delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a traffic stop by an Oswego police officer, defendant was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of drugs (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501(a)(6) (West 2006)) and driving under the combined influence of drugs and alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501(a)(5) (West 2006)) (DUI) in case number 06 — DT—57. As a result of the same arrest, defendant was also charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(A) (West 2006)) and unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/ 401(a)(2)(A) (West 2006)) in case number 06 — CF—69. Defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, and the trial court granted the motion on August 11, 2006. On September 7, 2006, the State moved to reconsider the trial court’s ruling. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider on September 28, 2006, and on October 23, 2006, the State filed a certificate of impairment (see People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234 (1980)) and a notice of appeal. We conclude that the State’s notice of appeal was not timely and we therefore dismiss the State’s appeal.
On July 11, 2007, defendant filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The State responded to the motion on July 19, 2007. At that time, the State’s reply brief was not yet due and no panel of this court had been assigned to decide the appeal. A panel of this court hearing motions denied the motion to dismiss on August 1, 2007, and shortly thereafter the appeal was assigned to a different panel of this court for disposition. Defendant later filed a “Motion to Submit Jurisdictional Motion With Issues Addressed in the Briefs and *466Arguments.” Defendant asks us to again consider our jurisdiction, despite the earlier denial of his motion to dismiss. The motion is allowed. The motion panel’s ruling does not foreclose us from revisiting the question of jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Waddick, 373 Ill. App. 3d 703, 705 (2007). Indeed, “[ajlthough the motion panel denied the motion to dismiss, this panel has an independent duty to determine whether we have jurisdiction and to dismiss an appeal if we do not.” Waddick, 373 Ill. App. 3d at 705.
In his motion to dismiss, defendant argues, inter alia, that the State had only 30 days to file its notice of appeal after the trial court granted the motion to quash and suppress on August 11, 2006, and that its motion to reconsider the trial court’s ruling did not extend the period for filing the notice of appeal. Defendant forthrightly acknowledges that his argument is contrary to a number of decisions from other districts of the appellate court, but he urges us to take a fresh look at the issue. Defendant directs our attention to six decisions: People v. Van Matre, 164 Ill. App. 3d 201 (1988), People v. Rimmer, 132 Ill. App. 3d 107 (1985), People v. McBride, 114 Ill. App. 3d 75 (1983), People v. Clark, 80 Ill. App. 3d 46 (1979), People v. Stokes, 49 Ill. App. 3d 296 (1977), and People v. Robins, 33 Ill. App. 3d 634 (1975).
Two of the cases defendant cited — McBride and Clark — have little or no bearing on the issue before us. The question in Clark was whether the defendant’s notice of appeal was timely where it was filed within 30 days following entry of an order: (1) denying the defendant’s motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to dismiss and (2) reinstating a previously vacated guilty plea and sentence. McBride stands for the proposition that the State may move for reconsideration of a suppression order prior to filing a notice of appeal. McBride, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 80. However, appellate jurisdiction was not at issue in McBride, and the court did not address the question of whether a motion to reconsider would extend the time for bringing an appeal. A third decision, Robins, does not address the precise jurisdictional issue in this case: whether a motion by the State to reconsider a suppression ruling tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. However, because cases addressing that issue have relied (either directly or indirectly) on Robins, it is necessary to consider it here.
Moreover, we are aware of two cases not cited by defendant— People v. Smith, 232 Ill. App. 3d 121 (1992), and People v. Burks, 355 Ill. App. 3d 750 (2004) — that also stand for the proposition that a motion to reconsider an order suppressing evidence tolls the time for taking an appeal from that order. Thus, we have six decisions to examine, five of which involve precisely the same issue now before us. We begin with Stokes. In that case (as in the present one), the trial court granted *467the defendant’s motion to quash and suppress, and the State filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of its motion to reconsider, but more than 30 days after the ruling granting the motion to quash and suppress. The Stokes court noted that the trial court retains the power to modify or vacate its judgment for a period of 30 days and that the State may appeal any order that has the substantive effect of suppressing evidence. Stokes, 49 Ill. App. 3d at 298. Ultimately, however, Stokes relied on Robins in holding that the motion to reconsider extended the time for the State to file its notice of appeal. Unlike Stokes, Robins did not involve review of a suppression ruling. In Robins, the State appealed from an order dismissing a criminal complaint because the applicable statute of limitations had expired. Stokes relied on the following language from Robins:
“Public policy clearly favors correction of errors at the trial level. We have previously held that a motion to reconsider is an appropriate method to be utilized in directing the attention of the trial judge to [a] claim of error. (Childress v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1968), 97 Ill. App. 2d 112, 239 N.E.2d 492.) The time for appeal commenced with the denial of that motion.” Robins, 33 Ill. App. 3d at 636.
Defendant correctly points out that Robins based its holding on a decision in a civil appeal — Childress. Civil and criminal appeals are governed by different rules, although there is substantial overlap (see 210 Ill. 2d R. 612). When Childress was decided, Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (36 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)), which applies to civil appeals, provided that, if a party filed a timely posttrial motion, the notice of appeal was due within 30 days after entry of the order disposing of the motion. However, the rule governing the perfection of appeals in criminal proceedings tolled the time for filing the notice of appeal only “if the appellant applies for probation or files a motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment.” 36 Ill. 2d R. 606(b). Thus, Childress provides no analytical support for Robins.
We need not decide, however, whether Robins was correctly decided. Even if Rule 303(a)’s tolling principle applied in criminal cases, Robins, like Childress, nevertheless involved a final judgment or order. Stokes, however, involved an interlocutory order — one suppressing evidence. See People v. Leach, 245 Ill. App. 3d 644, 653 (1993) (“A suppression order does not finally adjudicate a criminal prosecution, but only bars certain evidence from the impending trial”). Even in civil cases, “a motion attacking an interlocutory order will not toll the running of the 30-day deadline for the filing of the notice of appeal.” Craine v. Bill Kay’s Downers Grove Nissan, 354 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1026 (2005). Thus there is no valid precedent — civil or criminal — for the tolling rule announced in Stokes.
*468All the same, the dissent endorses the result in Stokes, asserting that “[i]t is the reasoning of the case, the basis in public policy, that gives the tolling rule force, not solely its provenance.” (Emphasis added.) 382 Ill. App. 3d at 480. Thus, the dissent does not hold Robins and Stokes up as models of legal analysis. What redeems these decisions, in the dissent’s eyes, is the public policy they express. The dissent’s thesis is straightforward: there is support in the case law for the proposition that public policy favors correction of errors at the trial level and tolling the time for filing an appeal advances that public policy objective.
If public policy is seen as the driving force in fashioning principles of appellate jurisdiction, things seem to fall into place — at least initially. Childress’s tolling rule in civil cases conforms to the applicable supreme court rule and to the public policy favoring correction of errors in the trial court. The same public policy supports Robins’s application of the tolling rule to final judgments in criminal cases even though, at that time, no supreme court rule provided for such a result. The dissent’s reasoning runs less smoothly, however, with respect to interlocutory orders. In the dissent’s view, public policy supports extending the tolling rule to interlocutory appeals in criminal cases, even if no supreme court rule so provides and even though the rule applicable in civil cases does not permit tolling. The dissent notes that, in civil cases, interlocutory orders from which an appeal may be taken ordinarily involve some burden or hardship, and the public policy favoring prompt appellate review of such orders “trumps the public policy preference of allowing trial courts to correct their errors in order to prevent needless appeals.” 382 Ill. App. 3d at 480. According to the dissent, this public policy does not apply to a defendant who has successfully moved to suppress evidence. We disagree. Permitting the State to delay its appeal, possibly for months, can cause significant hardship. First, the delay prolongs the anxiety attendant to facing criminal charges. An even more tangible hardship arises because a defendant is ordinarily entitled to be released from custody without bail while an appeal by the State is pending. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(3) (“A defendant shall not be held in jail or to bail during the pendency of an appeal by the State *** unless there are compelling reasons for his or her continued detention”). In contrast, so far as we are aware, a defendant has no right to be released from custody merely because he has prevailed on a motion to suppress evidence. Thus a defendant who has not been admitted to bail, or who cannot afford to post bail, may very well have to remain in custody for several months while the motion for reconsideration is adjudicated.
That said, our fundamental disagreement with the dissent’s ap*469proach to the jurisdictional issue — at least as that approach takes shape in the first section of the dissent — is that it treats public policy as the polestar of the jurisdictional analysis. Public policy is relevant to the inquiry insofar as it finds expression in our supreme court’s rules governing interlocutory appeals. But the law could not be more clear that the rules themselves are paramount. Our state constitution provides:
“Appeals from final judgments of a Circuit Court are a matter of right to the Appellate Court in the Judicial District in which the Circuit Court is located except in cases appealable directly to the Supreme Court and except that after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, there shall be no appeal from a judgment of acquittal. The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of Circuit Courts.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6.
Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)) permits interlocutory appeals from orders suppressing evidence, and Supreme Court Rule 606 (210 Ill. 2d R. 606) specifies the manner in which such appeals are perfected. We thus may not follow Stokes solely on the strength of a public policy rationale, ignoring Stokes’s failure to justify its result with reference to the supreme court rules governing appeals from suppression orders. We may not simply substitute our own view of sound public policy for the express command of these rules. The question before us is not whether it is desirable to toll the time for filing a notice of appeal while a motion to reconsider is pending. The question, rather, is whether the applicable supreme court rules call for doing so.
Before tackling that question, we briefly consider the four remaining decisions applying a tolling rule: Van Matre, Burks, Rimmer, and Smith. Van Matre relied on Stokes and Robins (Van Matre, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 203), and Burks relied on Van Matre (Burks, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 754). Neither Van Matre nor Burks contains any independent analysis of the jurisdictional issue, so those cases are no more persuasive than Stokes.
In Rimmer, the trial court granted a motion to quash and suppress. The State later filed a motion to admit certain statements based on “attenuating circumstances.” Rimmer, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 111. The trial court denied the motion and the State appealed. On appeal, the court held that the motion to admit statements was, in substance, a motion to reconsider the suppression ruling. The court held that the appeal was timely, but cited no authority and offered no analysis in support of the implicit premise that a motion for reconsideration tolls the time for appealing from an order suppressing evidence. See Rimmer, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 111.
*470 Smith cited People v. Williams, 138 Ill. 2d 377 (1990), for the proposition that “[a] timely motion for reconsideration of a ruling granting a suppression motion will toll the time to file a notice of appeal.” Smith, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 127. Williams held that, where the State does not appeal from an adverse suppression ruling or seek reconsideration of it during the time for taking an appeal, it cannot later relitigate the issue in the trial court. Thus, Williams is not authority for the proposition stated in Smith. The dissent acknowledges that Smith misstates the holding of Williams. 382 Ill. App. 3d at 481. However, the dissent notes that “Williams also reasoned that ‘statutory and judicial policy favors giving a circuit court “the opportunity to reconsider final appealable judgments and orders within 30 days of their entry” as long as no notice of appeal has yet been filed.’ ” 382 Ill. App. 3d at 481, quoting Williams, 138 Ill. 2d at 394, quoting People v. Heil, 71 Ill. 2d 458, 461 (1978). This reasoning has no application here, as the trial court did not reconsider a final judgment and it did not do so within 30 days.
The dissent notes that the principle was extended to interlocutory orders in People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163 (1990). The Mink court stated that “[a] court in a criminal case has inherent power to reconsider and correct its own rulings, even in the absence of a statute or rule granting it such authority” and that this power “extends to interlocutory, as well as final, judgments.” Mink, 141 Ill. 2d at 171. The issue before us, however, is not whether the court has the power to reconsider its rulings, but whether the pendency of a motion for reconsideration affects the requirements for perfecting an interlocutory appeal. The dissent’s reasoning is based on public policy, but Mink said nothing about public policy. And if there are any public policy implications of a trial court’s inherent power to reconsider its interlocutory rulings, the implications should be the same in a civil case where a trial court has the same power. See, e.g., Catlett v. Novak, 116 Ill. 2d 63, 68 (1987). However, as we held in Craine, a motion to reconsider has no effect on the time for perfecting an appeal from an interlocutory order in a civil case. We note that the appeal in Mink was from a final judgment, to wit, the reinstatement of the defendant’s conviction after the trial court, on the State’s motion for reconsideration, vacated an order granting the defendant a new trial. Mink says nothing about tolling; before the trial court granted the motion to reconsider, there was no order from which an appeal could be taken. Accord People v. Hammond, 18 Ill. App. 3d 693, 696 (1974).
We do not demand symmetry in civil and criminal appeals. Rather, we ask only for adherence to the applicable supreme court rules governing appellate jurisdiction in each setting, whether or not they *471yield similar results in procedurally analogous cases. Our point in once again citing Craine is simply that a tolling rule is not a necessary corollary of the trial court’s inherent power to correct its own errors, as the dissent evidently believes.1
We now turn our attention to the supreme court rules that, as previously noted, govern the jurisdictional question in this case. Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) states in pertinent part that “[i]n criminal cases the State may appeal *** from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in *** suppressing evidence,” but does not specify when the State’s notice of appeal must be filed. The time for filing the notice of appeal in a criminal case is the subject of Supreme Court Rule 606(b), which provides:
“Except as provided in Rule 604(d), the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion. When a timely posttrial or postsentencing motion directed against the judgment has been filed *** any notice of appeal filed before the entry of the order disposing of all pending postjudgment motions shall have no effect and shall be stricken by the trial court. Upon striking the notice of appeal, the trial court shall forward to the appellate court within 5 days a copy of the order striking the notice of appeal, showing by whom it was filed and the date on which it was filed. This rule applies whether the timely postjudgment motion was filed before or after the date on which the notice of appeal was filed. A new notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days following the entry of the order disposing of all timely postjudgment motions. Within 5 days of its being so filed a copy of the notice of appeal or an amendment of the notice of appeal shall be transmitted by the clerk of the *472circuit court to the clerk of the court to which the appeal is taken. Except as provided in paragraph (c) below, and in Rule 604(d), no appeal may be taken from a trial court to a reviewing court after the expiration of 30 days from the entry of the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken. The clerk of the appellate court shall notify any party whose appeal has been dismissed under this rule.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 606(b).
We interpret a supreme court rule in the same manner as a statute. People v. King, 349 Ill. App. 3d 877, 878 (2004). Our “primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the drafter’s intent,” the best indication of which is “the rule’s language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” King, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 878.
As defendant correctly notes, the first sentence of Rule 606(b) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of a final judgment unless a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed. Thus, the tolling rule embodied in this sentence and the four that follow applies to final judgments. The penultimate sentence of the rule, which is not limited to final judgments, contains no explicit tolling provision. As applied to final judgments, the first five sentences of the rule and the penultimate sentence could produce different results. The conflict may be resolved, however, by applying the principle of construction that, “[wjhere a general statutory provision and a more specific statutory provision relate to the same subject, we will presume that the legislature intended the more specific provision to govern.” Moore v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470, 480 (2006). The first five sentences are more specific, as they apply only to final judgments. Thus, a timely motion directed against a final judgment will toll the time for filing a notice of appeal from that judgment. However, an appeal from an interlocutory order may not be taken after the expiration of 30 days from the entry of the order. Our interpretation is consistent with our decision in King where we concluded that, because the penultimate sentence of Rule 606(b) is not limited to appeals from final judgments, it governs appeals from interlocutory orders denying motions to dismiss on grounds of former jeopardy. King, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 880.
The dissent suggests that the possible conflict between the first five sentences of the rule and the penultimate sentence justifies an ex-tratextual approach to construction. According to the dissent, the principle of “acquiescence” should be applied so as to construe the rule in accordance with Burks, Smith, Van Matre, Rimmer, and Stokes.
“The general rule is, that where terms used in the statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction and are retained in subsequent amendments or re-enactments of the *473statute, they are to be understood and interpreted in the same sense theretofore attributed to them by the court unless a contrary intention of the legislature is made clear. The judicial construction becomes a part of the law, and it is presumed that the legislature in passing the law knew such construction of the words in the prior enactment.” People ex rel. Nelson v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75, 78-79 (1935).
Similarly, “where the legislature chooses not to amend terms of a statute after judicial construction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in the court’s statement of legislative intent.” R.D. Masonry, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 215 Ill. 2d 397, 404 (2005). However, the presumption “is merely a jurisprudential principle; it is not a rule of law.” People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 331 (2007). A leading commentator has criticized the principle of acquiescence as an unreliable test of legislative intent. See 2B N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §49.10 (6th ed. 2000). Although similar criticism has not been voiced in reported Illinois decisions, it is clear that our supreme court has not always scrupulously adhered to the acquiescence principle. For instance, in McMahan v. Industrial Comm’n, 183 Ill. 2d 499 (1998), the court repudiated Childress v. Industrial Comm’n, 93 Ill. 2d 144 (1982)—a decision interpreting language from section 16 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/16 (West 1992)) — because “[t]he court’s holding in Childress was premised on an overly narrow and incorrect reading of the relevant statutory provisions.” McMahan, 183 Ill. 2d at 511. The McMahan court was evidently unfazed by the fact that, during the 16 years since Childress was decided, the General Assembly had amended section 16 three times (see Pub. Act 83—341, §3, eff. September 14, 1983; Pub. Act 83—1125, §1, eff. June 30, 1984; Pub. Act 86—998, §1, eff. December 18, 1989), but had not touched the language construed by the supreme court in Childress.
It is also debatable whether the threshold requirement for application of the principle — that the terms used in Rule 606(b) “have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction” — has been met here. None of the decisions on which the dissent relies actually explored the language of Rule 606(b). As we noted, the decisions were based on public policy rather than construction of Rule 606(b), which was mentioned only parenthetically. For all practical purposes, the cases simply ignored the rule. We question whether this may be properly called “judicial construction.”
Moreover, although supreme court rules are construed in the same manner as statutes, application of the acquiescence principle to a supreme court rule is analytically problematic. The dissent’s argu*474ment is that the supreme court has had opportunities to amend Rule 606(b) to correct the results in Stokes and similar cases; by not availing itself of these opportunities, the court has acquiesced in those results. In fact, the supreme court had even more direct opportunities to repudiate the tolling rule. Leave to appeal was sought in Burks, Smith, and Van Matre. The supreme court denied leave to appeal in all three cases. See People v. Burks, 215 Ill. 2d 602 (2005); People v. Smith, 146 Ill. 2d 647 (1992); People v. Van Matre, 119 Ill. 2d 572 (1988). If the failure to amend a court rule after it has been construed by a lower court amounts to acquiescence in the construction, then it would also seem that denial of a petition for leave to appeal should signal acquiescence. Indeed, by seeking leave to appeal, a party specifically brings the case construing the rule to the supreme court’s attention, so the argument for presuming acquiescence should be that much stronger when leave to appeal is denied. It is well established, however, that the denial of a petition for leave to appeal “has no precedential effect and in no way amounts to a consideration of the merits of the case[ ]” and does not “indicate approval of the appellate court’s action.” Relph v. Board of Education of DePue Unit School District No. 103, 84 Ill. 2d 436, 442 (1981). It is incongruous to presume acquiescence when the court fails to amend a rule, even though acquiescence cannot be presumed when the court forgoes a direct opportunity to correct an erroneous construction of a rule.
The dissent also offers an alternative textual analysis of Rule 606(b)’s first sentence, which states, in pertinent part, “the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion.” (Emphasis added.) 210 Ill. 2d R. 606(b). The dissent suggests that the word “final” modifies only the first instance of the word “judgment,” not the second. Under this reading, “a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the final judgment, or within 30 days after the ruling on a timely motion to reconsider directed against any appealable judgment, final or interlocutory.” 382 Ill. App. 3d at 497. In our view, the dissent’s reading is at odds with the fact that the second time the word “judgment” appears, it is preceded by the definite article “the,” which is used, inter alia, “as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent refers to someone or something previously mentioned or clearly understood from the context of the situation.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2368 (1986). The only reasonable reading of the first sentence, then, is that “the judgment” encapsulates the term “final judgment appealed from.”
*475We note that the dissent’s reading of Rule 606(b) would appear to foreclose any appeal from an interlocutory order if no motion to reconsider has been filed. The dissent claims this is not so, because the penultimate sentence of the rule permits an appeal from an interlocutory order within 30 days of its entry. This view not only ignores the definite article in the first sentence, but also fails to give any effect to the word “final.” If the dissent is correct that appeals from final judgments and interlocutory orders may, in either case, be taken within 30 days of the judgment or order itself, or within 30 days of the entry of an order disposing of the motion, the word “final” serves no discernible purpose. It would appear that, without the word “final,” the results would be exactly the same.
The dissent’s remaining argument for recognition of a tolling rule invokes considerations of stare decisis. But stare decisis considerations do not apply to decisions from other judicial districts of the appellate court. People v. DeVoss, 150 Ill. App. 3d 38, 40 (1986). The decisions that the dissent relies on are not from the Second District; consequently, we are not obliged to follow them. According to the dissent, DeVoss confuses the doctrine of stare decisis with the principle of hierarchical decision making, under which lower courts are bound by the decisions of higher ones. We disagree. Nowhere does DeVoss assert that stare decisis governs a lower court’s treatment of the decision of a higher court; it asserts only that stare decisis does not govern one appellate court district’s treatment of the decision of another appellate court district. This is not at all a controversial proposition; indeed, among the circuits of the United States Court of Appeals, which are analogous to the districts of the Illinois Appellate Court, “there is no rule of intercircuit stare decisis.” Taylor v. Charter Medical Corp., 162 F.3d 827, 832 (5th Cir. 1998). Thus, although of course we may defer to other districts’ decisions on the basis of comity (see, e.g., Villalobos v. F.D.L. Foods, Inc., 298 Ill. App. 3d 132, 141 (1998)), we are free to disregard them without any concern for stare decisis.
The dissent further argues that, if we decline to follow the course set by Stokes and its progeny, we should apply our decision only prospectively in accordance with the principles described in Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 91 (1997). We decline to do so at this juncture. In Aleckson, our supreme court reviewed our decision to apply one of our earlier decisions—Mueller v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 267 Ill. App. 3d 726 (1994)—only prospectively. Mueller—which was decided while Aleckson was pending before this court — held that an administrative decision pertaining to the promotion of a police officer is subject to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 et seq. (West 1992)) and that an action seek*476ing review of such a decision must be filed within 35 days after the decision is issued. Application of the Administrative Review Law in Aleckson would have resulted in dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action. We concluded that to do so would be unjust because the plaintiffs had filed their action in compliance with the law as it existed prior to Mueller.
Our supreme court stated:
“Generally, when a court issues an opinion, the decision is presumed to apply both retroactively and prospectively. [Citations.] That presumption can be overcome in two types of circumstances. First, the issuing court itself may expressly state that its decision will be applied prospectively only. [Citation.] Second, a later court may, under certain circumstances, override the presumption by declining to give the previous opinion retroactive effect, at least with respect to the parties appearing before the later court. The present case falls under the latter category. Accordingly, we will confine our discussion to cases which involve situations in which a later court is deciding whether to give a previous decision prospective effect only.” Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d at 86-87.
The defendants argued that only the supreme court had the power to give a decision only prospective effect. The Aleckson court flatly rejected the argument. Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d at 91.
Although Aleckson clearly stands for the proposition that the appellate court has the power to give a decision only prospective effect, it would seem that the exercise of that power necessarily presupposes that the appellate court has jurisdiction over the appeal. Our jurisdiction is, after all, the basis of our power to act. It is one thing to hold that a reviewing court that has jurisdiction to hear an appeal may apply a prior decision only prospectively. It is quite another to hold that a reviewing court that has found its jurisdiction lacking may nonetheless act outside its jurisdiction on the theory that it is empowered to apply its jurisdictional decision only prospectively. To so hold would empower the reviewing court to exercise jurisdiction where none exists. We are hesitant to extend Aleckson in this manner without clear direction from our supreme court.
We need not definitively resolve the question in this case, however. As Aleckson demonstrates, the question of prospectivity may be taken up in subsequent cases as is necessary or appropriate. Moreover, it has long been the law that, “[o]n those occasions when prospective application is warranted, the holding of the court still controls the case at bar; to not apply the rule would render it dictum and deprive the challenger the fruits of his efforts in questioning the old, erroneous rule.” John Carey Oil Co. v. W.C.P Investments, 126 Ill. 2d 139, 149 *477(1988); see also Department of Transportation ex rel. People v. Hunzicker, 342 Ill. App. 3d 588 (2003). Thus, even if we were now to rule that our holding should be only prospective, we would still be obliged to dismiss the State’s appeal.
In sum, the order quashing defendant’s arrest and suppressing evidence was not a final judgment, so the State’s motion to reconsider did not toll the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal. That period expired on September 11, 2006. The State’s notice of appeal, filed on October 23, 2006, was untimely and did not confer jurisdiction on this court.
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However, because we are creating a split of authority, and because a substantial number of cases involving this issue are currently pending, we have, “on our own motion, granted a certificate of importance [Ill. S. Ct. R. 316 (eff. Dec. 6, 2006)] and directed the same to issue.” People v. Butchek, 22 Ill. App. 3d 391, 403 (1974); see also Scott v. Industrial Comm’n, 184 Ill. 2d 202, 215 (1998) (noting without objection appellate court’s sua sponte issuance of certificate of importance).
Appeal dismissed.
GILLERAN JOHNSON, J, concurs.