The decision of this action is found in advance sheets of opinions in cases heard and determined by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, Yol. 1, No. 5, p. 200. The findings of fact and conclusions of law by J. Dewey Dorsett, Commissioner, are not set forth in the above published opinion.
Sec. 2 (f) of the North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act reads as follows: “ 'Injury’ and 'personal injury’ shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the eriiployment, and shall not include a disease in any form, except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident.”
In Johnson v. Hosiery Co., 199 N. C., at p. 40, it is said: Sec. 2(b) “undertakes to define the word employment and specifically excludes from the operation of the act 'persons whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer,’ etc. . . . It is further provided in section 60 that the award of the Commission 'shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.’ However, errors of law are reviewable. It is generally held by the courts that the various compensation acts of the Union should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation.” Rice v. Panel Co., 199 N. C., at p. 157.
The Commissioner, Dorsett, found: “In view of the foregoing we make the further finding of fact that J. P. Southern met with an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment upon the premises of his employer which resulted in his death.” The full Commission, upon appeal, sustained this finding of fact.
In the present action there was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the Industrial Commission. We think the finding borne out by the weight of authority.
In Indemnity Co. v. Scott, 278 S. W., at p. 348 (Texas) : “The finding of the court in.favor of appellees being general, every issuable fact must be considered found in their favor if there is any evidence to support such a finding. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to *170sustain each such finding, we must view tbe same in the light most favorable thereto, rejecting all evidence favorable to the opposite contention, and considering only the facts and circumstances which tend to sustain such finding.” S. C., 298 S. W., 414 (Texas).
In Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Com., 285 Ill., 31 (120 N. E. Rep., at p. 531) : “Our consideration of the evidence is limited to the inquiry whether the record contains competent evidence to sustain the award. If the evidence in favor of the applicant sustains the award, the weight of the evidence to the contrary will not be considered by the reviewing court. The determination of the facts upon contradictory evidence by the Industrial Commission is final.” Kuca v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 110 A. R., 731 (268 Pa., 163); Chicago Dry Kiln Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill., 556.
In Baum v. Ind. Com., 288 Ill., 516, 6 A. L. R. Anno., at p. 1247: “While compensation under the statute ordinarily is not recoverable unless the injury arises out of the employment, the cases, almost without exception, hold that an employee does not go outside his employment if, when confronted with a sudden emergency, he steps beyond his regularly designated duties in an attempt to save himself from injury, to rescue another employee from danger, or to save his employer’s property.” Dondenean v. State Ind. & Acci. Com., 119 Ore., 357, 50 A. L. R. (Anno.), p. 1148. “By accident arising out of and in the course of the employment” see definition given in Conrad v. Foundry Co., 198 N. C., 723. Harden v. Furniture Co., 199 N. C., 733; Phifer v. Dairy, ante, 65; Davis v. North State Veneer Corp., post, 263.
In the present case there is no dispute that the employee was on duty on the defendant’s mill property as night watchman at the time of the accident, and had been for years in the employ of defendant as nightwatchman. His conduct just prior to the accident was all in furtherance of his employer’s business. It was necessary to safely run the machinery in the mill that the gates be down, but the gates were raised after the man plunged in the race in his machine, and could not be dropped until the automobile was gotten out. Every effort was made to get the automobile out, and a few hours after Southern was drowned it was gotten out so that the mill could run. The conduct of Southern undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that he went in the race to get the automobile out and miscalculated the swiftness of the current. He often cleaned out debris in the race before, and his wife said that he stated on one occasion before, “This is my job getting planks and things out of the race.” This faithful employee, in performing a hazardous duty, to protect his employer’s property and keep the mill running, lost his life by accidental drowning. It was “an injury by accident and arising out of and in the course of the employment.” The Commission so *171found, and there was competent and sufficient evidence to support the finding. The deceased belonged to that noble army of workmen who serve their employers faithfully and not by “eye service,” and in' attempting to save the property of his employers, accidentally lost his life and left dependent a wife and children. The beneficent purpose of the act was that industry would care for the widow and orphan in such cases as the present.
The case of Davis v. North State Veneer Corp., post, 263, is clearly distinguishable. The judgment of the court below is
Reversed.