That the estate conveyed by the deed is a fee simple under the rule in Shelley’s case, as the plaintiff contends, is a proposition which in our opinion cannot be maintained. This is evident from the language of the rule itself: “Where a person takes an estate of freehold, legally or equitably, under a deed or will, or other writing, and in the same instrument there is a limitation by way of remainder, either with or without the interposition of another estate, of any interest of the same legal or equitable quality to his heirs, or heirs of his body, as a class of persons to take in succession from generation to generation, the limitation to the heirs entitles the ancestor to the whole estate.” 4 Kent Com. (215). It is also evident from the decisions. One of the prerequisites to the application of the rule is a limitation in fee or in tail by way of remainder, and such limitation does not appear in the conveyance. Reid v. Neal, 182 N. C., 192; Willis v. Trust Co., 183 N. C., 267; Hampton v. Griggs, 184 N. C., 13; Fields v. Rollins, 186 N. C., 221; Bank v. Dortch, 186 N. C., 510; Walker v. Butner, 187 N. C., 535.
In the construction of deeds the primary rule is to ascertain the real intention of the parties and then to give it effect, unless such intention is controlled by an arbitrary rule of law, as in Shelley's case. Bagwell v. Hines, 187 N. C., 690. This principle is fairly exemplified in Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C., 394. The deed there presented for interpretation contained the words “Unto the grantee and her heirs forever,” followed, after the description, by the habendum, “To have and to hold unto the grantee during her lifetime, and at her death to be divided between her children.” Taking the whole deed into consideration with a view to effectuating the purpose of the grantors, the Court held that it was their intention to convey to the designated grantee only a life estate with a remainder over to her children. Antiquated technicalities, it was said, should not be permitted to override the intention expressed by the makers of the deed; and if there should be doubt as to their intention the court should adopt such construction as would accord with their presumed meaning. Among the many decisions upholding this principle the following may be cited. Ipock v. Gaskins, 161 N. C., 674; Guilford v. Porter, 167 N. C., 366; Gold Mining Co. v. Lumber Co., 170 N. C., 273; Revis v. Murphy, 172 N. C., 579; *789 Williams v. Williams, 175 N. C., 160; Willis v. Trust Co., supra; Berry v. Cedar Works, 184 N. C., 187; Seawell v. Hall, 185 N. C., 80.
Another principle to be considered is this: Ordinarily tbe written and printed parts of a deed are equally binding; but if they are inconsistent tbe writing will prevail over tbe printed form. Miller v. Mowers, 81 N. E. (Ill.), 420; De Paige v. Douglas, 136 S. W. (Mo.), 345; In re Brookfield, 176 N. Y., 138; 18 C. J., 258 (206). Tbe deed construed in tbe first of these cases contained tbe words, “Grant, bargain and sell unto tbe said party of tbe second part, her heirs and assigns, all tbe following described lands. . . . during her natural lifetime” followed by tbe habendum “To have and to bold tbe said premises . . . unto tbe said party of the second part, her heirs and assigns, during her natural lifetime.” Only tbe words in italics were written in tbe deed, tbe others being a part of tbe printed form; and it was'beld that tbe written words controlled tbe construction, that tbe grantee took a life estate, and that it was unnecessary to reform tbe deed.
Tbe facts in tbe case before us are almost identical. As to form, tbe deed was printed in part and written in part, tbe words “during her natural life” being in writing. On account of tbe inconsistency between tbe written and tbe printed parts tbe deed is ambiguous, and, as suggested, we must consider tbe intention. If tbe printed form bad not been used tbe words “heirs” would evidently have been omitted, and tbe intention of tbe parties would, no doubt, have been more clearly expressed.
If tbe foregoing principles be applied we must conclude that tbe deed vests in tbe grantee an estate for life and not in fee.
Tbe judgment is
Affirmed.