[Foreperson]: I use[d] the word impasse, but I suppose deadlock is probably the legal term.
According to the court of appeals, that verbal exchange establishes a final resolution of Appellant's guilt as to first-degree burglary.25 We disagree.
As in Blueford , the foreperson here gave no indication that the jury was still unanimous on the charged offense in response to the trial court's question. In fact, shortly before the jury foreman indicated that the jury was at an impasse, the following exchange took place:
[Trial court]: Did you fill out any of the certificates on the Court's Charge?
[Foreperson]: No, sir, because we have no - no decision.
This unambiguously shows that the jury had not made a final decision on any of the charges. If the jury intended for its vote count from the day before to be a final verdict, then it would have clearly stated so. But it did not because, as the foreperson *746conveyed, the jury had not made a final decision.
The court of appeals also failed to fully consider the jury's continued deliberation after the reported vote count. These continued deliberations factored heavily into the Supreme Court's holding in Blueford -even though the jury continued deliberating for only a half hour more-because it gave the jury the opportunity to reconsider its prior vote.26 Here, the jurors continued deliberating for another three-and-a-half hours after the reported vote count, giving them ample time to reconsider their prior vote. Further, the vote count changed on the lesser-included offense from the time the jury sent the note to the time of the verbal exchange the following day. If the vote on the lesser-included offense changed, the vote on the charged offense could have changed too.27
We agree with the State that the jury note here lacks "the finality necessary to constitute an acquittal" on the first-degree burglary offense.28 We disagree with the court of appeals that the facts presented here are significantly distinguishable from Blueford . We hold that the jury note in question did not indicate that the jury had finally resolved to acquit Appellant of the first-degree burglary.
III. Our Precedent Does Not Conflict with Blueford
Though the court of appeals relied primarily upon Blueford in reaching its decision, it did acknowledge that Texas law formally recognizes the existence of informal verdicts.29 Article 37.10(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out in relevant part:
If the verdict of the jury is informal, its attention shall be called to it, and with its consent the verdict may, under the direction of the court, be reduced to the proper form. If the jury refuses to have the verdict altered, it shall again retire to its room to deliberate, unless it manifestly appear that the verdict is intended as an acquittal; and in that case, the judgment shall be rendered accordingly, discharging the defendant.30
*747The court of appeals also detailed several Texas cases in which jury notes regarding the inability to reach a verdict did not demonstrate that the jury had manifested an intent to acquit the defendant under Article 37.10(a).31 Yet, the court of appeals distinguished these cases by noting that they pre-dated, and conflicted with, Blueford .32 We perceive no conflict.
Under Texas law, an informal verdict is "one that does not meet the legal requirements of being written or answered as authorized."33 For a jury note to qualify as an informal verdict of acquittal, we have held that the jury note must also be "plainly intended to operate as an acquittal."34 In State ex rel. Hawthorn v. Giblin , we held that a jury note similar to the one at issue in this case did not qualify as an "informal verdict" under Article 37.10(a).35 In that case, the trial court sent a note to the jury asking about its progress. The jury wrote back that it was unanimous against guilt on attempted murder (the charged offense) but was deadlocked on aggravated assault (the lesser-included offense).36 After determining that further deliberations would be futile, the court ordered a mistrial.
We held that the note in Hawthorn was not an informal verdict because it was not "plainly intended to operate as an acquittal."37 In other words, the jury note did not establish that the jury had finally resolved to acquit the defendant. Given that the jury was merely responding to an inquiry from the trial court and that the jury was obviously deadlocked, we reasoned that the note was "intended merely as reports on the jury's progress toward a verdict."38
Thus, under Texas law we essentially ask the same question that the United States Supreme Court asked in Blueford : Did the jury finally resolve to acquit the defendant? In this case it did not. Because *748the jury did not plainly intend for its progress report to be treated as a verdict, the jury note lacked the "finality necessary to amount to an acquittal" on the charged offense.39
IV. Conclusion
We hold that Appellant's subsequent trial for first-degree burglary does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The jury note was not an informal verdict of acquittal under Texas law because it lacked the "finality necessary to amount to an acquittal" required under Blueford v. Arkansas . We reverse the court of appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment.