It was conceded by both parties that the foreman or superintendent of the work were both repre*749sentatives of the company and not fellow servants of the plaintiff’s injured son. That admission puts the first question that would have arisen in the natural order of inquiry in this case behind us. If such was the relation subsisting at the time of sustaining the injury, an act of the boy which ordinarily would have been deemed negligent because it exposed him to apparent danger would not, if done suddenly under the command of his superior, have made him culpable, because the law assumes that his conduct was influenced by a well-founded fear of losing employment if he disobeyed the order. Turner v. Lumber Co., at this Term ; Mason v. Railroad, 111 N. C., 482 ; Section, 114 N. C., 718 ; Logan v. Railroad, 116 N. C., 940. The court told the jury, however, that “ it was negligence to raise a log with a rope, if the rope was so fastened that it was liable to slip off and injure John Williams or any one else employed under Reister and working there that day.” The word “ liable ” must be interpreted in this connection in its application to the manner of tying-the rope, in the sense of “ exposed to the casualty or contingency more or less probable ” of slipping off the log. Webster’s Dictionary. The jury were warranted in drawing the inference that if the rope was so tied that by any accident due to any cause, however unexpected, it might slip off, the defendant was guilty of negligence and answerable for the injury. Persons, natural or artificial, are wanting in ordinary care if they fail to take precaution to prevent others from being subjected to danger, when by reasonable diligence, and without omitting to discharge a higher duty, they can avert such peril. But the law requires of all die exercise only of such a degree of diligence in the management of their own affairs, whether as to what is done or left undone by them, that they do not unnecessarily subject others to danger that might natur*750ally have been expected as a consequence of such acts or omissions. Turner v. Lumber Co., supra; Blue v. Railroad, 116 N. C., 955; Little v. Railroad, 118 N. C., 1072; Tillett v. Railroad, 118 N. C., 1031. The foreman was not bound to so fasten a rope as to insure all of the employees of the company who were assisting in raising the timber against casualties. His duty was done when he provided against what could reasonably have been expected, not against the consequences of accident that might or might not happen. Emry v. Railroad, 102 N. C., 209 at p. 226. The court below erred in so defining the duties of the defendant as to require it to provide against all accidents caused by defective appliances or machinery, or the failure to arrange and handle appliances in the safest possible manner. Whether due diligence has or has not been shown, to discover and guard against injury, as a result of the conditions shown to have existed, is a question for the jury. Mason v. Railroad, supra.
Hid the defendant exercise reasonable care to provide for the safety of those engaged in raising the timber ? It was the province of the jury to answer this inquiry. In the aspect of the evidence presented in plaintiff’s request, it was error to tell them that in law the defendant was negligent.
It did not necessarily follow, because the jury thought it possible for all of the employees to have held up the log after the rope had slipped, that the foreman was culpable for telling all to get out of the way. Tbe others did escape unhurt. The question whether all might have held it up was one as to which either of two inferences might have been drawn by the jury, and either would have been based merely upon the opinion of a witness.
For the error mentioned, a new trial is granted.
New Trial.