Regularly, the pleadings in an action should be settled before the trial begins. Hence, the plaintiff should have made objection to the sufficiency of the answer before the jury were empanneled. It seems that it was made afterwards, but the Court entertained the motion, as it might do in the exercise of its discretion, and denied the same.
We think the answer to the sixth paragraph of the complaint was insufficient, and clearly not a compliance with the statutory provision (The Cude, § 243), nor did it serve 'the purpose of The Code method of procedure. The provision just cited prescribes that “the answer of the defendant must contain ‘ a general or specific denial of each material allegation of the complaint controverted by the defendant, or of any knowledge or information thereof, sufficient to form a belief.’ ” Such denial may be general — that is that the allegation is not true; or it must be specific — that is, that it is true in some respects, but not true in others, as specified. It should also embrace “ any knowledge or information thereof (that is, the allegation of the complaint) sufficient to form a belief” in respect thereto. The purpose is to require the defendant frankly to deny the truth of the allegations of the complaint, if he can, or, if he cannot, then to admit the truth of them, or to specifically admit the truth of them, so far as they are true within his knowledge, and deny the truth of the same in particular respects, so far as he may be warranted in doing so by the facts; and he is further required to state such knowledge and information as he may have as to the allegations sufficient to form a belief. Such denials, admissions and statements of facts should be direct, positive and unequivocal — not argumentative and evasive. The object of answer is to raise necessary issues of fact and law, and to ascertain the facts as to the allegations of the complaint within the knowledge of the defendant, and thus avoid, as far as practicable, controversy, *465delay and expense, and facilitate the administration of justice in the action.
The answer of the present defendant, in the-respect complained of, was neither frank nor’ sufficient. It was “ that the allegations of the sixth paragraph of the complaint are untrue in manner and form as therein alleged.” The clear implication from this was, that the allegations were in some respects, in some way, to some extent, true. It was bound to answer in what “ manner and form,” in what respects, and to what extent, they were true, and also to state what knowledge or information it had in respect thereto sufficient 10 form a belief. The allegations were in respect to such matters and things as the defendant, through its proper officers and agents, must have had full knowledge of. The Court should have required the defendant, upon such terms as it might have deemed just, to answer the allegations by a proper denial or admission, or have stricken out the insufficient one. Pleading is not a mere game — an artifice — a mere trial of skill — it is serious and earnest, and the law will effectuate the purposes contemplated by it. Flack v. Dawson, 69 N. C., 42; Schehan v. Malone, 71 N. C., 440; Heyer v. Bealty, 76 N. C, 28; Durden v. Simmons, 84 N. C., 555; Gas Machine Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 91 N. C., 74.
The defendant was a foreign corporation, and hence the statute (The Code, §683) requiring “every contract of every corporation, by which a liability may be incurred by the company exceeding one hundred dollars, shall be in writing, and either under the common seal of the corporation or signed by some officer of the company authorized thereto,” does not apply to or embrace it. This plainly appears from the statute (The Code, §§ 663-701) and its purposes, and particularly from § 701 thereof, and as well from the nature of the matter. The Legislature of this State has not under*466taken to regulate by statute the powers and methods of business of foreign corporations, nor to prescribe how their contracts shall be executed. So far as we can see, general principles of law applicable to corporations, such as the defendant, apply to it in this action The Court, therefore erred, in applying the statute last cited to the bill sued upon. It was very certainly competent for the plaintiff to prove on the trial, by parol testimony, that W. E. Watkins was the vice-president of the defendant; that he was appointed; that he generally acted as such officer; that he had general charge and management of the defendant’s business in this State; that he had authority, general or special, to accept the bill in question in the name of the defendant; to prove that in so accepting the bill for the defendant he acted as its agent or vice-president, although he did not sign his name officially or as agent. The evidence tendered by the plaintiff and rejected was competent and material, and the Court should have received it. Turnpike Co. v. McCarson, 1 D. & B., 806; Lewis v. Railroad, 95 N. C., 179; Mechanics Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheaton, 326; Ang. & Ames on Corp., §294; Abb. Tr. Ev., ch. 3, par. 35; Id., par. 43.
There is error. The judgment of nonsuit must be set aside and further steps taken in the action according to law.
Error.