries, and bis resultant damages, was sufficient to justify tbe answer to tbe second issue.
Tbe assignments of error on this appeal cannot be sustained. Tbe judgment is affirmed.