To put this matter in proper factual context, we quote the trial court’s findings of fact in their entirety.
1. The Town is a municipal corporation situated in Nash County, North Carolina, and was organized and exists under and by virtue of the laws of the State of North Carolina.
2. The plaintiff, a municipality, is authorized to operate a water and sewer system for the benefit of its citizens and persons outside of the corporate limits of the Town who pay a rate set by the municipality for these services.
3. Prior to July 1, 1979, it became necessary for the Plaintiff Town to improve and update its water and sewer system, particularly its waste water disposal facilities to meet federal and state guidelines and requirements and this necessitated a considerable outlay of capital.
4. Construction was commenced prior to July 1, 1979, on a new waste water treatment facility which was not completed and placed in operation until December, 1979.
5. The plaintiff increased its water and sewer rates to help pay for the new water treatment facility. The rates were increased effective July 1, 1979, and the defendant was sent a bill for $413.00 covering the period from June 25th through August 31, 1979.
6. While the defendant was engaged in the business of operating a launderette in the Town of Spring Hope during the time covered by the bill and receiving water from the Town and using the Town’s sewer system, the new waste water disposal facility had not been completed and was not in operation during any of the time covered by the bill presented to him and, in fact, was not completed until December, 1979.
*2127. While the defendant was a user of the water-sewer system during the period covered by this bill, he was not a user of the new plant facility or new waste water treatment facility as the same was not in operation during the period of time covered by his bill.
Upon these findings of fact, the trial court entered the following pertinent conclusion of law:
3. The Town has complied with all laws in connection with the increase of rates, but since the increase in rates was made necessary to finance new waste water treatment facilities and since the defendant was not a user of the new waste water facility during the time covered by the bill, he is not required to pay the sewer portion of the bill.
Plaintiff made no exceptions to the trial court’s findings of fact, nor does it dispute them in its brief. The sole question before us, therefore, is whether these findings support the court’s conclusions of law and the judgment. Employers Insurance v. Hall, 49 N.C. App. 179, 180, 270 S.E. 2d 617, 618 (1980); Russell v. Taylor, 37 N.C. App. 520, 524, 246 S.E. 2d 569, 572 (1978).
The setting of rates and charges for water and sewer services furnished by a municipality to its customers is a proprietary function, subject only to limitations imposed upon such action by statute or contractual obligation assumed in such actions. See Aviation, Inc. v. Airport Authority, 288 N.C. 98, 102-103, 215 S.E. 2d 552, 555 (1975); see also Construction Co. v. Raleigh, 230 N.C. 365, 53 S.E. 2d 165 (1949). The statutory grant of authority to municipalities in North Carolina to set rates and charges for water and sewer services is contained in G.S. 160A-314(a), as follows:
A city may establish and revise from time to time schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties for the use of or the services furnished by any public enterprise. Schedules of rents, rates, fees, charges, and penalties may vary according to classes of service, and different schedules may. be adopted for services provided outside the corporate limits of the city.
Under this broad, unfettered grant of authority, the setting of such rates and charges is a matter for the judgment and discretion of municipal authorities, not to be invalidated by the courts *213absent some showing of arbitrary or discriminatory action. The great weight of authority is to the effect that in the setting of such rates and charges, a municipal body may include not only operating expenses and depreciation, but also capital cost associated with actual or anticipated growth or improvement of the facilities required for the furnishing of such services. See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R. 3d 1236 (1975); 12 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 35.37C., at 488 (3d Ed. 1970); C. Rhyne, Municipal Law § 23-7, 500-501 (1957); 3 Yokley, Municipal Corporations § 503, at 214-19 (1958). We concur in this position, and hold that where, as is the case here, the cost of necessary new facilities constructed to serve the municipality’s customers are known or are predictable, rates calculated to begin recoupment of those costs are not unlawful or illegal merely because the new facilities have not yet been put into actual use. The test is not whether any particular customer has directly benefited from the use of a discrete or particular component of the utility plant, but whether the municipal authority has acted arbitrarily in establishing its rates.
There is no showing of arbitrary action in the case now before us and we hold that the trial court entered its judgment under a misapprehension of applicable law.
Although the findings of fact by the trial court are not as detailed as the evidence would permit, defendant does not contest the correctness of the level of his bill, only its legality, and we therefore hold that the findings by the trial court are sufficient to require entry of judgment for plaintiff for the unpaid portion of defendant’s water and sewer bill.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Reversed and remanded.
Judge VAUGHN concurs.
Judge Clark dissents.