Plaintiffs appeal from an order awarding costs to defendants. We conclude that plaintiffs have not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded costs to defendants. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background
Pansy Ferguson Greene (“Greene”) died on or about 5 September 2001. The executors of Greene’s estate filed a medical malpractice complaint on 18 July 2002, alleging that her death had been caused by the negligence of defendants and seeking compensation for wrongful death. Defendants filed an answer on or about 17 September 2002, denying the material allegations in the complaint.
*180The action was tried before a jury at the 23 October 2006 civil session of Superior Court, Transylvania County. Pursuant to the jury’s verdict in defendants’ favor, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice by judgment entered 7 November 2006.
Defendants moved for costs on or about 20 December 2006. The trial court awarded costs to defendants in the amount of $14,218.28 by order entered on or about 8 March 2007. From that order, plaintiffs appeal.
II. Analysis
A. Deposition-Related Expenses
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by awarding deposition expenses as costs. Plaintiffs rely on Oakes v. Wooten, 173 N.C. App. 506, 620 S.E.2d 39 (2005) to contend that an award of deposition expenses is improper as a matter of law. Defendants rely on Morgan v. Steiner, 173 N.C. App. 577, 619 S.E.2d 516 (2005), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 648, 636 S.E.2d 808 (2006), to contend that an award of deposition costs is within the discretion of the trial court, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding deposition costs to defendants.1
We review an award of deposition costs for abuse of discretion. Vaden v. Dombrowski, 187 N.C. App. 433, 437, 653 S.E.2d 543, 545 (2007). “An abuse of discretion is a decision manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Briley v. Farabow, 348 N.C. 537, 547, 501 S.E.2d 649, 656 (1998). In the case sub judice, “[t]he trial court’s decision to award these costs was supported by the common law,” Vaden, 187 N.C. App. at 439-40, 653 S.E.2d at 547, and by documentation for each cost. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of deposition costs.
B. Expert Witness Costs
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred when it awarded costs for expert witnesses to defendants. Specifically, plaintiffs rely on the *1812003 rewrite of Rule 452 to contend that the trial court is barred from taxing the cost of an expert witness against a party unless the witness has appeared in obedience to a subpoena and the subpoena has been served on the party.
We agree that the cost of an expert witness cannot be taxed unless the witness has been subpoenaed. Vaden, 187 N.C. App. at 440, 653 S.E.2d at 547; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-314 (2005). We also agree that the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure require witness subpoenas to be served on the parties to the action. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 45 (b)(2) (rewritten effective 1 October 2003). However, plaintiffs’ reliance on rewritten Rule 45 to oppose the order awarding expert witness fees against them is misplaced. The public policy underlying the rule allowing payment of witnesses is that a witness should be compensated for what he is obligated by the State to do. See State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 27, 191 S.E.2d 641, 659 (1972) (citing State v. Means, 175 N.C. 820, 822, 95 S.E. 912, 913 (1918)); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-314. If a witness appears voluntarily, then he is entitled to no compensation. Johnson, 282 N.C. at 27, 191 S.E.2d at 659. Subject to the protections of Rule 45(c), the obligation to appear as a witness is perfected when the subpoena is served on the witness. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 45(e)(1). Therefore the right to compensation depends on the subpoena being served on the witness, and is not dependent on service of a copy of the subpoena on the opposing party. It follows therefore, in determining whether the trial court is barred by the lack of a subpoena from awarding the costs of an expert witness, that it is the service of the subpoena on the witness, not the service of the subpoena on the opposing party, which is dis-positive. Town of Chapel Hill v. Fox, 120 N.C. App. 630, 632, 463 S.E.2d 421, 422 (1995). Plaintiffs concede that subpoenas were served on both expert witnesses for which defendants sought costs.
In sum, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s award of either deposition costs or of expert witness costs. Accordingly, the trial court’s order awarding costs to defendants is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judge TYSON concurs.
*182Judge JACKSON concurs in the result by separate opinion.