The plaintiff’s complaint seeks relief as follows: (1) For alimony and counsel fees under C. S., 1667. (2) To set aside a deed of separation between the plaintiff and defendant. (3) To set aside a deed from F. L. Taylor to F. W. Taylor. A conspiracy and scheme growing out of the marriage contract — the one transaction is charged against defendants. All flow from “The same transaction or transaction connected with the same subject of action.” C. S., 507(1).
O. S., 1667 (N. C. Code, Anno.), in part, is as follows: “If any bus-band shall separate himself from his wife and fail to provide her and the children of the marriage with the necessary subsistence according to his means and condition in life, or if be shall be a drunkard or spendthrift, or be guilty of any misconduct or acts that would be or constitute cause for divorce, either absolute or from bed and board, the wife may institute an action in the Superior Court of the county in which the cause of action arose to have a reasonable subsistence and counsel fees allotted and paid for or secured to her from the estate or earnings of her husband. Pending the trial and final determination of the issues involved in such action, and also after they are determined, if finally determined, in favor of the wife, such wife may make application to the resident judge of the Superior Court, or the judge holding the Superior Courts of the district in which, the action is brought, for an allowance for such subsistence and counsel fees, and it shall be lawful for such judge to cause the husband to secure so much of bis estate or to pay so much of his earnings, or both, as may be proper, according to bis condition and circumstances, for the benefit of his said wife, and the children of the marriage, having regard also to the separate estate of the wife,” etc. (Italics ours.)
*201Under this section, when a man marries be assumes, and the law imposes on him, certain duties and obligations to the woman. It is contended by defendants that the deed of separation must first be declared invalid. The above statute is to the contrary.
In Barbee v. Barbee, 181 N. C., at pp. 538-9, it is said: “Plaintiff takes tbe position that where tbe facts of marriage is in issue, as it is here, no order awarding an allowance for a reasonable subsistence and counsel fees under C. S., 1667, as amended by chapter 123, Public Laws 1921, may be made until such issue has been determined by a jury. Such was the holding in Crews v. Crews, 175 N. C., 169, decided 6 March, 1918, but the law in this respect has been changed by chapter 24, Public Laws 1919; and it is now provided by statute that the wife may make application for an allowance for a reasonable subsistence and counsel fees ‘pending the trial and final determination of the issues involved in such action.’ ” Vickers v. Vickers, 188 N. C., 448; Price v. Price, ibid., 640; Simmons v. Simmons, 192 N. C., 825.
On tbe ground of public policy, deeds of separation are not favored by tbe law, but under certain circumstances they are recognized by certain statutes, wben signed in conformity thereto. C. S., 2515, 2516, 2529. In C. S., 2516, it is written “contracts between husband and wife not forbidden by tbe preceding section and not inconsistent with, public policy are valid.”
It seems to be unquestioned that a separation agreement must be untainted by fraud, must be in all respects fair, reasonable and just, and must have been entered into without coercion or the exercise of undue influence, and with full knowledge of all the circumstances, conditions, and rights of the contracting parties. Hughes v. Leonard, 66 Colo., 500; 5 A. L. R., Anno. at p. 823. Smith v. King, 107 N. C., 273; Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N. C., 408.
If the facts alleged are found by the jury not to be true and the deed of separation sustained as valid, no barm can follow, as any subsistence allowed to plaintiff during the pendency of the action, can be credited on the amount agreed to be paid under the deed of separation.
Where the parties have bound themselves by a contract to marry, neither can give away bis or her property without the consent of the other; and notice before the marriage of such a gift does not binder the party injured from insisting on its invalidity. Poston v. Gillespie, 58 N. C., 258; Logan v. Simmons, 38 N. C., 487; Spencer v. Spencer, 56 N. C., 404; Johnson v. Peterson, 59 N. C., 12. See Edwards v. Culberson, 111 N. C., 342.
In Trust Co. v. Pierce, 195 N. C., at p. 718, citing numerous authorities, this observation is made: “A connected story is told and a com--*202píete picture is painted of a series of transactions, forming one general scheme, and tending to a single end. This saves the pleading from the challenge of the demurrers.” Scales v. Trust Co., 195 N. C., 772.
We think the demurrer ore tenas should have been overruled. The judgment below is
Reversed.