(after stating the case): It was conceded and settled in Clark v. Railroad, 109 N. C., 430, that one who *1076attempts to walk across an elevated trestle, so high that it is dangerous to jump from it to the ground, is negligent, and that where he is injured by a train while crossing, it is the duty of a jury to find, in response to an issue involving the question, that he contributed by his own carelessness to cause the injury. Pickett v. Railroad, 117 N. C., 616; Baker v. Railroad, decided at this Term. In the case at bar, as in Olark v. Railroad, supra, the only question presented is, whether there was any intervening negligence on the part of the defendant, or, in other words, whether, notwithstanding the admitted carelessness of the plaintiff, the defendant’s engineer, after the plaintiff had exposed himself to danger, might have averted the accident by the exercise of ordinary care. . The engineer saw the plaintiff on the trestle in time to have stopped the train without peril to-those on board, and to have avoided the accident. Eor this reason the court instructed the jury to respond in the affirmative to the third as well as to the second issue.
But the plaintiff testifies that when he looked back and saw the train approaching, he, in obedience to a signal from a railroad hand, moved to one side, sat down upon a cap-sill and put his arms around a guard-rail. The plaintiff further testified that the passing train struck him in the forehead and inflicted a painful wound, but admitted that if he had held back his head, he would have escaped uninjured.
The engineer testified that -he saw that the plaintiff was on the trestle when his train was between a quarter and a half mile from him, and on perceiving his situation, immediately applied brakes, and could and would have stopped the train before reaching the point where plaintiff then was, if he had not seen the plaintiff step upon the cap-sill. The engineer says that he was running at the'rate of *1077twenty miles an hour, and by applying the brakes reduced the speed on seeing that Little was on the trestle, but when the latter took refuge upon the cap-sill he relieved the brakes and made no further efforts to stop. The engine passed Little, according to the engineer’s account, without injuring him. He was seen by and was looking at the engineer as the engine passed him. As a jeason for relieving brak.es when Little was seen to step on the cap-sill, the engineer testifies that the train hands were at the time working on the trestle, and were in the habit of moving out on the cap-sill when a train approached, as they could thereby easily avoid collision. The cap-sills projected a foot and a half.
The defendant asked the court to instruct the jury in substance that if the engineer had seen that others wTho had taken refuge from passing trains on the cap-sills had escaped unhurt, and if, acting upon the reasonable belief that the plaintiff was in a place of safety, he relieved the brakes -when he would, but for such belief, have stopped the train before reaching the point on the trestle where the plaintiff was stricken, they should answer the third issue in the negative. There was error in refusing to submit this proposition to the jury. It was the duty of the engineer to stop the train if it appeared to him that the natural and probable consequence of relieving the brakes and allowing the train to continue its course would be injurious to the plaintiff. While an engineer is required, when placed in such a situation as wasNeimyer, according to his testimony and that of other witnesses, to resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of saving life, (Clark v. Railroad supra,) that rule does not impose upon him the duty of providing against what he has no reasonable ground to believe would happen. The legal obligation is to take proper precaution to guard against what is the *1078usual or justly expected consequence of one’s acts — not against unexpected, unusual or extraordinary results. Tillett v. Railroad, at this Term; Blue v. Railroad, 116 N. C., 955; Emry v. Railroad, 102 N. C., 209; Russell v. Monroe, 116 N. C., 720; Thompson v. Winston, decided at this Term.
The court ought to have called the attention of the jury to the question whether the cap-sill had proven a safe place of refuge for others, and whether the engineer desisted from the effort to stop the train in time to prevent a collision because he entertained the reasonable belief that the plaintiff was no longer in danger. In refusing the instruction that would have presented this view of the evidence there was error which entitles the defendant to a new trial.
New Trial.