In the companion case of Hagedorn v. Hagedorn, 210 N. C., 164, 185 S. E., 768, the plaintiff sought to reach certain property which, it was alleged, her husband bad placed in corporate holding to defeat her marital rights. Here a similar effort is made to reach property, title to which plaintiff alleges her husband has placed in Lula Hagedorn with like intent and purpose.
HeymaN Hagedorn’s Appeal.
The only exceptions requiring attention on Heyman Hagedorn’s appeal are those directed to the plaintiff’s testimony in which she undertakes to speak to the subject of adultery, in support of the second issue, and, also, certain alleged confidential communications.
Counsel for plaintiff freely conceded in the trial court that the examination of bis client in support of the second issue was at first inadvertent, or without proper attention to C. S., 1801, which prohibits either spouse from testifying to the other’s adultery, and asked that the same be stricken out. This was done. The error was thus cured. Gray v. High Point, 203 N. C., 756, 166 S. E., 911; S. v. Lattimore, 201 N. C., 32, 158 S. E., 741; Nance v. Fertilizer Co., 200 N. C., 702, 158 S. E., 486; Eaker v. Shoe Co., 199 N. C., 379, 154 S. E., 667; Hyatt v. McCoy, 194 N. C., 760, 140 S. E., 807; S. v. Stewart, 189 N. C., 340, 127 S. E., 260; In re Will of Staub, 172 N. C., 138, 90 S. E., 119. In McAllister v. McAllister, 34 N. C., 184, Ruffin, C. J., said: “It is undoubtedly proper and in the power of the court to correct a slip by withdrawing improper evidence from the consideration of the jury, or by giving such explanations of an error as will prevent it from misleading a jury.” He expressed the same opinion in S. v. May, 15 N. C., 328, and the practice has been observed since that time. S. v. Davis, 15 N. C., 612; S. v. Collins, 93 N. C., 564; S. v. McNair, ibid., 628; Bridgers v. Dill, 97 N. C., 222, 1 S. E., 767; S. v. Crane, 110 N. C., 530, 15 S. E., 231; Wilson v. Mfg. Co., 120 N. C., 94, 26 S. E., 629; S. v. Lunsford, 177 N. C., 117, 97 S. E., 682; S. v. Dickerson, 189 N. C., 327, 127 S. E., 256. But even if we should agree with the defendant that there was error in respect of the second issue, still this would not work a new trial *178unless error were also committed in respect of the fourth issue, for in an action like the present, only one cause for divorce, either a vinculo or a mensa el thoro, need be alleged and shown. Albritton v. Albritton, 210 N. C., 111, 185 S. E., 762. In the instant case, the plaintiff has elected to make “assurance doubly sure” by alleging two causes for divorce — one absolute, the other from bed and board. Either would have sufficed under C. S., 1667. Price v. Price, 188 N. C., 640, 125 S. E., 264.
Plaintiff was allowed to testify to a number of conversations with her husband, which, it is contended, were of a confidential nature and should have been excluded under authority of McCoy v. Justice, 199 N. C., 602, 155 S. E., 452. It is provided by C. S., 1801 that “No husband or wife shall be compelled to disclose any confidential communication made by one to the other during their marriage.” This means that neither shall be compelled to disclose any such confidential communication, but does not perforce render a voluntary disclosure thereof incompetent. Nelson v. Nelson, 197 N. C., 465, 149 S. E., 585.
Speaking to a similar situation in Stickney v. Stickney, 131 U. S., 227, Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “The general rule of the common law is, that neither husband nor wife is admissible as a witness for or against each other in any case, civil or criminal. This exclusion, as Greenleaf says, is founded partly upon the identity of their legal rights and interests, and partly on principles of public policy, that the confidence existing between them shall be sacredly protected and cherished to the utmost extent, as being essential to the happiness of social life. But this doctrine has been modified in several states, in many particulars, by direct legislation upon the subject, such as that neither husband nor wife shall be compelled to disclose any communication made to him or her during the marriage, as in New York, A voluntary statement is receivable under such a statute.”
Lula HagedobN’s Appeal.
The defendant Lula Hagedorn, in her answer, admits that Heyman Hagedorn caused title to the two lots in Greensboro to be placed in her name “for the purpose of securing the replacement of moneys she had loaned her son.” Thus she only claims to hold the properties as security for loans, and concedes that the lots belong to her son. It has been found by the jury, however, upon ample evidence, that her claim of loans is fictitious, except as to the taxes advanced. Hence, the judgment would seem to be without prejudice to any of her rights. Taylor v. Taylor, 197 N. C., 197, 148 S. E., 171; Sexton v. Farrington, 185 N. C., 339, 117 S. E., 172; Gentry v. Harper, 55 N. C., 177; Fahey v. Fahey, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1147, and note. She elected not to testify in the *179case, notwithstanding plaintiff’s evidence in denial of the genuineness of her supposed loans.
The plaintiff stands in the position of a creditor of her husband. Walton v. Walton, 178 N. C., 73, 100 S. E., 176. As against her claim, the deed to Lula Hagedorn, absolute on its face, but intended only as security, will not avail. Foster v. Moore, 204 N. C., 9, 167 S. E., 383; Gulley v. Macy, 84 N. C., 434; Johnson v. Murchison, 60 N. C., 292; Holcombe v. Ray, 23 N. C., 340; Gregory v. Perkins, 15 N. C., 50.
The result is that none of the exceptions can be held to work a new trial on either appeal.
No error.