With respect to plaintiff’s appeal, it is sufficient to say that as tbe judgment of confirmation was entered out of the county and under a misapprehension of the agreement of the parties, it was properly vacated on motion. Bisanar v. Suttlemyre, 193 N. C., 711, 138 S. E., 1.
Unless authorized by statute, or by consent of the parties, a judge of the Superior Court has no authority to hear a cause, or to make an order substantially affecting the rights of the parties, outside of the county in which the action is pending. Gaster v. Thomas, 188 N. C., 346, 124 S. E., 609; Cahoon v. Brinkley, 176 N. C., 6, 96 S. E., 650.
It is likewise sufficient to say in regard to defendants’ appeal, the holding that Laura E. McDaniels is seized of less than an indefeasible fee in said lands accords with the decisions on the subject. Nobles v. Nobles, 177 N. C., 243, 98 S. E., 715. The limitations in the will are not so framed as to attract the rule in Shelley’s case, which obtains in this jurisdiction not only as a rule of law but also as a rule of property. Whitehurst v. Bowers, 205 N. C., 541, 172 S. E., 180; Martin v. Knowles, 195 N. C., 427, 142 S. E., 313; Welch v. Gibson, 193 N. C., 684, 138 S. E., 25. “Nearest blood kindred” excludes the idea of representation or affinity, Fields v. Rollins, 186 N. C., 221, 119 S. E., 207; and, “as regulated by the laws of descent,” has reference to the nearest blood kindred of the testator, who would potentially be a part at least of the next of kin of the first taker. Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C., 158, 106 S. E., 501. These expressions, taken in connection with the original limitation of the remainder “to her legitimate children,” would seem to indicate that the use of the word “heirs” in the ulterior clause was intended to be taken in the sense of issue or children. The case, therefore, is controlled by the decisions in Puckett v. Morgan, 158 N. C., 344, 74 S. E., 15; Jones v. Whichard, 163 N. C., 241, 79 S. E., 503; Pugh v. Allen, 179 N. C., 307, 102 S. E., 394; Blackledge v. Simmons, 180 N. C., 535, 105 S. E., 202; Hampton v. Griggs, 184 N. C., 13, 113 S. E., 501; Reid v. Neal, 182 N. C., 192, 108 S. E., 769; Doggett v. Vaughan, 199 N. C., 424, 154 S. E., 660.
The distinction between this line of cases, in which the rule has been held not to be applicable to the limitations appearing therein, and the long line of decisions in which it has been held to be applicable and firmly established as the law of this jurisdiction, was first pointed out in Pugh v. Allen, supra, and repeated in Hampton v. Griggs, supra, Welch v. Gibson, supra, Doggett v. Vaughan, supra, substantially as follows: When there is an ulterior limitation which provides that upion the happening of a given contingency, the estate is to be taken out of *135tbe first line of descent and then put back into tbe same line, in a restricted manner, by giving it to some, bnt not to all, of those wbo presumptively would bave shared in tbe estate as being potentially among tbe heirs general of tbe first taker, this circumstance may be used as one of tbe guides in ascertaining tbe paramount intention of tbe testator, and, with other indicia, it has been held sufficient to show that the words “heirs” or “heirs of tbe body” were not used in their technical sense. See, also, and compare Clark v. Clark, 194 N. C., 288, 139 S. E., 437, Yelverton v. Yelverton, 192 N. C., 614, 135 S. E., 632.
Tbe remaining portions of tbe judgment are not challenged by exception or appeal, hence they are deemed to be correct.
On plaintiff’s appeal
Affirmed.
On defendants’ appeal
Affirmed.