Settlement agreements are governed by principles of contract law. Neiswonger v. Margulis, 203 S.W.3d 754, 760 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). Matters of contract interpretation - including whether a contract is ambiguous - are questions of law to be reviewed de novo on appeal. Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 226 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007).
B. Did the Settlement Agreement Rescind All Rights of Dr. Berkowitz and his Assignee, Smith?
Smith argues that Keystone did not have the legal right to rescind Dr. Berkowitz's insurance contract, but we find that both Keystone and Dr. Berkowitz, together, contracted to rescind the insurance contract.
When interpreting any contract, a court must follow the terms of the contract as written if those terms are plain, unequivocal, and clear. Muilenburg, Inc. v. Cherokee Rose Design & Build, L.L.C., 250 S.W.3d 848, 853-54 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008). Unless an ambiguity is present in the contract, a court will not look outside of the four corners of the contract to determine the intent of the parties. Eisenberg v. Redd, 38 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Mo. banc 2001). If the essential terms of a settlement agreement are present in a contract and are sufficiently definite to enable a court to give them exact meaning, the contract will be found to be valid and enforceable even if some terms are missing or left to be agreed upon at a later time. Vulgamott v. Perry, 154 S.W.3d 382, 390-91 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). "It is the most basic principle of contract law that parties are bound by the terms of the contracts they sign and courts will enforce contracts according to their plain meaning, unless induced by fraud, duress, or undue influence."
*281Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Dunn, 194 S.W.3d 339, 349 (Mo. banc 2006).
During his completion of the application for insurance with Keystone in late 2009, even if Dr. Berkowitz disclosed to Keystone's Vice President of Sales, Tony Lyons, orally, or by writing, some or all of his past hospital suspensions, lawsuits, and reprimand from the Missouri State Board of Registration for Healing Arts, it is undisputed that Dr. Berkowitz signed the written application without such information being reported on the application itself and that Dr. Berkowitz did not suggest making any changes. When asked whether he had ever been directly or indirectly involved in "any claim, potential claim or suit arising out of the rendering or failing to render professional services," Dr. Berkowitz did not list numerous malpractice lawsuits that had been filed against him. Despite being sued more than 15 times, he listed a single lawsuit, Wilman, which resulted in a $ 200,000 settlement. Dr. Berkowitz did not list his hospital suspensions or a reprimand from the Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts that occurred in 2007, despite questions on the application asking whether he had ever been subject to reprimand, or been investigated by any hospital committee, state licensing or regulatory agency, or other medical review committee. Based on the answers in Dr. Berkowitz's application for insurance, Keystone issued a professional liability policy covering Dr. Berkowitz and his private practice for the year 2010.
Dr. Berkowitz did not report new events as they occurred, such as the January 2010 federal indictment for Medicare fraud, even though he had answered "no" on the application question asking if he had even been charged with, or indicted for, any crime, and Dr. Berkowitz had agreed in the application to "immediately notify [Keystone] if there is any change in any of the answers, statements or particulars."3
In late 2010, Dr. Berkowitz applied for renewal of his insurance for the year 2011. Specifically, he certified that he reviewed his initial application dated November 6, 2009, and that "there have been no facts, matters or events that change any of [his] answers provided in the initial application." He further certified that the answers to the initial application questions remain correct, and that he had "no knowledge of any incident, circumstances, or potential adverse outcome that resulted, or may result, in injury or death, or in a claim, potential claim or suit involving [him] (even if such claim or suit may be without merit)." Keystone agreed to renew his policy for 2011.
On March 3, 2011, Keystone's chairman and CEO James Bowlin ("Bowlin") sent, via certified mail, a letter to schedule a meeting, "[c]onfirming our initial conversation of last Friday and my follow-up of earlier this week." The letter clearly stated, "[a]s [Bowlin] mentioned, [he] believe[d] it would be helpful for [Dr. Berkowitz] to have [Dr. Berkowitz's] personal counsel with [him]...." Although Dr. Berkowitz testified that he did not bring his counsel with him to the March 7, 2011 meeting despite the letter's advice, he later consulted with his personal attorney, Mr. *282Bender or Mr. Carl Lang. Dr. Berkowitz also testified that during the March 7 meeting, Bowlin and Keystone's attorney gave him the rescission Agreement and read it to him. The Agreement covers both the 2010 and 2011 policies, and it mutually rescinded the insurance policy and waived all of Dr. Berkowitz's claims against Keystone.
The agreement provides, in part:
Notwithstanding this right to rescind, in the interest of all parties, and for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Keystone and Berkowitz mutually agree to effect a termination of the Keystone policies under the following terms:
1. Berkowitz to Obtain Insurance; Rescission. Within 10 days of the date of this Agreement, Berkowitz shall obtain professional liability insurance from another professional liability insurer, and advise Keystone when such insurance has been obtained. In the event Berkowitz does not obtain such insurance within such time, the parties agree that Keystone shall and will rescind the Policies effective as of their dates of inception, e.g. December 31, 2009 as to the First Policy and December 31, 2010 as to the Second Policy.
2. Mutual Cancellation of the Policies; Waiver of Notice. In exchange for the agreements of Berkowitz herein, on the earlier of either the 10th day after the date of this Agreement or the date upon which Berkowitz advises Keystone that such insurance contemplated by Section 1 has been obtained, Keystone and Berkowitz mutually agree that the Policies shall be cancelled effective as of the initial date of such policies, e.g. December 31, 2009 as to the First Policy and December 31, 2010 as to the Second Policy....
Additionally, the parties agreed that Keystone was not going to provide any insurance coverage, and would not cover any portion of the Smith lawsuit. Dr. Berkowitz said he understood that in signing the Agreement, he was "on the hook for any verdict rendered in Smith. " Dr. Berkowitz understood that there was a mutual release by which both he and Keystone were giving up claims against each other. A confidentiality provision was included so that neither party would disclose any aspect of the Agreement or matter giving rise to the Agreement without prior written consent of the other party, which Dr. Berkowitz identified as critical to his decision to execute the Agreement.
The plain and unambiguous language of the Agreement in this case demonstrates the intent of the parties, that Dr. Berkowitz and Keystone clearly enter into a mutual Settlement Agreement in March 2011, at which time Dr. Berkowitz cancelled the Keystone insurance policies "effective as of the initial date of such policies, e.g. December 31, 2009." Berkowitz "acknowledge[d] and agree[d] that Keystone is not, and shall not, provide any coverage for [Smith v. Berkowitz], whether for defense thereof and/or for any damages adjudged against ... Berkowitz." Further, Dr. Berkowitz "will have sole responsibility for the cost of defense of [Smith v. Berkowitz] and for the payment of any damages or settlements connected therewith." Dr. Berkowitz agreed to, and did "waive any and all rights, claims, actions and causes of action Berkowitz may have in relation to Keystone, including, but not limited to, the right to pursue coverage under the Policies; [and] reimbursement of costs incurred and payments made in relation to [Smith v. Berkowitz] (whether for defense or damages)."
"We determine what the parties intended by what they said, and we cannot *283be concerned with what they may have subjectively intended to say." Promotional Consultants, Inc. v. Logsdon, 25 S.W.3d 501, 506 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000). Although we need not look beyond the clear language in the Agreement, even the parties' actions here confirmed their intent as clearly and unambiguously expressed in their Agreement. Dr. Berkowitz applied for new insurance on March 11, and upon obtaining it and consulting with his attorney, the rescission Agreement was signed on March 16, 2011. Dr. Berkowitz did not make any changes to the Agreement. Notably, the Agreement states, "The parties acknowledge they've had legal counsel's advice in relation to entering into this agreement," which did occur. Dr. Berkowitz testified that he received a check in the amount of $ 25,686 for reimbursement of his premiums from Keystone, which he cashed.
Accordingly, Dr. Berkowitz had no insurance coverage for the Smith v. Berkowitz lawsuit, and had waived all claims against Keystone. By giving up his insurance and claim for breach of contract, he received the promise of confidentiality, avoided future litigation that might result in a judicial rescission at a high cost and on the public record, and received a refund of premiums. Just as the trial court ruled prior to this judgment, this was not a case of fraud, duress or undue influence.
"The purpose of encouraging settlements would be frustrated if a party, following an apparent settlement, could avoid the agreement by instituting and prevailing in further litigation by arguing that the settlement was ineffective because his legal position was sound." See Budget Rent A Car of St. Louis v. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co., 939 S.W.2d 412, 414-15 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996). Dr. Berkowitz (and his assignee Smith) cannot now avoid this Agreement by arguing it was ineffective because Keystone did not have the right to rescind the insurance policy at all.
Next, we find that Smith, the assignee of Dr. Berkowitz, is bound by the settlement Agreement entered into by Dr. Berkowitz. An assignment is the transfer of a cause of action to another, vesting legal title in the assignee, together with the right to maintain an action in his or her own name as the real party in interest. Kroeker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 105, 109-110 (Mo. App. 1971). "The only rights or interests an assignee acquires are those the assignor had at the time the assignment was made. " Renaissance Leasing, LLC v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 322 S.W.3d 112, 128 (Mo. banc 2010) (emphasis added). "If there can be no recovery on the part of the insured, ... there can be no recovery on the part of his assignee, ... who would stand in his shoes."
In Hellmann v. Sparks, 500 S.W.3d 252, 268 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015), an agreement to relocate a community dock was orally rescinded before the rights under the agreement were assigned to the plaintiffs, property owners in a residential subdivision. The Court of Appeals stated:
The trial court's determination that there was no agreement to relocate the community dock was correct because the parties to the original agreement to move the community dock had mutually rescinded that agreement prior to the time the [plaintiffs] received their assignment of [the assignor's] rights under those contracts.
....
At the time the [plaintiffs] purchased the property and [the assignor] made the assignment of his rights under the agreement to relocate the community dock, the agreement to relocate the community dock had already been rescinded.
*284Consequently, it was as if the agreement had never existed, and there was nothing to transfer to the [plaintiffs].
We find Hellman to be instructive in that Dr. Berkowitz's insurance policy with Keystone had been mutually rescinded prior to the time Smith received her assignment of Dr. Berkowitz's rights under the insurance policy. Whereas Dr. Berkowitz had no right to Keystone's coverage and waived any breach of contract claim against Keystone, he could not pass coverage or claims on to Smith. Thus, the trial court erred in refusing to enter a directed verdict in favor of Keystone in Smith's lawsuit. Keystone's first point is granted and the trial court's judgment is reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court enter a directed verdict for Keystone.
Because the trial court must enter a directed verdict in favor of Keystone, we need not discuss Keystone's remaining points on appeal.
Conclusion
We reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Keystone.
Robert M. Clayton III, J., concurs.
Angela T. Quigless, J., concurs.