Tbe jury baying accepted plaintiff’s version of tbe occurrence, there is ample evidence to support tbe verdict, and we find no valid reason for disturbing tbe results of tbe trial.
Defendant’s motion for nonsuit, on tbe ground tbat no rule of tbe company required tbe train on tbe yard at tbe time to put out or establish protection as against an inferior train, and, .therefore, no breach of duty is shown, was properly overruled. True, tbe rule chiefly' relied upon for this position, as we understand it, No. 658% D, seems to relieve defendant’s train on tbe yard at tbe time from putting out tbe full and specific protection required by new rule 99, but there is doubt if this is capable of tbe construction tbat tbe train referred to is relieved of putting out any notice whatever of its presence on the yard at tbe time. And on tbe facts presented in this record, if defendant’s rules are susceptible of such interpretation, it would seem tbat tbe rules themselves might be held to- constitute or countenance a breach of duty on tbe part of defendant, in tbat tbe company did not, in tbe exercise of reasonable care, provide for its employees a proper place or reasonably safe conditions under which to do their work. Chicago, etc. R. R. v. Wright, 239 U. S., 548-550. In tbat case, one where a switching engine bad collided with an extra on tbe yard of defendant company, causing tbe injury complained of, the negligence imputed being an excessive rate of speed under conditions presented, the Court, among other things, said: “While doubting tbat tbe rules, rightly understood, permitted tbe switching crew to proceed at a speed which obviously endangered tbe safety of tbe extra which they know might be coming through tbe cut, on tbe same track, we agree tbat if this were permitted by tbe rules, they were in tbat respect unreasonable and void.”
Apart from this, there is evidence on part of plaintiff to tbe effect tbat it was tbe custom for tbe company to have either red lights in tbe rear or torpedoes put out, if cars were left standing on tbe main line', and if this should be accepted by tbe jury, our decisions bold tbat such a custom known to exist by tbe company, or existent and followed for such a length of time tbat tbe company should have taken note .of it, may have tbe force and effect of abrogating any'rule to tbe contrary. Tisdale v. Tanning Co., 185 N. C., 497, citing Smith v. R. R., 147 N. C., 603; Biles v. R. R., 139 N. C., 528.
Defendant excepts further because plaintiff was allowed to ask Dr. Oaveness and Dr. Horton, both professional experts, as to tbe general character of plaintiff’s witness, Dr. Glascock, as physician and surgeon. Dr. Glascock himself was examined as an expert witness for plaintiff, and bad given an opinion as to tbe nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries,’ ascertained from an examination in tbe line of professional *250duty, and in this respect had been made the subject of aggressive attack by defendant, both as to his character for truthfulness and professional skill, and in such case it is eminently right that plaintiff should be allowed to support and strengthen his witness in both respects from the testimony of other witnesses who were themselves qualified to speak to the question. Authority with us also is in support of his Honor’s ruling. Alley v. Pipe Co., 159 N. C., 327, citing among other cases Lamb v. Littman, 132 N. C., 978; R. R. v. Jewell, 46 Ill., 99; Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1894.
Defendant further and very earnestly insists that prejudicial error was committed in his Honor’s charge on the question of damages, the portion excepted to being as follows: “There is a rule by which you will be guided if you should reach the fourth issue, and that rule is as follows : The plaintiff would be entitled, if at all, to recover a fair and reasonable sum for the pain and suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendant’s negligence, and for a fair recompense for loss of what he could otherwise have earned in his trade, and has been deprived of his capacity for earning by way of defect, for his expenses for medical attention, and the reasonable present value of his diminished earning-capacity forever in the future, and not the difference between what he would be able to earn in the future, but for such injury, and such sum as he would be able to earn in his present condition. Or, to state it differently, the estimate should be- based upon the present value of the difference between plaintiff’s earning capacity, and not the total difference caused by the injury.”
The objection being more especially to the clause, “for the reasonable present value of the diminished earning capacity forever,” but in our opinion the exception cannot be sustained. His Honor, in this particular portion of the charge, was endeavoring to impress upon the jury the position that plaintiff could not recover for the entire difference caused by the injury, but only the present value of such difference — a position that is in accord with our decisions on the subject, and in this respect makes in favor of defendant. The expression, “the present value of his diminished earning capacity forever in the future,” clearly did not mean for all time to come, nor to indicate that the injury was permanent or otherwise, but rnerély that the present value of diminished earning capacity for all future time to the extent affected by the injury complained of, and any juror of fair average intelligence must have so understood it. Thé position is put beyond question by the closing clause, “Or, to state it differently, the estimate should be based upon the present value of the difference between plaintiff’s earning capacity,-and not the total difference caused by the injuryConsidering the charge as a whole, and even the portion of it excepted to, the jury, in the ascertain*251ment of damages, bave been instructed in substantial accord with our decisions on the subject, and in a manner that gives defendant no just ground of complaint. Ledford v. Lumber Co., 183 N. C., 614; Johnson v. R. R., 163 N. C., 451. On careful consideration, we find no reversible error in the record, and the judgment of the court below is affirmed.
No error.