(after staling the case.) The defendant made no obj' ction on the trial to the evidence produced on the part of the State. It went to prove that an election was ordered and held according to the forms of the law, and that the result was ascertained and declared in writing to be in favor of “Prohibition.” The statute (The Code, §3114) required that it should be held as nearly as practicable in accordance with the statute regulating elections of members of the General Assembly. It seems to us that this was substantially done. It appears that there was but one voting place in the township. The judges and registrar conducted the election at the time and place prescribed, ascertained the result thereof, and certified the same over their proper signatures, and deposited their certificate with the Register of Deeds. They, under the circumstances, necessarily constituted the canvassing board for the purpose of ascertaining the result, and what they did was about as near an observance of the election law applicable as was practicable. There was no formal proclamation of the result, but this was not essential. The important and essential things to be done were, that the proper officers should hold the election, ascertain the result and certify the same, and deposit their certificate in the proper public office of deposit, so that the people of the township — indeed, all people — could there learn the result. They had notice of the election, and the law charged them with knowledge of the result. It provided the means by which and the place where such information might be had by everybody.
Such ascertainment and declaration of the result of the election was prima facie correct, and it was conclusive until by a proper action, brought for the purpose, the true result otherwise should be ascertained and declared by a judicial determination. The law contemplates and intends, generally, that the result of an election, as determined by the proper election officers, shall stand and be effective until it shall be *688regularly contested and reversed, or adjudged to be void by a tribunal having jurisdiction for that purpose. It would lead to confusion and ridiculous absurdity to allow the validity and result of an election to be contested every time the result of it, as determined by the election officers, became material collaterally in a litigation. .In the present case the defendant might be able to prove facts showing that the election mentioned was void for one cause or another; another defendant, charged with a like offence, might be less fortunate, and the State might show that it was regular and valid, and so on indefinitely. The law does not provide for such continual and repeated coutests in every case that may arise. It intends that one contest, properly instituted for the purpose, shall establish the validity or invalidity of the election questioned. If the present defendant or others "were dissatisfied with the conduct of the election, or the result of it as declared, they should have promptly brought their action, as they might have done, to contest its validity and the correctness of the ascertained result. They had the right to do so, and, as they did not, it cannot be attacked in a collateral action. This is well settled. Smallwood v. New Berne, 90 N. C., 36; State v. Emery, 98 N. C., 768, and cases there cited; Gatling v. Boone, Ibid., 573; McDowell v. Construction Company, 96 N. C., 514; Rigsbee v. Durham, 99 N. C., 341.
Nor can the motion in arrest of judgment be sustained. The first ground assigned in support of it is without force. The statute in regpect to “ Local Option ” referred to is a public one, of which the Court takes notice, and applies in all proper connections, and in this case in connection with the charge in the indictment. And so also the statute (Acts 1881, ch 136) which changes the name of the township mentioned in the indictment is a public local one, of which the Court takes notice, and applies, in connection with the averment in the indictment, that the name had been changed by that statute. State v. Chambers, 93 N. C., 600.
*689Nor does the statute last cited repeal the “ Local Option Act” in the township mentioned or elsewhere, or in any way or manner affect it; it simply changes the name, and does not purport to change or ¡íffectthe territory or anything or any state or condition of things within its compass.
Very clearly, the Court had jurisdiction of the offence charged. The statute (The Code, §3316) makes it a misdemeanor to sell any spirituous liquors within a “ county, town or township ” where such sale is prohibited as provided in that statute, and no particular measure of punishment for the olfence is prescribed. A .Justice of the Peace, therefore, had not jurisdiction of the offence charged, and the Superior Court had, and the Criminal and Inferior Courts would have in like cases.
What we have said disposes of the objections raised by the defendant. It is made our duty to look through the whole record and see if it is sufficient to warrant the judgment. . We have done so, and deem it proper to say that we-find that the indictment contained but a single count, and in effect charged several distinct offences. It was, therefore, bad, because of duplicity, and the defendant might have objected to it successfully by demurrer, or a motion to quash it might hav.e been sustained. Ach. Cr. Pl., 50. But the Court required the Solicitor to elect that he would prosecute for a single offence charged, and he entered a nolle prosequi as to all the offences charged but one. This, in effect, left but a single charge in the indictment, and we cannot see-that the defendant suffered or could suffer any harm by pleading to it, and going to trial upon his plea. But-if there was a defect it was cured by the verdict, and, the judgment could not be arrested on that account. State v. Locklear, Busb., 205; State v. Simons, 70 N. C., 336.
There is no error. Affirmed..