delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County dismissing his complaint with prejudice.
The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant was employed as an inspector with the Department of Agriculture and that his duties were ministerial; that in excess of his duties he negligently and/or wilfully and wantonly initiated criminal charges against the plaintiff and publicly accused the plaintiff of being an adulterator and mishandler of feed products.
The defendant who was represented by the Attorney General’s office filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which in pertinent part reads:
“4. The complaint herein clearly shows the sole and only reason that this defendant was made a party in this action is that he exercised authority and discharged duties of the State agency in connection with the subject matter of said complaint.
5. Plaintiff is in fact suing an agency of the State of Illinois in contravention of P.A. 77-1776, Ill. Rev. Stats., 1973, ch. 127, par. 801, which provides:
‘Except as provided in “AN ACT to create the Court of Claims, to prescribe its powers and duties and to repeal AN ACT herein named”, filed July 17, 1945, as amended, the State of Rlinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court.’
This action can not, therefore, be maintained in the Circuit Court.”
The trial court in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice held that plaintiff’s suit should have been filed in the Court of Claims:
“It is the opinion of the court that the motion of the defendant based upon limitations of Chapter 127, paragraph 801, is well founded and that the principle complaint is a suit against an individual for governmental acts and that the defendant is immune from this suit and that this court does not have jurisdiction in this matter and that the same should be filed in the Corut of Claims in the State of Illinois.
*976THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.”
The sole question before this court, then, is whether plaintiff was, in fact, suing the State of Illinois in contravention of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 127, par. 801. We emphasize that in considering this case we are not concerned with the question of whether plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action against the defendant individually.
In G. H. Sternberg & Co. v. Bond, 30 Ill. App. 3d 874, 333 N.E.2d 261, this court considered a case wherein the trial court enjoined the Director of the Department of Transportation from enforcing contract rights under a construction contract entered into between plaintiff and the State. In holding that the State was the real party in interest rather than the defendant, this court observed that it was clearly the intent of plaintiff to enjoin any and all members of State government from taking any action in the contract. We further observed that plaintiff’s suit attempted to bind the State and asked no relief from the defendant personally.
In this case plaintiff does not purport to sue the State or a department of the State. Neither does he seek to control an activity of the State or subject the State to liability.
In Sternberg we said:
“The supreme court has consistently held that whether a cause of action is barred by sovereign immunity is not to be determined solely by identification of the formal parties in the record but depends upon the issues presented and the relief sought. [Citations.] In Strum v. Department of Conservation, 14 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 303 N.E.2d 32 (1973), plaintiff filed suit against the Department and its director asking for a determination of her rights under a lease entered into with the State and for an injunction prohibiting her eviction by the State. The court held that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The court stated:
‘A suit brought against an officer or agency with relation to some matter in which defendant represents the state in action and liability, and the state while not a party to the record is the real party against which relief is sought, so that a judgment or decree for plaintiff, although nominally against the named defendant as an individual distinct from the state, could operate to control the action of the state or subject it to liability, is in effect, a suit against the state. [Citation.] (14 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 1093-94, 303 N.E.2d 32, 34.)’ ” 30 Ill. App. 3d 874, 876-77.
*977The following language contained in 81 C.J.S. States §216 (1953), at pages 1316-18, is most relevant to this appeal:
“As is sometimes pointed out in the cases, suits, such as those mentioned in the preceding section, wherein it is sought to compel defendant officially to perform an obligation, or refrain from action, which is that of the state in its political capacity, are clearly distinguishable from suits against officers or agents personally, because, while claiming to act officially, they have committed or they threaten to commit wrong or injury to the person or property of plaintiff, either without right and authority or under color of an unconstitutional statute. Although defendant may assert that he acted officially, and on behalf of the state, a suit of this latter class is not a suit against the state, whether it is brought to redress injuries; to recover property wrongfully taken or held by defendant on behalf of the state; to recover damages; for an injunction; or to compel an officer to obviate the effect of an illegal act.”
Since the plaintiff sought damages only against the defendant personally, and since he did not attempt to control the action of the State or subject it to liability, we find that this cause of action was not one against the State of Illinois. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County and remand this case for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
EBERSPACHER, J., concurs.