"I don't think this report says what you hoped it would say. If that's supposed to raise a genuine issue of fact whether there was ice in the area at the time of plaintiff's fall, and whether the ice, if any, would have been noticeable on the asphalt, I don't think this gets you there. I think this last part that we've referenced, there's inferences that can be drawn. I think there's a fine line or a tipping point when we go from inferences to just pure speculation."
At the summary-judgment hearing, it was not the moment for the trial justice to weigh the evidence before her or make credibility assessments-that is a function that should be reserved for the factfinder at trial. See Limoges v. Nalco Company , 157 A.3d 567, 571 (R.I. 2017). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, we vacate the judgments of the Superior Court. The papers in this case may be remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
Justice Indeglia, with whom Justice Robinson joins, dissenting.
Even in a negligence claim, for a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment he or she must submit competent evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to be resolved at trial. From my review of the record, however, Voccola merely presented speculative evidence on the issue of the existence of black ice in the Stop & Shop parking lot on the day that she fell, making summary judgment in favor of the defendants appropriate in this case. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
"To prevail in a negligence action, the plaintiff must introduce competent evidence to establish not only that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and that that duty was breached, but also that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury." Kennedy v. Tempest, 594 A.2d 385, 388 (R.I. 1991). Specifically, on the element of causation, "the causal connection between negligence and a plaintiff's injury must be established by competent evidence and may not be based on conjecture or speculation." Cooley v. Kelly , 160 A.3d 300, 305 (R.I. 2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting McLaughlin v. Moura , 754 A.2d 95, 98 (R.I. 2000) ).
Regarding a motion for summary judgment, this Court has stated that "[w]e will affirm a trial court's decision only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Providence Business Loan Fund, Inc. , 200 A.3d 153, 156 (R.I. 2019) (emphasis added) (brackets omitted) (quoting Cancel v. City of Providence , 187 A.3d 347, 350 (R.I. 2018) ).
In the instant case, my primary concern is the fact that Voccola never properly identified what had caused her to fall. In Russian v. Life-Cap Tire Services, Inc. , 608 A.2d 1145 (R.I. 1992), this Court affirmed a hearing justice's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, *564holding that the plaintiff failed to assert sufficient facts on which reasonable inferences could be drawn identifying the defendants' negligence as the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Russian , 608 A.2d at 1147, 1148. There, the plaintiff was injured on the premises of one of the defendants, an automobile tire business, and claimed that he "felt something hit him in the shins" prior to falling. Id. at 1147. However, the plaintiff never identified what had actually hit him in the shins; rather, he testified that the work area was clear of debris and tools in the immediate area where he fell. Id. at 1146. The plaintiff conjectured that it may have been a car jack that caused his fall, but failed to present any evidence from which one could rationally infer any negligence on the part of the defendants. Id. at 1147. In affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants, this Court reasoned that "the mere happening of an accident does not in and of itself necessarily warrant a reasonable and legitimate inference of negligence." Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Kennedy , 594 A.2d at 388 ); see Habershaw v. Michaels Stores, Inc. , 42 A.3d 1273, 1277 (R.I. 2012) (holding that a mere allegation that retailer's floor was "shiny" was insufficient to support a negligence claim arising out of customer's slip and fall because it was not competent evidence).
Here, Voccola stated in her deposition that at the time of her fall she did not observe any ice; she did not touch the ground with her hand to feel if there was ice; she did not notice if her clothes were wet; and, when she observed the pavement, she found it to be uniform and all one color. Like the plaintiff in Russian , Voccola could not identify with any specificity what had caused her fall. Russian , 608 A.2d at 1147. While Voccola may conjecture that black ice caused her to fall, her own deposition testimony contradicts her theory. Because the mere fact that Voccola fell "does not in and of itself necessarily warrant a reasonable and legitimate inference of negligence[,]" her deposition testimony was not competent evidence on the existence of black ice. Id. (quoting Kennedy , 594 A.2d at 388 ).
Because Voccola's deposition testimony was not enough to carry her past defendants' motions for summary judgment, the only discovery material that might save her claim was the affidavit of Steven Cascione (the Cascione affidavit). My concern here is that the majority appears to believe that, when the hearing justice found that Cascione failed to lay a proper foundation and excluded the Cascione affidavit as too speculative, she improperly weighed the evidence. I disagree. From my review of the record, it appears that the hearing justice based her decision to disregard the Cascione affidavit on Rule 56(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
"We are cognizant that in considering a motion for summary judgment, the court does not pass upon the weight and credibility of the evidence, but must consider the affidavits and other pleadings in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Weaver v. American Power Conversion Corporation , 863 A.2d 193, 200 (R.I. 2004). "However, we also have held that naked and conclusory assertions in an affidavit are inadequate to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and thus do not afford a basis for reversal of a trial justice's ruling granting a motion for summary judgment." Id. "The obvious rationale for this rule prevents a party from dodging summary disposition with factual assertions in tailor-made affidavits designed solely to create a mirage of material issues." Id.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that "[b]efore admitting expert testimony, the *565trial justice must evaluate whether the testimony that a party seeks to present to the jury is 'relevant, within the witness's expertise, and based on an adequate factual foundation .' " Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Association, Inc. , 820 A.2d 929, 940 (R.I. 2003) (emphasis in original) (quoting Rodriquez v. Kennedy , 706 A.2d 922, 924 (R.I. 1998) ); see also Franco v. Latina , 916 A.2d 1251, 1258 (R.I. 2007) ("An expert may not give an opinion without describing the foundation on which the opinion rests.") (quoting Gorham v. Public Building Authority of Providence , 612 A.2d 708, 717 (R.I. 1992) ). Rule 56(e) requires that "[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence , and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." (Emphasis added.) "[A]lthough an opposing party is not required to disclose in its affidavit all its evidence, he or she must demonstrate that he or she has evidence of a substantial nature, as distinguished from legal conclusions, to dispute the moving party on material issues of fact." Jessup & Conroy, P.C. v. Seguin , 46 A.3d 835, 839 (R.I. 2012) (brackets omitted) (quoting Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co. , 705 A.2d 969, 971 (R.I. 1998) ).
In this case, the hearing justice correctly surmised that the Cascione affidavit was the only evidence that might save Voccola's claim, recounting:
"As counsel points out, not only can I say they're not similar to the snowbanks that were present on that day, your own client actually stated they're not; that the [snowbanks] that were there that day were much smaller. I don't know how much value, or whether or not that rises to the level * * * of the competent evidence that plaintiff needs to produce[.]"
The hearing justice then went on to discuss the rest of the Cascione affidavit, stating: "I think that is speculation. I don't think it's competent evidence." Furthermore, she found that "even when I take all the inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff that would establish-when I say 'no evidence,' [I mean] no competent evidence." I think it is clear from the record that the hearing justice made a Rule 56(e) determination regarding the speculative nature of the Cascione affidavit.
The issue before us in the instant case is whether, at the summary-judgment stage, a hearing justice may make an independent determination regarding the speculative nature of an expert's affidavit. Because caselaw regarding this issue in our jurisdiction is sparse, I look elsewhere for guidance. "This Court has stated previously that where the federal rule and our state rule of procedure are substantially similar, we will look to the federal courts for guidance or interpretation of our own rule." Crowe Countryside Realty Associates, Co., LLC v. Novare Engineers, Inc. , 891 A.2d 838, 840 (R.I. 2006) (brackets omitted) (quoting Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp. , 489 A.2d 336, 339 (R.I. 1985) ). Because Rule 56(e) is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, this Court should look to federal court decisions to interpret whether a hearing justice can make an independent 56(e) determination regarding an expert witness's testimony at the summary-judgment stage.
"Under Rule 56(e), affidavits supporting or opposing summary judgment must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence. A district court may exclude expert testimony where it finds that the testimony has no foundation or rests on speculative evidence." Schubert v. Nissan Motor Corporation in U.S.A. , 148 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1998) (deletion omitted)
*566(quoting Casas Office Machines, Inc. v. Mita Copystar America, Inc. , 42 F.3d 668, 681 (1st Cir. 1994) ). In Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc. , 8 F.3d 88 (1st Cir. 1993), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the expert affidavits in that case failed to produce "sufficient support for the conclusion that the injury to [the decedent] was caused by the defendant's product." Hayes , 8 F.3d at 92. There, the decedent, while sitting in the back seat of a vehicle stopped at an intersection, was hit from behind by another vehicle fitted with a snowplow unit that consisted of a metal lift channel that protruded outward from the front of the truck. Id. at 89. The plaintiff's witness, who was an accident reconstruction expert, "used the police report, autopsy report, death certificate, hospital and medical records, depositions, pictures of the accident scene and vehicles, and the study conducted by [an independent company], in order to reconstruct the accident." Id. at 92. With that information, the expert opined in his affidavit that the decedent was struck in the head by sheet metal that had been pushed forward by the lift arm of the snowplow, given that the blow to the head was the same size, shape, and rigidity, there had been no other objects of the like near the decedent's head, and, thus, the defendant's product had caused the injury. Id. at 93.
Nevertheless, the court disregarded the expert's affidavit, reasoning that his "bald assertion that no other part of the car or truck had that particular shape is difficult to accept, given that [the expert] never had the opportunity to examine the [car] after the accident." Hayes , 8 F.3d at 93. Furthermore, the court stated that the photographs of the car in which the decedent had been seated were not clear enough to establish the size and shape of each piece of the accident wreckage. Id. Thus, the court found that the expert had failed to provide any factual details to support his theory, and omitted the affidavit for failing to meet the standards of a Rule 56(e) determination. See id. at 92, 93.
Here, Cascione provided the temperatures from the night and early morning prior to Voccola's fall, the size of the snowbank (taken from the photograph), and the low angle of the sun-illustrating the ideal condition for the snowbank to melt, create a pool of water, then freeze. Furthermore, Cascione opined that, given the low angle of the sun, a shadow could have formed over the newly formed ice, making it difficult for Voccola to see any ice as she walked in the Stop & Shop parking lot.
The main problem I see with the Cascione affidavit is that it was based on speculative evidence. Cascione founded his opinion on photographs of a snowbank taken three years after Voccola's fall, and no testimony was provided as to the size or shape of the snowbank on the day of the accident-the pictures merely indicated the same general area where the snowbank was formed. Moreover, he based his opinion in part on Voccola's deposition; and, in that deposition, when asked about the size and shape of the snowbank, Voccola merely stated that "[i]t must have been in my line of view but I didn't really notice it * * *." Furthermore, Cascione never went to the scene of the accident; as such, he could not determine whether any slopes, elevations, or divots in the pavement could have prevented the alleged black ice from forming in the area where Voccola fell. Finally, Cascione stated that there may have been a shadow, making it difficult to see any ice formation in the Stop & Shop parking lot; however, Voccola directly contradicted that fact in her deposition, when she testified that she did not observe any shadows on the day of her accident.
*567Based on the above factors, the hearing justice determined that the Cascione affidavit was not competent evidence, thus rendering it inadmissible. As such, she did not consider the affidavit when ruling on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Because the Superior Court, in the Rule 56 context, views only admissible evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there was nothing for the hearing justice to weigh when she granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. See Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC , 200 A.3d at 156. From my review of the record in the instant matter, I cannot say that the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, as neither Voccola's deposition testimony, nor the Cascione affidavit, was competent on the issue of the existence of black ice on the day that Voccola fell.
For the above-stated reasons, I must respectfully dissent.