— after stating the facts: The Judge below had the power, in any view of the case, to compel an election or quash the indictment, treating the charges of sales to different persons as distinct counts. State v. Cooper, 101 N. C., *889684; State v. Parish, ante, 685. There was no error, therefore, in the enforcement by the Court of election before the defendant should be compelled to plead.
We concur, too, with his Honor in the view that the law does not impose upon the State the burden of charging in the indictment and proving on the trial that the defendant was a “ reputable physician,” as well as that he gave a false and fraudulent prescription. The statute (ch. 215, §4, Laws of 1887) casts upon a druggist, indicted under its provisions, the burden of showing (if he would excuse himself from a sale that is prima facie in violation of law) that he sold for bona fide medical purposes, and upon the prescription of a practicing physician, known to such druggist to be of reputable standing in his profession, or recommended as such by a physician who is so known, ^nd that the prescription was-in writing, signed by such physician. A druggist, when indicted under this statute, must prove, but the State is never required to aver in the indictment the character of the physician giving the prescription.
The transaction on which the indictment was founded should also be sufficiently identified by its terms to insure to the accused the benefit of a plea of former acquittal or conviction, if indicted a second time for the same offence. State v. Pickens, 79 N. C., 652; State v. Burns, 80 N. C., 376; State v. Stamey, 71 N. C, 202; State v. Watkins, 101 N. C., 702. We think, therefore, that all of the counts of the indictment were fatally defective in not charging that the prescription was false and fraudulent.
It is of the essence of the offence created by the law (§ 4, ch. 215, Laws of 1887) that the prescription should be false or fraudulent. The indictment should set out, distinctly, not only that the prescription was either false or fraudulent, but in what the falsehood or fraud consisted, as that the prescription was intended to convey, and did convey, the idea that, in the opinion of the defendant, the person to whom *890the prescription was given was sick and was in need of ,the liquors prescribed as a medicine, whereas, in fact and in truth, the said person (prescribed for) was not sick and did not need the spirituous liquor as a medicine. The prescription must be shown to be false or fraudulent (either being sufficient), and the person indicted should know, before he is compelled to plead, whether he is to meet a charge of giving a false prescription, or whether he is accused of giving the prescription, knowing that it was false and intending to deceive or to evade the law. State v. Holmes, 82 N. C., 607; State v. Pickett, 78 N. C., 458; State v. Fitzgerald, 1 Dev. & Bat., 408; State v. Watkins, supra. The-fraud or falsehood should be so distinctly charged as to give the defendant notice of the charge against him and enable him to prepare his defence, and also to enable the Court to see whether fraud or falsehood is, in fact, charged, that the defendant can be held to answer.
Affirmed.