The court was of opinion that as a matter of law the plaintiff, upon all the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial of this action, was not entitled to an affirmative answer to the seventh issue, and, therefore, instructed the jury that, -if they believed all the evidence pertinent to said issue and found the facts to be as testified by all the witnesses, they would answer the seventh issue, “No,” and the eighth issue “Nothing.” Plaintiff excepted to this instruction, and on his appeal to this Court assigns same as error. The question presented for decision by this assignment of error is whether the deed from the plaintiff to the defendant conveys to defendant a permanent right of way over and across plaintiff’s land, to be located by defendant within the period of time during which defendant had- the right to enter upon said land, and to cut and remove therefrom the timber conveyed by the deed. This question must be answered in the affirmative on the authority of Grady v. Tile Co., ante, 511, 154 S. E., 834, and Hughes v. R. R., 119 N. C., 688, 23 S. E., 717. The language used by the plaintiff in his deed is so plain and his intention so clearly expressed, that there is no room for construction. Hinton v. Vinson, 180 N. C., 393, 108 S. E., 897. In McCain v. Ins. Co., 190 N. C., 549, 130 S. E., 186, it is said: “Rules of construction are only aids in interpreting contracts that are either ambiguous or not clearly plain in meaning, either from the terms of the contract itself, or from the facts to which the rules are to be applied.” Courts will not and ought not to undertake to construe the language of a deed, when the intention of the grantor is clearly and plainly expressed, as in the deed involved in the instant ease. We find no error in plaintiff’s appeal. The defendant has the right, by the terms of its deed, to maintain permanently on the right of way over and across plaintiff’s land described therein the tramway or railroad which it constructed on said right of way, during the period in which it had the right to locate said right of way.
In his rulings on defendant’s objections to evidence offered by plaintiff, and in his instructions to the jury relative to the issues other than the seventh and eighth issues, the trial judge failed, we think, to give effect to the right of defendant, under its deed from the plaintiff, to enter upon plaintiff’s land and to cut and remove therefrom the timber conveyed by said deed. Defendant had the right to cut said timber and to remove the same from said land. Such cutting and removal, if done in the usual and ordinary manner and by the usual and ordinary methods, as was necessarily contemplated by the parties when the timber was conveyed by plaintiff to defendant, was not wrongful, although as incidents thereto plaintiff’s fences were injured, and his ditches and drains dammed up by trees and tree-tops. These results are not unusual and defendant is not liable in damages to plaintiff if only the usual and *722ordinary results followed from the exercise by defendant of its rights under its deed. Defendant is liable to plaintiff only if the jury shall find from the evidence that defendant exercised its rights to cut and remove said timber in a negligent manner, or by negligent methods, thus causing plaintiff injuries greater in extent than usually follow the cutting and removal of timber.
There was evidence tending to show that defendant was negligent both in the manner and in the methods which it employed in the exercise of its rights. The evidence was conflicting, at least, as to whether defendant wrongfully removed lightwood from plaintiff’s land as alleged in the complaint. There was no error in the refusal of the court to allow defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit. For errors, however, both in the admission of evidence and in instructions to the jury, defendant is entitled to a new trial. It is so ordered.
New trial.